United States v. Mark Lomax ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5089
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARK LOMAX,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, Senior District
Judge. (1:10-cr-00145-WMN-1)
Submitted: August 23, 2012 Decided: August 30, 2012
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Lauren E. Case, Staff
Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Debra L. Dwyer, Assistant
United States Attorney, Gerald A. A. Collins, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Mark Lomax of three counts of
interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of the Hobbs
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006). The district court sentenced
Lomax to 240 months’ imprisonment. Lomax timely appealed,
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions, two supplemental jury instructions given by the
district court, and the procedural reasonableness of his
sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
Lomax first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions. We review challenges to sufficiency
of evidence de novo. United States v. Roe, 606 F.3d 180, 186
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 617 (2010). We are obliged
to sustain a guilty verdict that, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, is supported by
substantial evidence. United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377,
385 (4th Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence in the context of a
criminal action is evidence that a reasonable finder of fact
could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion
of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States
v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
A defendant bringing a sufficiency challenge bears a
“heavy burden.” United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239, 1245 (4th
Cir. 1995). In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, we do
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not review the credibility of witnesses, and we assume the jury
resolved all contradictions in favor of the Government. United
States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245 (4th Cir. 2007). “Reversal
for insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case ‘where
the prosecution’s failure is clear.’” United States v. Beidler,
110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978)).
The Hobbs Act makes it a crime to commit robbery or
extortion to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce or the movement
of any commodity in commerce. “A Hobbs Act violation requires
proof of two elements: (1) the underlying robbery or extortion
crime, and (2) an effect on interstate commerce.” United States
v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 353 (4th Cir. 2003). We have
reviewed the record and conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to support Lomax’s convictions. To the extent Lomax
requests that we overrule the minimal effects test regarding the
impact on interstate commerce, we reject his request. United
States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 486 n.8 (4th Cir. 2002) (a panel
of this court cannot overrule a decision of a prior panel).
Lomax next asserts that the district court erred in
giving two supplemental instructions to the jury. The initial
jury instructions included a redacted version of § 1951(a), with
references to extortion and the potential punishment for
violation of the statute removed. After the jury twice
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requested a complete copy of the statute, the district court
gave the jury a copy of § 1951 with only the potential term of
imprisonment redacted. The district court also provided the
jury with a definition of “interstate commerce” from Black’s Law
Dictionary after the jury asked for a definition of the term
three times. Lomax argues that these two supplemental
instructions were unfairly prejudicial.
“[T]he necessity, extent, and character of any
supplemental instructions to the jury are matters within the
sound discretion of the district court” and should be reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d
212, 219 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). We review the decision to give an
instruction and the instruction itself for abuse of discretion.
Foster, 507 F.3d at 244. When evaluating the adequacy of
supplemental jury instructions given in response to a question
asked by the jury during deliberations, we consider “whether the
court addressed the jury’s inquiry fairly and accurately without
creating prejudice.” United States v. Martinez, 136 F.3d 972,
977 (4th Cir. 1998). Because we conclude that the district
court’s supplemental instructions addressed the jury’s inquiries
without prejudicing Lomax, we find that the district court did
not abuse its discretion.
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Lomax also challenges his sentence as procedurally
unreasonable. We review a sentence for reasonableness under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). A sentence is procedurally
reasonable if, among other requirements, the court sufficiently
explains its reasons for imposing it. United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). The district court must
provide “an individualized assessment based on the particular
facts of the case before it.” Id. at 330 (internal quotation
marks omitted). While every sentence requires an adequate
explanation, when the district court imposes a sentence within
the Guidelines range, “the explanation need not be elaborate or
lengthy.” United States v. Hernandez, 603 F.3d 267, 271 (4th
Cir. 2010).
Lomax argues that due to his turbulent childhood,
substance abuse, and current medical status, a variance below
the Guidelines was appropriate. The district court declined to
vary downward. Lomax contends that the district court did not
provide an adequate explanation for its refusal. The
“individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy, but
it must provide a rationale tailored to the particular case at
hand and adequate to permit ‘meaningful appellate review.’”
Carter, 564 F.3d at 330 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). The
district court considered the parties’ arguments, including
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Lomax’s contention that his childhood, history of substance
abuse, and medical status warranted a variance. It explained
that Lomax’s crimes were a danger to the community and that his
medical status did not warrant a departure from the suggested
Guidelines range. Our review of the record leads us to conclude
that the district court provided an adequate explanation of
Lomax’s sentence and did not abuse its discretion in imposing
its chosen sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm Lomax’s convictions and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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