United States v. Latroy Dugger , 665 F. App'x 281 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4153
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LATROY KRISHAWAN DUGGER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan,
District Judge. (4:06-cr-00028-FL-1)
Submitted: November 18, 2016 Decided: December 13, 2016
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Latroy Krishawan Dugger appeals the 46-month sentence
imposed following the revocation of his supervised release term.
On appeal, Dugger asserts that his sentence was plainly
procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to
adequately explain its reasons for rejecting his sentencing
arguments in support of a downward variance. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
A district court has “broad discretion” in imposing a
sentence after revoking a defendant’s supervised release.
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010).
We will affirm a revocation sentence that is within the
applicable statutory maximum and not “plainly unreasonable.”
United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir.) (internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 494 (2015).
To determine whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we must first assess the sentence for procedural
and substantive unreasonableness, considering the same general
principles utilized in review of original sentences. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir. 2006). In so
doing, we assume “a more deferential appellate posture” than
that employed in review of original sentences. Padgett, 788
F.3d at 373 (internal quotation marks omitted). Only if we find
the revocation sentence unreasonable need we determine whether
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it is “plainly” so. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 657
(4th Cir. 2007).
A sentencing court generally must provide an
“individualized assessment justifying the sentence imposed and
rejection of arguments for a higher or lower sentence based on
[18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)].” United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d
572, 584 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The court “need not robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every
subsection” in explaining the sentence it imposes, “particularly
when imposing a within-Guidelines sentence.” United States v.
Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 395 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). However, if the defendant has presented
“nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence than
that set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge
should address the party’s arguments and explain why he has
rejected those arguments.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court’s explanation for its sentence must be
adequate to “demonstrate that it considered the parties’
arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal
decisionmaking authority.” Lynn, 592 F.3d at 576 (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted). In the revocation context,
the court’s statement of reasons need not be as specific or as
detailed as that required in imposing an original sentence, “but
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it still must provide a statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“Chapter Seven instructs that, in fashioning a revocation
sentence, the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s
breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree,
the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal
history of the violator.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638,
641 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court also should consider, among other factors, “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant,” as well as the need for the sentence “to
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct” and “to protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(B), (C); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012)
(enumerating applicable sentencing factors). Even where the
court’s explanation is brief, “[t]he context surrounding a
district court’s explanation may imbue it with enough content
for us to evaluate both whether the court considered the
§ 3553(a) factors and whether it did so properly.” United
States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 381 (4th Cir. 2006); see
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude the court
provided an adequate explanation to support Dugger’s revocation
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sentence. As Dugger acknowledges, the court’s statements at the
close of the hearing evidence its consideration of counsel’s
sentencing arguments and Dugger’s allocution. While the court’s
explanation was brief, its comments during the hearing
adequately expressed its contemplation of the applicable
§ 3553(a) factors when rejecting Dugger’s arguments for a
variance. The court appropriately emphasized the significant
breach of trust produced by Dugger’s return to the drug
trafficking conduct underlying his original offense. The court
demonstrated its consideration of Dugger’s offense, history, and
characteristics by observing that Dugger had not reformed his
conduct, despite his advancing age and family support. In light
of the significant deference accorded a district court when
imposing a revocation sentence, see Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547,
we conclude these statements articulated sufficient support for
the court’s determination that Dugger’s conduct warranted a
sentence within the policy statement range.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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