United States v. Jeffrey Neuhauser , 745 F.3d 125 ( 2014 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6186
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JEFFREY CISSEL NEUHAUSER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:99-cr-00189-AW-1)
Argued: January 29, 2014 Decided: March 11, 2014
Before MOTZ, KING, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in
which Judge King and Judge Diaz joined.
ARGUED: Susan Amelia Hensler, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Kristi Noel
O'Malley, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
Shortly before his term of imprisonment on child sex
offenses ended, Jeffrey Neuhauser received notification that the
Government had certified him as a “sexually dangerous person”
under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 4248. The certification stayed his release from prison, where
he remained confined in civil detention pending the resolution
of his status. The district court ultimately concluded that the
Government had not proven Neuhauser to be a “sexually dangerous
person” and so ordered his release from prison. Neuhauser then
moved to terminate the term of supervised release that had been
imposed in conjunction with his term of imprisonment. He
asserted that his term of supervised release began when his term
of imprisonment ended, and thus, his supervised release ran
throughout the time he spent in civil detention. The district
court denied the motion, holding that Neuhauser’s term of
supervised release did not begin until he was freed from
confinement. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
In September 1999, Neuhauser pled guilty to one count of
interstate travel with intent to engage in sex with a minor and
one count of distribution of child pornography. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423(b) and 2252(a)(1). The court sentenced him to 109 months
2
imprisonment and an additional five years of supervised release.
The Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) set a release date of June 6,
2007, and Neuhauser served his time in prison without
significant incident.
On May 22, 2007, just two weeks before Neuhauser’s
scheduled release date, the Government certified him as a
“sexually dangerous person” under the Adam Walsh Act. The
certification triggered a stay of Neuhauser’s discharge until a
federal district court could determine whether he met the
criteria for civil commitment. See 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a). On
June 6, 2007 -- Neuhauser’s original release date -- the BOP
processed him for Adam Walsh Act “review” and transferred him to
a different housing unit within the same federal prison. He
remained there for the next four-and-a-half years while
constitutional challenges to the Adam Walsh Act were resolved. 1
1
See Order, United States v. Neuhauser, No. 5:07-HC-2101-BR
(E.D.N.C. Jan. 8, 2008) (holding proceedings in abeyance while
appellate courts addressed constitutionality of Adam Walsh Act);
Order, id. (June 11, 2010) (lifting stay based on Supreme
Court’s ruling in United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126
(2010)); see also Comstock, 560 U.S. at 130 (upholding the
constitutionality of the Adam Walsh Act under Article I); United
States v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436, 449 (4th Cir. 2012) (upholding
the constitutionality of the Adam Walsh Act under the Equal
Protection Clause); United States v. Comstock, 627 F.3d 513,
524–25 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Comstock II”) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Adam Walsh Act under the Due Process
Clause). We note that Neuhauser does not pose any
constitutional challenge to his period of civil detention.
3
On January 19, 2012, after an evidentiary hearing, the
district court refused to certify Neuhauser for civil
commitment. The court reasoned that although Neuhauser
evidenced an interest in adolescent boys, the Government did not
demonstrate that his condition qualified as a “mental illness”
justifying civil commitment. United States v. Neuhauser, No.
5:07-HC-2101-BO, 2012 WL 174363, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 2012)
(explaining that a pedophilia diagnosis requires the exhibition
of an interest in preadolescent boys). On February 3, 2012, the
BOP released Neuhauser, and he returned to his Maryland home.
Five months later, on June 6, 2012, Neuhauser moved to
terminate his term of supervised release. He argued that his
term of supervised release began on the date that his prison
sentence ended: June 6, 2007. After that date, he noted, he
was no longer serving time in prison pursuant to criminal
sanction, but rather he remained in prison pursuant to the
operation of a civil statute. Neuhauser maintained that civil
detention, unlike criminal confinement, does not constitute
“imprisonment.” Because federal law specifies that supervision
begins on the date of a person’s “release[] from imprisonment,”
he contended that his term of supervised release began when his
confinement for Adam Walsh Act review began. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(e) (emphasis added).
4
The district court disagreed. It credited Neuhauser’s
argument that a person’s term of supervised release begins at
the end of his imprisonment. The court reasoned, however, that
“release from imprisonment” occurs only when a person is freed
from confinement. Because the Government confined Neuhauser
until the resolution of his civil-commitment hearing, the
district court determined that his supervised release commenced
only after that date, i.e., in February 2012, not in June 2007.
Neuhauser noted a timely appeal. 2
II.
