Flood v. New Hanover County ( 1997 )


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  • PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    JULIA FLOOD; DRAKE FOX; ROBERT
    HOWLETT; KATHERINE JOHNSON;
    KAREN KEROACK; ANTHONY MARTIN;
    JAMES MCLEAN;JOHN MCMILLIAN;
    DAVID MILLER; LORA MILLER;
    MICHAEL NAVE; POWELL PHILLIPS;
    BOBBY PIERCE; JACK POPLIN; DAVID
    PRITCHARD; ROBERT PUGH; JOHN
    SCIALES; BRIAN SIMONSON; PAMELA
    STEWART; RONALD WAHAB; STANLEY
    No. 97-1099
    G. WARDRIP, JR.; SHEILA
    YOUNGBLOOD,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    and
    RUSSELL ASHLEY,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    NEW HANOVER COUNTY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.
    James C. Fox, Chief District Judge.
    (CA-96-123-7-F-3)
    Argued: July 15, 1997
    Decided: September 22, 1997
    Before MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge, and BUTZNER and
    PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Murnaghan wrote the opinion,
    in which Senior Judge Butzner and Senior Judge Phillips joined.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Gary Keith Shipman, SHIPMAN & ASSOCIATES,
    L.L.P., Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellants. Andrew William
    Olsen, Assistant County Attorney, OFFICE OF THE COUNTY
    ATTORNEY, Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge:
    Plaintiffs-Appellants, a group of present or former full-time emer-
    gency medical service ("EMS") personnel (collectively, the "Plain-
    tiffs"), filed suit against their employer, Defendant-Appellee New
    Hanover County, North Carolina (the "County") for violations of the
    Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C.A.§§ 210-19 (West
    1965, 1985 & Supp. 1997). The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs'
    claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for fail-
    ure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons
    stated below, we affirm the district court's judgment.
    I.
    The Plaintiffs all work a nine-day regularly recurring cycle of
    24.15 hours on-duty, 24 hours off-duty, 24.15 hours on-duty, 24 hours
    off-duty, 24.15 hours on-duty, followed by 96 consecutive hours off-
    duty. Although their work schedule never changes, they work a differ-
    ent number of total hours each week depending upon the number of
    scheduled work days that fall within the week. Thus, their workweek
    ranges between 48.3 hours, 56.3 hours, 64.45 hours, and 72.45 hours,
    and their amount of overtime consequently ranges between 8.3 hours,
    16.3 hours, 24.45 hours, and 32.45 hours. The County also requires
    the Plaintiffs to attend regularly scheduled shift meetings and continu-
    ing education seminars to maintain their EMS certifications. The
    2
    County compensates the Plaintiffs for the time that they spend at the
    meetings and seminars, and it adds the hours attributable to the meet-
    ings and seminars to the Plaintiffs' regularly scheduled hours for that
    week.
    At all relevant times, the County has compensated the Plaintiffs
    pursuant to a "fluctuating workweek" payment method. That method
    allows employers to compensate employees at a one-half time rate for
    overtime hours, rather than the standard one and one-half time rate,
    if the employment meets certain requirements. See 
    29 C.F.R. § 778.114
     (1996). The County gave each of its employees a memo-
    randum that clearly explained the fluctuating workweek payment
    method and that provided examples of how the County would calcu-
    late employees' salaries pursuant to that method. The County required
    each employee to sign the memorandum under a printed statement
    that reads, "The Fluctuating Work Week 29 C.F.R.§ 778.114 of the
    Fair Labor Standards Act has been explained to me and I have had
    the opportunity to have any questions answered."
    On August 5, 1996, the Plaintiffs filed suit against the County.
    They claimed that the County's compensation plan did not meet the
    requirements of the fluctuating workweek payment method. They
    sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, backpay for unpaid over-
    time compensation, liquidated damages, and attorney's fees. The
    County subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' suit pur-
    suant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
    a claim upon which relief may be granted. The district court granted
    the County's motion to dismiss on the ground that the County's com-
    pensation plan satisfied all of the requirements of the fluctuating
    workweek payment method.
    II.
    We review the district court's decision to grant the motion to dis-
    miss de novo. See Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
    
    85 F.3d 178
    , 181 (4th Cir. 1996). We must accept the factual allega-
    tions in the Plaintiffs' complaint and must construe those facts in the
    light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. See Estate Constr. Co. v. Miller
    & Smith Holding Co., 
    14 F.3d 213
    , 217-18 (4th Cir. 1994). We may
    affirm the district court's dismissal only if it appears beyond doubt
    3
    that the Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim
    that would entitle them to relief. See Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life
    Ins. Co., 
    883 F.2d 324
    , 325 (4th Cir. 1989).
    III.
