Luis Ramos-Romero v. William Barr ( 2019 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-1696
LUIS AMILCAR RAMOS-ROMERO,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Submitted: July 30, 2019 Decided: August 15, 2019
Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Petition dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Sam H. Hasan, HASAN LAW GROUP PLLC, Falls Church, Virginia, for Petitioner.
Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony C. Payne, Assistant Director,
Yedidya Cohen, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Luis Amilcar Ramos-Romero, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for
review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal
from the immigration judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal. For the
reasons set forth below, we dismiss the petition for review.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012), entitled “Denials of discretionary relief,”
“no court shall have jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of relief
under section . . . 1229b,” which is the section governing cancellation of removal. In this
case, the immigration judge found, and the Board agreed, that Ramos-Romero failed to
meet his burden of establishing that his United States citizen children would suffer
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he is returned to El Salvador. * We conclude
that this determination is clearly discretionary in nature, and we therefore lack jurisdiction
to review challenges to this finding absent a colorable constitutional claim or question of
law. See Sattani v. Holder, 749 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding no jurisdiction to
review determination that aliens failed to demonstrate requisite hardship to their U.S.
citizen son); Obioha v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 400, 405 (4th Cir. 2005) (“It is quite clear that
*
Because we can resolve this case by considering the agency’s independent and
dispositive finding that Ramos-Ramero failed to meet his burden of establishing that his
U.S. citizen children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he is
removed to El Salvador, we need not address Ramos-Ramero’s challenges to the
immigration judge’s finding that Ramos-Ramero is, or was, a habitual drunkard. See INS
v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not
required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they
reach.”).
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the gatekeeper provision [of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)] bars our jurisdiction to review a decision
of the [Board] to actually deny a petition for cancellation of removal.”); Okpa v. INS, 266
F.3d 313, 317 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding, under transitional rules, that issue of hardship
is committed to agency discretion and is not subject to appellate review).
After reviewing Ramos-Romero’s challenges to the agency’s finding that he failed
to demonstrate the requisite hardship, we conclude that he fails to raise a colorable
constitutional claim or question of law under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2012). See Gomis
v. Holder, 571 F.3d 353, 358 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[A]bsent a colorable constitutional claim or
question of law, our review of the issue is not authorized by § 1252(a)(2)(D).”). We
therefore lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of Ramos-Romero’s application
for cancellation of removal.
Ramos-Romero also argues that the agency lacked jurisdiction over his removal
proceedings because his notice to appear did not identify a time and date for his initial
hearing. He relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105
(2018) (holding that a notice to appear that fails to designate specific time or place of
removal proceeding does not trigger stop-time rule ending alien’s continuous presence
period for purposes of cancellation of removal). Because Ramos-Ramero did not raise this
claim before the Board, we lack jurisdiction to consider it on the ground that he failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2012); Massis v. Mukasey,
549 F.3d 631, 638-40 (4th Cir. 2008). In any event, Ramos-Ramero’s claim is squarely
foreclosed by our recent decision in United States v. Cortez, __ F.3d __, 2019 WL 3209956,
*5 (4th Cir. July 17, 2019) (No. 19-4055) (holding that the failure of a notice to appear to
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include a date and time for petitioner’s removal hearing “does not implicate the
immigration court’s adjudicatory authority or ‘jurisdiction’”).
Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
PETITION DISMISSED
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