Yun Wang v. Eric Holder, Jr. , 493 F. App'x 476 ( 2012 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-1659
    YUN WANG,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals.
    Submitted:    August 7, 2012                 Decided:   August 22, 2012
    Before KING, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Petition dismissed in part and granted in          part;   vacated   and
    remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Yun Wang, Petitioner Pro Se.      Lindsay Corliss, Office of
    Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
    Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Yun        Wang,     a    native       and    citizen      of    the     People’s
    Republic of China, petitions for review of an order of the Board
    of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing her appeal from the
    immigration judge’s order denying her applications for asylum,
    withholding       of    removal        and    withholding         under     the    Convention
    Against    Torture        (“CAT”).           While       we    conclude     that    we     lack
    jurisdiction to review the denial of asylum, because the record
    compels a finding that Wang established a well founded fear of
    persecution, we grant in part the petition for review, vacate
    the Board’s order and remand for further proceedings.
    We note that we are without jurisdiction to review the
    Board’s    determination             that    Wang’s      asylum    application       was    not
    timely.     See Gomis v. Holder, 
    571 F.3d 353
    , 358-59 (4th Cir.
    2009).    We further note that Wang fails to make a constitutional
    challenge or raise a question of law regarding the denial of
    asylum.
    While        this        court    does       not    have      jurisdiction      to
    consider the denial of Wang’s untimely application for asylum,
    we retain jurisdiction to consider the denial of her request for
    withholding of removal as this claim is not subject to the one-
    year limitation bar.                 See 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.4
    (a) (2012).                       The
    current state of the law regarding this court’s review of a
    final     order        denying       withholding         of     removal      was    recently
    2
    summarized in Djadjou v. Holder, 
    662 F.3d 265
    , 272-74 (4th Cir.
    2011).      In order to qualify for withholding of removal, the
    alien must show that there is a clear probability of persecution
    on account of a protected ground, such as political opinion or
    religious belief.        See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3)(A) (2006); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b)(1)(i) (2012).             A showing of past persecution on
    account of a protected ground creates a rebuttable presumption
    that     the    threat     would     recur       upon     removal.             
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b)(1)(i).
    If the alien fails to show past persecution, she can
    establish entitlement to relief if she shows that it is more
    likely than not that she will be persecuted on account of a
    protected       ground     if      removed        to     her     country.                
    Id.,
    § 1208.16(b)(2) (2012).          This may require some showing that the
    alien herself will be singled out for persecution.                             See Cruz-
    Lopez v. INS, 
    802 F.2d 1518
    , 1520-21 (4th Cir. 1986).                              She can
    also   show     entitlement     to   relief      by    showing    that    there          is   a
    pattern or practice of persecution of persons similarly situated
    to   her   on    account   of   a    protected         ground    and    that       her    own
    inclusion with such persons makes it more likely than not that
    her life or freedom would be threatened upon return.                               
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b)(2)(i),        (ii).       If       the    alien    meets    her        burden,
    withholding of removal is mandatory.
    3
    When the Board adopts the immigration judge’s decision
    and includes its own reasons for affirming, this court reviews
    both decisions.         This court will uphold the Board’s decision
    unless it is manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of
    discretion.       The standard of review of the agency’s findings is
    narrow    and     deferential.           Factual      findings     are     affirmed   if
    supported by substantial evidence.                    Substantial evidence exists
    to   support    a   finding     unless     the     evidence      was    such   that   any
    reasonable adjudicator would have been compelled to conclude to
    the contrary.        See Djadjou, 
    662 F.3d at 272-74
     (case citations
    omitted).
    Because the immigration judge did not make an adverse
    credibility       finding,     it   is   presumed       Wang    testified      credibly.
    See 8     U.S.C.§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)             (2006);       Marynenka    v.   Holder,
    
    592 F.3d 594
    , 599-601 & n.* (4th Cir. 2010).
    The immigration judge found Wang did not meet the well
    founded    fear     standard    necessary        to    establish       eligibility    for
    asylum.     The immigration judge properly noted that if Wang could
    not establish the well founded fear standard she could also not
    establish the more stringent standard necessary to be eligible
    for withholding of removal.               The general rule is that one who
    does not meet the standard for asylum is necessarily ineligible
    for withholding of removal.              Yi Ni v. Holder, 
    613 F.3d 415
    , 427
    (4th Cir. 2010).        Because the immigration judge found Wang did
    4
    not establish a well founded fear necessary for asylum, she did
    not determine whether Wang met the more stringent standard for
    withholding of removal.
    We conclude that substantial evidence does not support
    the immigration judge’s findings and that the record compels a
    finding       that     Wang     established          a     well     founded      fear      of
    persecution.         Thus, we vacate the Board’s order and remand for a
    determination         of   whether         Wang      met     the       requirements        for
    withholding of removal.
    Initially,        we     conclude       that       substantial     evidence
    supports      the    finding     that      Wang     did    not     establish     that      she
    suffered past persecution because of her Falun Gong practice.
    Her   three-day       detention      and    beating        during      her   interrogation
    that did not result in significant injury was insufficient to
    compel    a   finding      of   past    persecution.             See    Qiao   Hua    Li    v.
    Gonzales, 
    405 F.3d 171
    , 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Dandan v.
    Ashcroft,      
    339 F.3d 567
    ,     573       (7th    Cir.     2003));     see     also
    Kondakova v. Ashcroft, 
    383 F.3d 792
    , 797 (8th Cir. 2004). 1
    1
    We note that the immigration judge found “[t]here was no
    medical attention required” after Wang was released from
    detention, having suffered a bleeding mouth, swollen face and
    bruises on her legs and arms.      (A.R. at 82).   Wang credibly
    testified, however, that she did need to go to the doctor after
    her release, but could not afford it. (A.R. at 106).