    As a general rule, the FLSA provides that an employer may not
    employ an employee for a workweek longer than forty hours unless
    it pays its employee one and one-half times the employee's "regular
    rate" for all hours in excess of forty. See 
    29 U.S.C.A. § 207
    (a)(1);
    Monahan v. County of Chesterfield, Virginia, 
    95 F.3d 1263
    , 1267 (4th
    Cir. 1996). The employee's "regular rate" is the hourly rate that the
    employer pays the employee for the normal, nonovertime forty-hour
    workweek. See Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 
    325 U.S. 419
    , 424 (1945). If the employer employs an employee on a
    weekly salary basis, it determines the employee's regular hourly rate
    of pay by dividing the weekly salary by the number of hours that it
    intends the weekly salary to compensate. See 
    29 C.F.R. § 778.113
    (1996).1
    However, the Department of Labor's (the "DOL") implementing
    regulations provide an alternative way for employers to calculate the
    regular rate of pay for certain salaried employees. Section 778.114 of
    the implementing regulations provides that a salaried employee whose
    hours fluctuate from week to week can reach a mutual understanding
    with the employer that he or she will receive a fixed amount of com-
    pensation per week, regardless of the number of hours that the
    employee works in that week, and that he or she additionally will
    receive a rate of fifty percent of the regular hourly pay for any hours
    over forty worked in that week. See 
    29 C.F.R. § 778.114
    (a). The
    employee must clearly understand that the fixed weekly amount com-
    _________________________________________________________________
    1 Thus, the regulations provide that if an employer pays its employee
    $182.70 per week with the understanding that the salary compensates the
    employee for a regular workweek of thirty-five hours, the employee's
    regular rate of pay is $182.70 divided by thirty-five hours, or $5.22 per
    hour. When the employee works overtime, the employer must pay the
    employee $5.22 for each of the first forty hours and $7.83 (one and one-
    half times $5.22) for each additional hour thereafter. See 
    29 C.F.R. § 778.113
    .
    4
    pensates for all of the hours worked in that week, rather than a set
    number of hours as in the case of a regular salaried employee hereto-
    fore described, and that he or she will receive that amount every week
    regardless of whether he or she actually works a long or a short work-
    week. 
    Id.
     The employer calculates the regular hourly pay by dividing
    the employee's fixed weekly pay by the total number of hours that the
    employee worked during the week. Id.2 The fixed amount must be
    sufficient to provide compensation at a regular rate not less than the
    minimum hourly rate, and the overtime premium cannot be less than
    one-half of the regular rate. 
    Id.
     Since the employer has already paid
    the employee a regular rate of pay for all of the hours that the
    employee worked, including the overtime hours, it only has to pay an
    additional one-half time pay premium for the overtime hours. Id.;
    Monahan, 
    95 F.3d at 1280-81
    .
    Thus, under the "mathematical payment structure provided under
    [the fluctuating workweek] method of overtime compensation, the
    more the employee works and the more overtime the employee logs,
    the less he or she is paid for each additional hour of overtime."
    Monahan, 
    95 F.3d at 1280
    . However, section 778.114 does not repre-
    sent an "exception" to FLSA. It merely provides an alternative means
    by which an employer can determine its employees' regular and over-
    time rate of pay. See Bailey v. County of Georgetown, 
    94 F.3d 152
    ,
    154-55 n.5 (4th Cir. 1996).
    Here, the County pays the Plaintiffs pursuant to the fluctuating
    workweek payment method. The starting salary for EMS personnel is
    _________________________________________________________________
    2 Thus, the regulations provide that if an employer pays its employee
    $250.00 per week with the understanding that the salary compensates the
    employee for all hours that the employee works each week, and the
    employee works forty-four hours in one particular week, the employee's
    regular rate of pay is $250.00 divided by forty-four hours, or $5.68 per
    hour. The employer must pay the employee $261.36[$250.00 fixed sal-
    ary plus $11.36 (one-half times $5.68 for each of the four hours of over-
    time)] for that forty-four hour week. When the employee works fifty
    hours in one particular week, the employee's regular rate of pay is
    $250.00 divided by fifty hours, or $5.00 per hour. The employer must
    pay the employee $275 [$250.00 fixed salary plus $25.00 (one-half times
    $5.00 for each of the ten hours of overtime)] for that week. See 
    29 C.F.R. § 778.114
    (b).
    5
    $18,574. The employee therefore receives a fixed, weekly salary of
    $357.20 ($18,574 divided by fifty-two weeks) regardless of the num-
    ber of hours that the employee works in any particular week. Pursuant
    to section 778.114, the County then adds fifty percent of the employ-
    ee's regular rate of pay for each hour over forty that the employee
    works. The County determines the employee's regular hourly rate by
    dividing the fixed, weekly amount by the total number of hours that
    the employee works in a particular week. The County undisputedly
    calculates the Plaintiffs' salaries correctly pursuant to the section
    778.114 method. The Plaintiffs argue, however, that the County must
    pay them the standard overtime rate of one and one-half times their
    regular rate because it does not meet the requirements of section
    778.114.
