United States v. Broadus , 403 F. App'x 828 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4056
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JEROME ANDRE BROADUS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:09-cr-00244-CCB-4)
Submitted: November 30, 2010 Decided: December 3, 2010
Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. James Roos III, LAW OFFICES OF J. JAMES ROOS III, Towson,
Maryland, for Appellant. Michael Clayton Hanlon, Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jerome Andre Broadus pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and
crack cocaine. The district court sentenced him to 120 months’
imprisonment — the statutory mandatory minimum sentence.
Broadus’ attorney filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether Broadus’
guilty plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered and whether the
sentence was reasonable. Broadus filed a pro se supplemental
brief challenging the effectiveness of counsel below. Finding
no reversible error, we affirm.
In the absence of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea,
this court reviews the adequacy of the guilty plea pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 for plain error. See United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Our review of the
transcript of the plea hearing leads us to conclude that the
district court fully complied with Rule 11 in accepting Broadus’
guilty plea. The court ensured that Broadus understood the
charge against him and the potential sentence he faced; that he
entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily; and that the plea
was supported by an independent factual basis. See United
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States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
Accordingly, we affirm Broadus’ conviction.
We have also reviewed Broadus’ sentence and determined
that it was properly calculated and that the sentence imposed is
reasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007);
see United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010).
The district court followed the necessary procedural steps in
sentencing Broadus, appropriately treated the sentencing
guidelines as advisory, properly calculated and considered the
applicable guidelines range, and weighed the relevant 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006) factors. We conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Broadus to the 120-
month mandatory minimum sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 41;
United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007)
(applying appellate presumption of reasonableness to within-
guidelines sentence).
Finally, in his pro se supplemental brief, Broadus
claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are generally not cognizable
on direct appeal. United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th
Cir. 1997). Rather, to allow for adequate development of the
record, a defendant must bring such claims in a 28 U.S.C.A. §
2255 (West Supp. 2010) motion, unless the record conclusively
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establishes ineffective assistance. United States v.
Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999); King, 119 F.3d at
295. Because the record does not conclusively show that
Broadus’ counsel was ineffective, we decline to consider these
claims on direct appeal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Broadus, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Broadus requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Broadus. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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