Clive Pettis, Sr. v. Nottoway County School Board , 592 F. App'x 158 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1192
CLIVE C. PETTIS, SR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
NOTTOWAY COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD; DANIEL J. GROUNARD,
Individually and in his official capacity as Division
Superintendent, Nottoway County Schools,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
HELEN SIMMONS, Individually and in her official capacity as
a duly elected Member of the Nottoway School Board; WALLACE
HURT, Individually and in his official capacity as a duly
elected Member of the Nottoway School Board; ROBERT HORN,
Individually and in his official capacity as a duly elected
Member of the Nottoway School Board; JACQUELINE HAWKES,
Individually and in her official capacity as a duly elected
Member of the Nottoway School Board; SHELLI HINTON,
Individually and in her official capacity as a duly elected
Member of the Nottoway School Board,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:12-cv-00864-HEH-DJN)
Submitted: October 31, 2014 Decided: November 13, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
JeRoyd W. Greene, III, ROBINSON AND GREENE, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellant. R. Craig Wood, Melissa Wolf Riley, MCGUIREWOODS
LLP, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Clive C. Pettis, Sr., appeals the district court’s
order denying his motion for summary judgment and granting
summary judgment for the Nottoway County School Board and its
superintendent, Daniel J. Grounard (collectively, “Defendants”)
and its order denying Pettis’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion to
alter or amend the judgment. Pettis alleges that his employment
contract was not renewed on the basis of his race and in
retaliation for his complaints of discrimination, in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). Finding no error in the district
court’s orders, we affirm.
We review de novo whether a district court erred in
granting summary judgment, viewing the facts and drawing all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710 F.3d 209, 213 (4th
Cir. 2013). When reviewing an appeal from cross-motions for
summary judgment, however, we separately review the merits of
each motion, taking care to resolve all factual disputes and
competing rational inferences in favor of the party opposing
that motion, to ascertain whether “either of the parties
deserves judgment as a matter of law.” Rossignol v. Voorhaar,
316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
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omitted). Summary judgment is properly granted “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Where, as here, a plaintiff does not allege direct
evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff asserting racial
discrimination may avoid summary judgment by proceeding under
the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). ∗ To demonstrate a prima
facie case of discrimination under that framework, a plaintiff
must show that: he is a member of a protected class; he suffered
an adverse employment action; at the time of the action, he was
performing his job satisfactorily; and similarly situated
employees outside the protected class were treated more
favorably. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354
F.3d 277, 285 (4th. Cir. 2004).
We conclude that Pettis failed to establish that he
was performing his job satisfactorily at the time his contract
was not renewed. Grounard received complaints from coworkers
and Pettis’ supervisor about his interactions with them and his
failures to satisfactorily perform his required tasks. During
∗
The elements of a discrimination claim are identical under
the three statutes from which Pettis’ claims arise. Love-Lane
v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 2004).
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meetings with Grounard and other School Board employees, Pettis
was insubordinate. Pettis received numerous warnings and
discipline about these issues but failed to improve his
performance.
Next, Pettis argues that the district court ignored
his most recent complaints of harassment when it concluded that
he failed to establish a necessary element of his retaliation
claim. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in protected
activity; (2) an adverse employment action was taken against
him; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected
activity and the employment action. Holland v. Wash. Homes,
Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 218 (4th Cir. 2007).
We conclude that Pettis’ vague complaints of
harassment are not protected activity. Protected activity
includes both participation and opposition activity. Kubicko v.
Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 1999). A
complaint is protected as opposition activity if it is a
response to an employment practice that is, or that the
plaintiff reasonably believes is, unlawfully discriminatory.
Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 338-39 (4th Cir. 2006).
Pettis could not reasonably believe, nor did he at the relevant
time ever assert, that his employer’s actions were unlawfully
discriminatory.
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We further find that Pettis fails to establish a
causal connection between his only protected activity — filing
an EEOC complaint — and the nonrenewal of his contract. “[A]
causal connection for purposes of demonstrating a prima facie
case exists where the employer takes adverse employment action
against an employee shortly after learning of the protected
activity.” Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.
2004). However, the temporal nexus between two events cannot
provide proof of causation unless the “temporal proximity
between an employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an
adverse employment action” was “very close.” Clark Cnty. Sch.
Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Pettis’ EEOC complaint was
filed nearly four years before his contract was not renewed.
While other relevant evidence may be used to support a claim of
causal connection where temporal proximity is lacking, Lettieri
v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 (4th Cir. 2007), Pettis has
failed to proffer any such evidence.
Finally, Pettis challenges the district court’s denial
of his Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend. We review for abuse
of discretion. Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 220 (4th
Cir. 2014). A district court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion “if
the movant shows either (1) an intervening change in the
controlling law, (2) new evidence that was not available at
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trial, or (3) that there has been a clear error of law or a
manifest injustice.” Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d
403, 407 (4th Cir. 2010).
We find no abuse of discretion here. Although Pettis
disputed the district court’s substantive rulings on his claims,
“mere disagreement does not support a Rule 59(e) motion.”
Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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