Harvinderjit Sahi v. Loretta Lynch ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1173
HARVINDERJIT SINGH SAHI,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: May 29, 2015 Decided: June 9, 2015
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Harvinderjit Singh Sahi, Petitioner Pro Se. Sheri Robyn Glaser,
Benjamin C. Mizer, Ernesto Horacio Molina, Jr., Office of
Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Harvinderjit Singh Sahi, a native and citizen of India,
petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the immigration
judge’s denial of his requests for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). We have thoroughly reviewed the record, including the
various documentary exhibits relevant to communal violence, and
the transcript of Sahi’s merits hearing. We conclude that
substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision. INS v.
Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (stating standard of
review).
Regarding Sahi’s claim that he suffered past persecution,
the record does not compel the conclusion that the Indian
government and the police were consistently unable or unwilling
to intervene when Sahi was the victim of communal violence. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder,
632 F.3d 117, 128 (4th Cir. 2011). As the Board noted, Sahi
never reported any of the incidents of alleged persecution to
the police. See, e.g., Mulyani v. Holder, 771 F.3d 190, 198–99
(4th Cir. 2014) (where the petitioner’s claim was undermined by
her failure to contact the police or any other government
authority). Moreover, Sahi submitted no evidence corroborating
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his belief that Indian police are ineffective at investigating
religious violence or are somehow complicit in that violence.
Further, the record does not compel the conclusion that
Sahi’s fear that he will be persecuted if he returns to India is
objectively reasonable or that it is more likely than not that
he will be tortured after his return. Sahi cannot meet either
the subjective or objective component of this standard. See
Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 2004). Sahi’s
subjective fear of persecution is undermined by his decision to
return to India twice after visits to the United States. See,
e.g., Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 977 (10th Cir. 2011)
(where return trips to the petitioner’s home country undermined
her claim that she had a subjective fear of persecution).
Moreover, as we have noted, the independent evidence submitted
by Sahi does not suggest that police are unwilling or unable to
intervene, to investigate, or to make arrests in instances of
religious violence.
Because substantial evidence supports the finding that Sahi
did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution, we will not disturb the Board’s decisions regarding
Sahi’s petition for asylum or withholding of removal. See Yi Ni
v. Holder, 613 F.3d 415, 427 (4th Cir. 2010) (reiterating the
rule that, because withholding of removal requires a higher
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burden of proof, “an applicant who is ineligible for asylum is
necessarily ineligible for withholding of removal”).
We also will not disturb the Board’s decision regarding
Sahi’s request for protection under the CAT. To qualify for
that protection, a petitioner must show that it is more likely
than not he would be tortured upon return to his home country,
and that torture would be with the acquiescence of a public
official. Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 2012).
As we have noted, Sahi has not shown that the communal violence
he suffered, or that he fears suffering on return to India,
occurred or would occur with the acquiescence of a public
official.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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