The sole dispute in this case concerns the date on which
Neuhauser’s supervised release began. Neuhauser contends that
his supervised release began on June 6, 2007, the date on which
his prison sentence ended. The Government maintains that
Neuhauser’s release began on February 3, 2012, the date on which
2
Although not directly at issue here, our holding affects
the propriety of the district court’s July 2013 order sentencing
Neuhauser to a second term of imprisonment and supervised
release. The district court found that Neuhauser had violated
the conditions of his original term of supervised release in
March 2013. See Judgment, United States v. Neuhauser, No. 8:99-
cr-00189-AW-1 (D. Md. July 10, 2013). The court based this
second sentence on its finding that Neuhauser was under
supervision at the time of the March 2013 incident. If we held
that Neuhauser’s original term of supervised release commenced
in June 2007, not in February 2012, however, his original term
of supervised release would have expired before the March 2013
incident, and thus, Neuhauser’s infraction could not form the
basis of the second sentence.
5
his actual confinement ended. The parties thus dispute a
question of law, which we consider de novo. Holland v. Pardee
Coal Co., 269 F.3d 424, 430 (4th Cir. 2001).
A.
This question requires us to determine whether the time a
person spends in prison awaiting the resolution of his status
pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act affects the date on which his
supervised release begins, as determined by 18 U.S.C. § 3624.
Under § 3624, a defendant’s “term of supervised release
commences on the day the person is released from imprisonment.”
18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). Ordinarily, the BOP releases a prisoner
from confinement upon the expiration of his criminal sentence.
See id. § 3624(a). But under certain conditions, a defendant’s
release from confinement will be stayed for some time beyond
that date. In particular, under § 4248(a) of the Adam Walsh
Act, the Government’s certification of a prisoner as a “sexually
dangerous person . . . stay[s] [his] release” pending the
outcome of a civil-commitment proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a).
A prisoner so confined remains in BOP custody until a district
court determines whether he satisfies the requirements for civil
commitment. Id.
There is no dispute that Neuhauser remained confined
pursuant to § 4248 beyond the expiration of his prison sentence.
The question is whether his confinement beyond his scheduled
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release date qualifies as “imprisonment” under § 3624.
Neuhauser stresses that from June 2007 onward, he was held in
civil detention pending the outcome of a hearing. This was not
imprisonment, he argues, because the term “imprisonment” refers
only to incarceration imposed as a punishment for a crime. In
view of the fact that § 4248 is not punitive in nature, see
Timms, 664 F.3d at 456, he maintains that his Adam Walsh Act
confinement lacked the requisite indicia of punishment to count
as “imprisonment” under § 3624.
Like any issue of statutory interpretation, we begin our
analysis with the statute’s plain text. Broughman v. Carter,
624 F.3d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 2010). The ordinary meaning of
“imprisonment” evinces no necessary link to criminal punishment.
On the contrary, to “imprison” someone is simply to “put [a
person] in prison.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 572
(1979). As Judge Chasanow has recently noted, numerous
dictionaries confirm that the term “imprisonment” “focuses on
the nature of . . . confinement,” not the reason for its
imposition. Tobey v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 2d 594, 598
(D. Md. 2011) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (2009) (defining
“imprisonment” as “the state of being confined; a period of
confinement”); Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989) (defining
“imprisonment” as “detention in a prison or place of
confinement; close or irksome confinement”)). Indeed, in other
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legal contexts, the term “imprisonment” describes something
other than a defendant’s service of a criminal sentence. See 18
U.S.C. § 3041 (permitting imprisonment before trial). 3 Thus, we
find no support for Neuhauser’s argument in the text of § 3624.
Nor does the structure of the statute assist Neuhauser.
Section 3624 contains two provisions regulating supervised
release: a provision regulating when supervised release begins
and another regulating when supervised release is tolled. See
18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). According to the statute, a term of
3
Neuhauser notes that persons detained under civil-
commitment statutes are not “prisoners” for the purposes of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See Michau v. Charleston
Cnty., 434 F.3d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 2006). The PLRA, however,
provides no analogy helpful to Neuhauser. For the PLRA applies
only to persons “incarcerated or detained” in a federal facility
“who [are] accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or
adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(c) (emphasis added). The supervised-release
statute, by contrast, applies to all “imprisoned” persons. 18
U.S.C. § 3624(e). The lack of limiting qualification in § 3624
indicates that it has a much broader scope than the PLRA, and
thus, cases like Michau are not relevant here.