    5
    On the other hand, we conclude that Wang established
    both the subjective and objective components necessary for the
    well founded fear analysis.               “The subjective component can be
    met through the presentation of candid, credible, and sincere
    testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution. . . .
    [It] must have some basis in the reality of the circumstances
    and be validated with specific, concrete facts . . . and it
    cannot be mere irrational apprehension.”                 Qiao Hua Li, 
    405 F.3d at 176
     (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).                        The
    objective element requires a showing of specific, concrete facts
    that would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances to
    fear persecution.        Gandziami–Mickhou v. Gonzales, 
    445 F.3d 351
    ,
    353 (4th Cir. 2006).
    To     demonstrate     that    a     fear   is    well   founded,   the
    applicant must show that her persecutor is or could become aware
    of a disfavored belief or characteristic.                      Hongsheng Leng v.
    Mukasey, 
    528 F.3d 135
    , 142 (2d Cir. 2008).                   An alien can do this
    by offering evidence that she will be singled out or that there
    is   a   pattern    or   practice     of       persecuting     persons   similarly
    situated to the alien.       
    Id.
    Because it is presumed that Wang testified credibly,
    she established the subjective component of the well founded
    fear analysis.        See Zhou v. Gonzales, 
    437 F.3d 860
    , 867 (9th
    Cir. 2006); Zhao v. Gonzales, 
    404 F.3d 295
    , 307 (5th Cir. 2005).
    6
    Wang’s credible testimony, supporting affidavits and
    objective       evidence     showed     the       following:           Falun    Gong       is   a
    practice that is labeled a cult and outlawed in China.                               Wang is
    a Falun Gong practitioner who was detained for three days and
    beaten after being arrested for handing out Falun Gong fliers.
    In order to be released from detention, she agreed to spy on
    Falun Gong members.            After her release, authorities came to the
    family house threatening her mother.                   However, Wang was already
    in hiding at a relative’s house and stayed there until she left
    China for the United States, arriving in April 2004.                                In 2008,
    her father was detained for two weeks after authorities learned
    Wang was practicing Falun Gong in the United States.                                We submit
    this     evidence       shows    that     Wang        is    a     known        Falun       Gong
    practitioner, that she was arrested for handing out Falun Gong
    fliers    and    that    she    left    China       after   agreeing           to    spy    for
    authorities.          After considering this evidence along with the
    objective record evidence, we are compelled to find that Wang
    has a well founded fear that she will be targeted when she
    returns.
    The       immigration      judge       noted    that        Wang    could       not
    testify    as    to    how   Chinese     authorities            were    aware       that    she
    continued her practice in the United States.                            Given that Wang
    testified credibly about the reasons for her father’s detention
    and her testimony on this issue is supported by her mother’s
    7
    affidavit, we conclude it was speculative and unreasonable for
    the    immigration         judge    to    believe       that     Wang   should          know   how
    authorities came to learn she practiced Falun Gong in the United
    States.
    The immigration judge also found it significant that
    four years passed between Wang’s detention and 2004 exit from
    China and her father’s 2008 detention.                              While the passage of
    time    may     be   relevant      in     considering      whether          authorities        are
    still    targeting         a     particular    alien,          in    this     instance,        the
    immigration judge failed to consider that authorities did indeed
    target Wang soon after her release from detention and then had
    to learn that Wang left China for the United States and that she
    continued her practice after she arrived.
    The State Department’s 2008 Human Rights Report for
    China     and      the     2007    Profile    of        Asylum       Claims       and    Country
    Conditions for China show that Falun Gong practitioners, from
    high level leaders to private practitioners, stand a risk of
    being    persecuted         by    being    sent    to    reeducation          through      labor
    camps, psychiatric hospitals or imprisonment.                           This is contrary
    to the immigration judge’s conclusion that Wang does not have a
    well founded fear because she is not a well known Falun Gong
    activist      or     a   person    who    holds     a    position       in    a    Falun       Gong
    organization.            According to the Human Rights Report, in has been
    reported that since 1999, 100,000 Falun Gong practitioners have
    8
    been sentenced to labor camps and 3000 persons have died from
    being tortured.        While the objective evidence indicates that the
    range of sanctions goes from a fine or loss of employment to
    something more severe, such as detention in a labor camp, Wang
    was previously detained for handing out Falun Gong fliers, told
    authorities      she       would   spy     for     them,       and   then     continued
    practicing Falun Gong once she arrived in the United States.                          It
    is reasonable to assume she might face a more severe sanction if
    she were to return to China.                See Shan Zhu Qiu v. Holder, 
    611 F.3d 403
    , 408 (7th Cir. 2010) (State Department reports show a
    progressive discipline system for Falun Gong practitioners and
    that the punishment stops when the alien ceases to practice).
    After    taking      into    account       the    entire      record,   we
    conclude it compels a finding that Wang established both the
    subjective and objective components of a well founded fear of
    persecution.
    Accordingly, while we dismiss the petition for review
    from the denial of asylum as untimely, we grant the petition
    from   that    part    of    the   Board’s       order   denying     withholding      of
    removal.      We vacate the Board’s order in part and remand for
    consideration         of    whether       Wang    established        the      stringent
    9
    requirements for withholding of removal. 2   We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
    presented in the materials before the court and argument would
    not aid the decisional process.
    PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART;
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    2
    In her informal brief, Wang does not challenge the denial
    of relief under the CAT.    Accordingly, that claim is abandoned
    and was not reviewed by this court.     See Ngarurih v. Ashcroft,
    
    371 F.3d 182
    , 189 n.7 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding that failure to
    raise a challenge in an opening brief results in abandonment of
    that challenge); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 
    178 F.3d 231
    , 241
    n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (same).
    10