United States v. Alison Hill , 664 F. App'x 298 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4782
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALISON PAIGE HILL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:14-cr-00079-F-4)
Submitted: October 19, 2016 Decided: November 4, 2016
Before TRAXLER, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Elisa Cyre Salmon, SALMON LAW FIRM, LLP, Lillington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Barbara D. Kocher, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alison Paige Hill pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, dispense, and
produce with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). She was sentenced within
her advisory Guidelines range to 108 months in prison. However,
with respect to her supervised release, the district court varied
upward and imposed a 10-year term. On appeal, Hill challenges the
district court’s decisions with respect to certain Guidelines in
fashioning her sentence, the reasonableness of her Guidelines
sentence, and the reasonableness of her 10-year variant term of
supervised release. The Government seeks to enforce the appellate
waiver as to all but the last claim. For the reasons that follow,
we dismiss in part and affirm in part.
“We review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo, and will
enforce the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within
the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Copeland, 707 F.3d
522, 528 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The
validity of an appeal waiver depends on whether the defendant
knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive the right to appeal.”
United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 169 (4th Cir 2005). To
determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, we examine
“the totality of the circumstances . . ., including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.” Id. (internal
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quotation marks omitted). “Generally, if a district court
questions a defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights
during the [plea] colloquy and the record indicates that the
defendant understood the full significance of the waiver, the
waiver is valid.” Copeland, 707 F.3d at 528 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
In her plea agreement, Hill waived her right to appeal her
“conviction and whatever sentence is imposed on any ground,
including any issues that relate to the establishment of the
advisory Guideline range, reserving only the right to appeal from
a sentence in excess of the applicable advisory Guideline range
that is established at sentencing.” The language of this appeal
waiver is clear and unambiguous, and the record reveals that Hill
understood the full significance of the waiver. The court also
confirmed that Hill was competent to plead guilty and was entering
her plea in the absence of threats, force, or promises outside of
those contained in the plea agreement. Accordingly, we conclude
that Hill’s appeal waiver is valid and enforceable as to issues
within its scope.
In her first two claims, Hill argues that the district court
erred in imposing an enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2015) for possession of a firearm in
connection with her drug offense and (2) denying her a reduction
under USSG § 3B1.2 for her mitigating role. In her third claim,
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she argues that her 108-month Guidelines sentence and 10-year
variant term of supervised release are unreasonable. Hill’s
challenges to her within-Guidelines sentence of 108 months’
imprisonment are clearly within the scope of, and consequently,
barred by the appellate waiver. We therefore dismiss these claims.
Because the district court imposed an upward variance on the
supervised release term, however, Hill’s challenge to this aspect
of her sentence is outside the scope of the waiver. Hill argues
that the district court did not explain why a 10-year term of
supervised release was necessary or why the 4-to-5-year advisory
Guidelines range was inadequate to address its concerns. Because
Hill did not object to the term of supervised release below, this
court reviews the record for plain error. United States v. Webb,
738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). To establish plain error, Hill
must show (1) that the district court erred, (2) that the error is
clear or obvious, and (3) that the error affected her substantial
rights, meaning that it “affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993).
Even when this burden is met, this court has discretion whether to
recognize the error and may deny relief unless the district court’s
error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 736.
A “term of supervised release . . . [is] part of the
sentence,” United States v. Evans, 159 F.3d 908, 913 (4th Cir.
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1998), and is therefore reviewed for reasonableness. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If a sentence is
procedurally reasonable, this court reviews for “substantive
reasonableness . . . under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). The
sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes” of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012).
A district court is required to consider the following factors
when determining the length of a term of supervised release: the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, deterrence, protection of the
public, the need to provide the defendant with treatment or care,
the applicable sentencing range, public policy, and any need for
restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (2012).
Here, the district court noted the severity of
methamphetamine addiction and expressly considered Hill’s troubled
youth, addiction, and criminal history. The court stressed that
Hill had a history of probation violations and that she had
committed the instant offense while on a sentence of probation.
The court then tailored a term of supervised release that would
monitor future criminal activity and payments of restitution,
noting the upward variance was warranted in light of the nature
and circumstances of the offense, the dangers of methamphetamine
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production, and the need to protect the community. The 10-year
term was well within the statutory maximum supervised release term
of life. We conclude that the supervised release variance was
procedurally and substantively reasonable and, therefore, affirm
this portion of Hill’s sentence. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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