Neuhauser’s reliance on 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) fails for a
similar reason. That statute provides for a reduction in a
person’s “term of imprisonment” if the person has spent time in
prison “prior to the date [of his] sentence” as a result of,
inter alia, “the offense for which the sentence was imposed.”
Id. Neuhauser finds it “notable” that this credit does not
obtain for periods spent in civil detention. It is unclear why
this is “notable” or what bearing § 3585(b) has on the case at
hand, given that both parties agree that Neuhauser remained
confined past his “term of imprisonment.” Perhaps Neuhauser
intends to suggest that § 3585(b) states a universal definition
of “imprisonment,” which excludes confinement in civil
detention, but nothing in the text of § 3585(b) –- or any other
statute –- indicates that this is the case.
8
release begins when a person is “released from imprisonment,”
while a term of release is tolled when a person “is imprisoned
in connection with a conviction.” Id. (emphasis added). The
distinction between “imprisonment,” on the one hand, and
“imprisonment in connection with a conviction,” on the other,
belies Neuhauser’s suggestion that “imprisonment” must involve a
conviction. If Neuhauser were correct, and “imprisonment”
necessarily related to punishment, there would be no need for
Congress to qualify the term “imprisonment” in the statute’s
tolling provision. Under Neuhauser’s definition, “imprisonment”
would always be “in connection with a conviction,” and the
inclusion of that phrase in the tolling provision would be
entirely unnecessary. To avoid an interpretation of the statute
that would “render [its] terms meaningless or superfluous,” the
word “imprisonment” must mean something broader than detention
“in connection with a conviction.” See Scott v. United States,
328 F.3d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2003).
Finally, we note that only a broad definition of
“imprisonment” comports with the purpose of § 3624. As we
explained in United States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 451 (4th
Cir. 2011), “[t]he congressional policy in providing for a term
of supervised release after incarceration is to improve the odds
of a successful transition from the prison to liberty.” See
also id. (“Supervised release . . . is a unique method of post-
9
confinement supervision that fulfills rehabilitative ends
distinct from those served by incarceration.” (quotation marks
and citations omitted)). It is hard to imagine the way in which
supervision would aid in a person’s transition if he could serve
his entire term of supervised release before leaving prison.
B.
Our analysis accords with that of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000). There, the Court
determined the date on which a defendant’s supervised release
commenced in a case in which later appellate precedent required
modification of his prison term. Id. at 54. Johnson originally
received a sentence of nine years imprisonment plus a term of
supervised release; the change in the law led to a modified
sentence of four years imprisonment plus a term of supervised
release. Id. at 54–55. Unfortunately, Johnson had already
spent six years in prison before receiving the modified
sentence. Id. at 55. Having served “too much prison time,”
Johnson argued that his improper imprisonment should be credited
toward his term of supervised release. Id. at 54–55. He
contended that his term of supervised release began on the date
that his lawful imprisonment ended, not the date on which the
BOP ultimately released him. Id. at 55–56.
The Supreme Court rejected the argument. The Court noted
that under § 3624, a defendant’s supervised release “does not
10
commence until [the] individual ‘is released from
imprisonment.’” Id. at 57. That phrase, it explained,
contemplates a defendant’s “freed[om] from confinement.” Id.
For this reason, “[s]upervised release does not run while an
individual remains in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.”
Id. After all, the Court explained, “[s]upervised release has
no statutory function until confinement ends.” Id. at 59.
The Government maintains that the Supreme Court’s holding
in Johnson is “dispositive” here. Neuhauser argues that the
case is clearly distinguishable because Johnson, unlike
Neuhauser, conceded the fact of his imprisonment. This
difference, he argues, requires us to apply a “fundamentally
different analysis” than that employed by the Supreme Court in
Johnson, which he claims leads to a “fundamentally different”
result.
Neuhauser is correct that Johnson does not strictly control
this case. While Johnson freely admitted that he had been
“imprisoned,” albeit wrongly, for the entire six years of his
detention, Neuhauser makes no similar admission. Instead,
Neuhauser maintains that he was not “imprisoned” during the last
four years of his confinement. Accordingly, Neuhauser presents
an argument that Johnson did not make on appeal, i.e., that
detention pursuant to a civil statute does not constitute
“imprisonment” in any sense of the term.
11
But this new argument does not warrant a “fundamentally
different analysis.” Rather, Johnson is instructive here in two
important respects. First, Johnson reiterates the commonsense
meaning of “imprisonment” as “confinement.” See Johnson, 529
U.S. at 57 (explaining that to be “released from imprisonment,”
one must be “freed from confinement”). That the Supreme Court
applied this definition so readily to another supervised-release
case underscores its relevance here. Second, Johnson emphasizes
the importance of construing § 3624 in light of its purpose. As
the Johnson Court recognized, supervised release contributes to
a defendant’s rehabilitation and “transition to community life.”
