United States v. Muttaqin Abdullah , 666 F. App'x 304 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4397
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MUTTAQIN F. ABDULLAH, a/k/a King, a/k/a Clayton Montray
Pinckney,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior
District Judge. (3:05-cr-00014-MBS-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2016 Decided: December 16, 2016
Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Parks N. Small, Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Beth Drake, Acting United States
Attorney, Jimmie Ewing, Robert Frank Daley, Jr., Assistant
United States Attorneys, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Muttaqin F. Abdullah appeals from the sentence imposed
after he was resentenced for his conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. At resentencing, the court imposed a
term of imprisonment of time served and a three-year term of
supervised release. On appeal, Abdullah contends that the court
erred in imposing supervised release because he had already
served nearly a year and a half more than the statutory maximum
term of imprisonment.
Abdullah argues that the district court did not have the
authority to impose a sentence above the total maximum combined
sentences for term of imprisonment and supervised release. He
suggests that if this court does find a term of supervised
release to be available, that the three-year term is an
unreasonable sentence. Because Abdullah was resentenced under
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (2012), the imposition of supervised
release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2012) became discretionary.
We review questions of law de novo. United States v. Strieper,
666 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 2012). The district court’s
imposition of a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
Abdullah acknowledges that the Supreme Court has held that
“[s]upervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct
from those served by incarceration” and that “[t]he objectives
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of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time
were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release.” United
States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). In Johnson, the
Court considered whether the defendant was entitled to a
reduction in the term of his supervised release to compensate
him for two and a half years of time served over what was
available after some of his convictions were invalidated. The
Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (2012) did not entitle the
defendant to credit based on over service of an original term of
imprisonment, stating that § 3624(e) “does not reduce the length
of a supervised release term by reason of excess time served in
prison.” Johnson, 529 U.S. at 60.
Abdullah contends, however, that to impose a sentence in
excess of the statutory maximums for term of imprisonment and
supervised release violates Congress’s intent in creating
maximum sentences. Abdullah posits that his case differs from
Johnson in that, in Johnson, the defendant would never serve the
maximum statutory sentence even if his supervised release was
revoked. Here, if Abdullah’s supervised release were ever to be
revoked, and he served the maximum three years, he would serve 1
year, 4 months, and 27 days over the statutory maximum sentence
of ten years and three supervised release years. This
assertion, however, ignores that Johnson compels the conclusion
that the initial term of imprisonment and subsequent term of
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supervised release are separate sentences and not conglomerated
or subject to being served concurrently.
We have confirmed since Johnson that a supervised release
term consecutive to a term of imprisonment cannot be served
concurrently to a term of imprisonment because the purpose of
supervised release is different from that of incarceration. See
United States v. Neuhauser, 745 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 2014)
(evaluating whether civil confinement after criminal sentence
completed counted toward supervised release term); United States
v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 451 (4th Cir. 2011) (considering
tolling of supervised release while defendant absconded).
Abdullah’s term of supervised release cannot begin until he
is released from confinement. Thus it is not possible to
consider the initial term of imprisonment to fulfill at least a
portion of the supervised release term because the supervised
release term was not yet ripe. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 57(“the ordinary, commonsense meaning of release is to be freed
from confinement”); Neuhauser, 745 F.3d at 129 (“supervised
release has no statutory function until confinement ends”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Abdullah does not challenge the three-year supervised
release term on any basis other than it is an invalid option, or
at least is unavailable for the period of time that his sentence
was overserved. We conclude, however, that the district court
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did not abuse its discretion in imposing the three-year term of
supervised release in light of Abdullah’s threatening
communication, during his initial sentencing, of the court and
murder victim’s family, and his numerous assaults and offenses
while in prison, including threatening and assaulting correction
officers.
Accordingly, we affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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