United States v. Derrick Taylor , 670 F. App'x 181 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4100
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DERRICK LAMONT TAYLOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (5:15-cr-00177-H-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2016 Decided: November 14, 2016
Before AGEE, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rudolph A. Ashton, III, DUNN PITTMAN SKINNER & CUSHMAN, PLLC,
New Bern, North Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce,
United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Barbara D.
Kocher, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Derrick Lamont Taylor pleaded guilty to failing to register
under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2250 (2012). The district court imposed a within-
Guidelines 21–month sentence. Taylor appeals, claiming that the
district court’s failure to acknowledge and apply its discretion
to order a sentence concurrent to his state sentence and to set
a start date renders his sentence unreasonable. Finding no
error, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review considers both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id.In assessing procedural reasonableness, we consider factors such
as whether the district court correctly calculated the
Sentencing Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012) factors, and sufficiently explained the sentence imposed.
Id.If no procedural errors exist, we consider the substantive
reasonableness of a sentence, evaluating “the totality of the
circumstances.” Id. The court presumes the reasonableness of
sentences within the Guidelines range. United States v.
Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). This “presumption
can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is
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unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors.” Id.Assessing procedural reasonableness first, we reject both
of Taylor’s arguments. The district court did not err by
failing to acknowledge its discretion to order concurrent
sentences. See United States v. Hayes, 535 F.3d 907, 909-10
(8th Cir. 2008). Moreover, the record reveals that the district
court understood its authority to impose concurrent sentences.
Nor did the court err by omitting a start date from the
judgment. See Hayes, 535 F.3d at 909-10; United States v.
Wells, 473 F.3d 640, 645, 650 (6th Cir. 2007).
To the extent Taylor’s arguments also touch on the
substantive reasonableness of his sentence, we find that, under
the totality of the circumstances, Taylor has not overcome the
presumption of reasonableness afforded his within-Guidelines
sentence. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when imposing Taylor’s sentence.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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