Brotherhood Mutual Insurance C v. Berlette McMillan , 492 F. App'x 389 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1291
BROTHERHOOD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BERLETTE MCMILLAN; RHONDA TABRON, Individually, and as
Parent and Natural Guardian of D.T.; SHANK SHREEVES,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
LATISHA CARTER, Individually, and as Parent and Natural
Guardian of W.C., N.C. and M.C.; RAYANNE CARTER,
Individually, and as Parent and Natural Guardian of C.W. and
C.C.; TANIKIA JONES,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:11-cv-01326-AW)
Submitted: July 13, 2012 Decided: August 1, 2012
Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Dennis F. O’Brien, DENNIS F. O’BRIEN, P.A., Bel Air, Maryland;
Charles G. Monnett, III, CHARLES G. MONNETT III & ASSOCIATES,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellants. Stephen S.
McCloskey, Eric M. Leppo, SEMMES, BOWEN & SEMMES, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
This appeal stems from an interpleader action filed by
Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company (“Brotherhood”). After the
Appellants, among others, were injured in a single-car accident
involving an automobile insured under a policy issued by
Brotherhood, Brotherhood filed an interpleader action in the
district court, depositing $1 million into the court registry
and asking to be released from the case so that the injured
parties could litigate among themselves regarding the proper
apportionment of the insurance payout. The Appellants filed a
declaratory judgment counterclaim, seeking a declaration that
the applicable limit under the relevant business auto insurance
policy (the “Policy”) was $2 million rather than $1 million.
Brotherhood denied the Appellant’s claim, and the Appellants
filed a partial motion for summary judgment while Brotherhood
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the Appellants’
counterclaim.
The district court entered an order denying the
Appellants’ partial motion for summary judgment and granting
Brotherhood’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the
Appellants’ counterclaim, construing the Policy as providing for
only a $1 million aggregate coverage limit per accident,
regardless of whether Brotherhood was required to pay under the
liability insurance coverage provisions or under the
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underinsured motorist coverage provisions. The Appellants noted
an appeal to the district court’s order, * and, having reviewed
the record, we affirm.
The Appellants’ argument on appeal is the same as that
urged in the district court; namely, that because the claimants’
damages exceeded the Policy’s $1 million liability limit, they
may recover up to an additional $1 million under the Policy’s
underinsured motorist coverage provisions. Review of a summary
judgment determination is de novo, and reasonable inferences are
drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
United States v. Bergbauer, 602 F.3d 569, 574 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 297 (2010). The parties agree that the
Policy is governed by Maryland law, under which insurance
contracts are not construed against the insurer except where the
contract’s language is ambiguous. Cheney v. Bell Nat’l Life
Ins. Co., 556 A.2d 1135, 1138 (Md. 1989).
Although the Appellants contend that the pertinent
provisions of the Policy are ambiguous and support a reading in
*
We note that “as a general rule an order granting
interpleader is interlocutory” and therefore unappealable. Ergo
Science, Inc. v. Martin, 73 F.3d 595, 597 (5th Cir. 1996).
Nevertheless, the district court subsequently entered a final
order in this case, rendering the previously-filed notice of
appeal effective to permit this court to exercise its
jurisdiction. In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2005);
Barrett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 95 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1996).
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their favor, our review of the applicable language convinces us
that the Policy straightforwardly precludes Appellants from
recovering any more than a $1 million aggregate sum per
accident, regardless of under which form of coverage they press
their claims. Nor do we deem it necessary, as the Appellants
request, to certify a question of law to the Maryland state
courts prior to reaching this result.
“Where there is no ambiguity in an insurance contract,
the court has no alternative but to enforce the policy’s terms.”
Kendall v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 702 A.2d 767, 773 (Md. 1997).
Accordingly, we deny the Appellants’ request that we certify a
question of law to the Maryland state courts, and we affirm the
district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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