See id. at 59. These objectives would be ill served were a
defendant to begin his release while living in prison.
Johnson thus lends support to the view that supervised
release commences on the date that a person is freed from
confinement, irrespective of whether that confinement resulted
from a criminal or civil statute. This view also accords with
holdings from other courts that have recently held that
supervised release does not begin until a § 4248 detainee is
released from confinement. United States v. Mosby, 719 F.3d
925, 930 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding as a matter of law that § 4248
detainee’s supervised release commences on the day he was “freed
from confinement”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 905 (2014); Tobey,
794 F. Supp. 2d at 602 (same).
12
We recognize that in United States v. Turner, 689 F.3d
1117, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit reached a
different result. There, a divided panel held that when the
Government’s institution of a civil-commitment proceeding stays
a prisoner’s release from confinement, his term of supervised
release begins on the date that he was due to be discharged.
Id. The majority reasoned that because § 3624 suspends a term
of supervised release when a defendant is “imprisoned in
connection with a conviction,” an individual detained pursuant
to a civil statute cannot be subject to § 3624’s tolling
provision. Id. (emphasis added).
The Turner majority, however, conflated the two separate
provisions of § 3624: the commencement provision and the
tolling provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). These statutory
provisions work in different ways. See United States v. Ide,
624 F.3d 666, 669 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Tobey, 794 F. Supp.
2d at 600. The commencement provision specifies the date on
which supervised release begins, while the tolling provision
describes periods of time during which supervised release is
suspended. Of course, “[w]hat never begins cannot end.”
Turner, 689 F.3d at 1127 (Smith, J., dissenting). Thus, a court
must first assess whether the defendant’s supervised release has
begun before it addresses whether his supervised release has
been suspended.
13
Turner’s conflation is particularly problematic because, as
noted above, suspension and commencement are triggered by
different events. Although supervised release is suspended when
a person is “imprisoned in connection with a conviction,”
supervised release commences simply when a person is “released
from imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (emphasis added). Of
critical importance here, the commencement provision does not
require that imprisonment be “in connection with a conviction.”
Id. Under the statute’s plain language, any imprisonment,
regardless of whether it is imposed pursuant to a criminal
conviction, prevents supervised release from commencing.
Turner thus falters in light of the plain language of
§ 3624. The Turner majority’s sole justification for permitting
supervised release to run during a detainee’s civil confinement
is that this kind of detention is not “imprisonment in
connection with a conviction.” Turner, 689 F.3d at 1126. 4 But
4
Even if the Turner majority were correct in its reliance
on this language, its analysis would still be problematic. For
a defendant detained pursuant to § 4248 is in fact imprisoned
“in connection with a conviction.” The Adam Walsh Act allows
the Government to commit individuals only if they are presently
confined in prison pursuant to a conviction. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 4248(a). Indeed, in Comstock, 560 U.S. at 134–37, the Supreme
Court emphasized that it was § 4248’s close relationship to the
enforcement of criminal law that provided Congress with the
authority to enact the statute. See id. at 149. The Court
observed that Congress presumably could not pass a law providing
for the civil commitment of any “sexually dangerous person.”
Id. at 148. Rather, it was the Adam Walsh Act’s connection to a
(Continued)
14
§ 3624 does not require that imprisonment be “in connection with
a conviction” to stave off the commencement of supervised
release. Because Turner does not take account of the
distinction between § 3624’s commencement and tolling
provisions, we cannot endorse its analysis.
III.
For all of these reasons, we hold that a defendant’s term
of supervised release does not commence while he remains in
federal custody pending the resolution of his status under the
Adam Walsh Act. 5 The judgment of the district court is therefore
AFFIRMED.
detainee’s criminal conviction that rendered the statute
constitutional. Id. at 136.
5
We note that the case at hand does not require us to
determine whether a defendant’s civil commitment -- as
distinguished from the time a defendant serves in prison pending
the outcome of his civil-commitment hearing -- constitutes
“imprisonment.” There may be reasons for treating civil
commitment differently. For example, once a person is civilly
committed, section 4248 requires the Government to “release
[that] person to . . . the State.” 18 U.S.C. § 4248(d)
(emphasis added). Releasing a prisoner may suffice to end his
imprisonment. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 57. In any event, our
disposition in this case does not preordain the outcome of that
very different situation.
15