    The language of section 778.114 suggests that an employer must
    meet the following requirements before it can pay an employee pursu-
    ant to the fluctuating workweek method: 1) the employee's hours
    must fluctuate from week to week; 2) the employee must receive a
    fixed weekly salary that remains the same regardless of the number
    of hours that the employee works during the week; 3) the fixed
    amount must be sufficient to provide compensation at a regular rate
    not less than the legal minimum wage; 4) the employer and the
    employee must have a clear, mutual understanding that the employer
    will pay the employee the fixed weekly salary regardless of the hours
    worked; and 5) the employee must receive a fifty percent overtime
    premium in addition to the fixed weekly salary for all hours that the
    employee works in excess of forty during that week. See 
    29 C.F.R. § 778.114
    ; Condo v. Sysco Corp., 
    1 F.3d 599
    , 601-02 (7th Cir. 1993).
    The Plaintiffs argue that the County may not use the fluctuating
    workweek method because their hours do not "fluctuate" from week
    to week. Although the Plaintiffs admittedly work different hours
    every week, i.e., either 48.3, 56.3, 64.45, or 72.45 hours, they contend
    that their hours do not fluctuate because they work pursuant to a writ-
    ten, fixed, regular, repeating, and perpetual schedule. They would
    define the term "fluctuate" in section 778.114 as a requirement of
    utter unpredictability. According to the Plaintiffs, an employee's
    hours only fluctuate if the employee works different hours every week
    and the employer does not set a fixed, predictable schedule.
    6
    However, the agency charged with administering the FLSA has
    rejected the Plaintiffs' argument. The Wage and Hour Division of the
    DOL has clearly stated its view that section 778.114 does not require
    an unpredictable schedule. In a letter ruling, the DOL determined that
    an employer could use the fluctuating workweek method to pay
    employees who worked alternating forty-three and fifty-one hour
    workweeks pursuant to a fixed schedule. See DOL Administrative
    Letter Ruling of May 18, 1966, reprinted in Gilbert J. Ginsburg, et
    al., Fair Labor Standards Handbook app. III at 104 (1996). The DOL
    noted that although employers generally utilize the fluctuating work-
    week method when their employees work "a varying or irregular
    number of hours in a workweek," the fixed, alternating workweeks in
    that case met the requirements of section 778.114. Id. at 105.
    Although the DOL's letter ruling does not bind the Court, it does
    "constitute `a body of experienced and informed judgment,'" and we
    give it substantial weight. Schultz v. W.R. Hartin & Son, Inc., 
    428 F.2d 186
    , 191 (4th Cir. 1970) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
    323 U.S. 134
    , 140 (1944)).
    The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
    has also rejected the Plaintiffs' argument. In Roy v. County of Lexing-
    ton, South Carolina, 
    948 F.Supp. 529
    , 531 (D.S.C. 1996), the plain-
    tiffs, current and former EMS employees, worked a three-day
    regularly recurring cycle of 24.5 hours on-duty followed by 47.5
    hours off-duty. The court held that the employees' hours "fluctuated"
    for the purposes of section 778.114 even though the employees
    worked under a regular, perpetual schedule. The court explained:
    The employees . . . argue that § 778.114 is not applicable
    because the workweek did not "fluctuate" for purposes of
    the regulation. As they note, they worked on a regularly
    recurring three-day cycle of twenty-four and one-half hours
    on and forty-seven and one-half hours off. Thus, even
    though the regular hours they worked in a week were not the
    same, their regular hours over a period of weeks were pre-
    dictable, and they could rely on the cycle to determine when
    they would work on any particular date in the future.
    However, the fact that the cycle recurs does not mean that
    the hours do not fluctuate. It is not necessary for regular
    hours to be sporadic for the regulation to be applied; it is
    7
    sufficient that the regular hours vary from one workweek to
    another, as they do here. The Court therefore rejects this
    argument.
    Id. at 531 n.1 (emphasis added).3
    We similarly reject the Plaintiffs' argument. Even though the Plain-
    tiffs work pursuant to a fixed schedule, their hours fluctuate, i.e., they
    vary, from workweek to workweek. Therefore, since the Plaintiffs'
    hours fluctuate, the County pays them a fixed weekly salary of
    $357.20 regardless of the number of hours that they work, and the
    County undisputedly satisfies the other requirements of section
    778.114, the district court correctly dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit. The
    Plaintiffs alleged no claim upon which relief may be granted.
    IV.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment.
    AFFIRMED
    _________________________________________________________________
    3 But see Burgess v. Catawba County, 
    805 F.Supp. 341
    , 348 (W.D.N.C.
    1992) (noting in dicta that an EMS employee's hours did not fluctuate
    for the purposes of section 778.114 when he worked a regular schedule
    of twenty-four hours on-duty followed by forty-eight hours off-duty).
    8