United States v. Jack Parker , 790 F.3d 550 ( 2015 )


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  •                              PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-4989
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JACK WINFRED PARKER,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 13-4990
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    DOUGLAS E. TAYLOR,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
    of South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior
    District Judge. (3:13-cr-00133-CMC-2; 3:13-cr-00133-CMC-3)
    Argued:   March 27, 2015                  Decided:    June 25, 2015
    Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
    Vacated and remanded by published opinion.    Judge Keenan wrote
    the opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Judge Thacker joined.
    ARGUED: Joshua Snow Kendrick, KENDRICK & LEONARD, P.C.,
    Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellants.        Julius Ness
    Richardson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia,
    South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Christopher S. Leonard,
    KENDRICK & LEONARD, P.C., Greenville, South Carolina, for
    Appellants. William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, Winston
    D. Holliday, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
    THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for
    Appellee.
    2
    BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:
    Jack     Parker       and      Douglas        Taylor      (collectively,       the
    defendants)     appeal     their    convictions        for    engaging    in    illegal
    gambling,     in   violation       of   18       U.S.C.    § 1955.       This    appeal
    primarily presents the question whether prosecutors’ failure to
    disclose certain impeachment evidence, despite knowing of such
    evidence before trial, violated the constitutional protections
    articulated in Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    (1963).
    The central contested issue during the jury trial was the
    sufficiency of the evidence to satisfy the statutory requirement
    that the gambling operation involve at least five persons.                          The
    government advanced several theories regarding the identity of
    the “fifth participant” in the gambling business, including that
    Jack Parker’s daughter-in-law, Tammy Parker, participated in the
    enterprise by maintaining financial and tax records of gambling
    proceeds.
    The defendants argue on appeal that the government violated
    Brady   by   failing      to    disclose     certain       impeachment    information
    regarding Ben Staples, a government witness who testified about
    Tammy Parker’s involvement in the gambling operation.                          Upon our
    review, we conclude that the government violated its obligations
    under   Brady      and,        accordingly,       we      vacate   the    defendants’
    convictions and remand their cases to the district court.
    3
    I.
    Jack Parker, his son, Brett Parker, and Douglas Taylor 1 were
    tried       in    the       district         court      for    participating              in    an   illegal
    gambling          business            involving         at    least      five        participants,        in
    violation          of       18    U.S.C.         § 1955.           All    three       defendants        were
    convicted following a three-day jury trial, although only Jack
    and Douglas have filed this appeal from their convictions. 2
    A.
    We    begin          by     describing           the    statute          under      which     the
    defendants were convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which prohibits the
    acts of “conduct[ing], financ[ing], manag[ing], supervis[ing],
    direct[ing],            or       own[ing]        all    or    part       of    an    illegal         gambling
    business.”             18 U.S.C. § 1955(a).                   An “illegal gambling business”
    is   defined           as    a    gambling          business        that:      (1)    is       operated    in
    violation of applicable state or local law; (2) “involves five
    or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct,
    or   own         all    or       part       of   such    business”            (the    five-participant
    requirement);               and       (3)    “has      been    or    remains         in    substantially
    continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or
    1
    Because Jack, Brett, and Tammy Parker share a last name,
    we will refer to all the defendants by their first names in this
    opinion.
    2
    In addition to the federal gambling conviction, Brett was
    convicted in a South Carolina state court of murdering his wife,
    Tammy, and his business partner, Bryan Capnerhurst.     Brett was
    sentenced to two terms of life imprisonment for these murders.
    4
    has   a   gross   revenue        of    $2,000      in     any    single    day.”     
    Id. § 1955(b).
    Congress imposed the above size and duration limitations in
    Section    1955   “as    a       means   of       screening      out    those    gambling
    businesses     that     are      too     insignificant           to    warrant   federal
    action.”     United States v. Gresko, 
    632 F.2d 1128
    , 1132 (4th Cir.
    1980).        When      attempting        to       prove        the    five-participant
    requirement, the government need not show that the same five
    participants were involved in the business for all thirty days;
    “[h]owever, there must be evidence that the business involved at
    least five people at all times for thirty days.”                          
    Id. at 1132-
    33.       Accordingly,       a    jury    considering           the    five-participant
    requirement may reach a guilty verdict under Section 1955 so
    long “[a]s each member of the jury agrees that some five persons
    were involved at all times over some thirty-day period or on any
    one single day in which the gross revenues exceeded $2,000.”
    United States v. Nicolaou, 
    180 F.3d 565
    , 571 (4th Cir. 1999)
    (emphasis in original).
    B.
    The defendants stipulated at trial that they engaged in
    “bookmaking” in violation of South Carolina law.                         Therefore, the
    government’s      evidence            focused        on     the        five-participant
    requirement of Section 1955.                  The government sought to prove
    that the business operated by Jack and Douglas was linked to
    5
    another two-person gambling enterprise operated by Brett, and
    that this joint enterprise also included a fifth participant.
    The defendants stipulated that Jack and Douglas engaged in
    a sports gambling business together, and further stipulated that
    Brett worked with a fourth man, Bryan Capnerhurst, also in a
    sports    gambling       business.    In       the     course   of    these    gambling
    operations,      customers       placed    telephone       calls       or   sent     text
    messages    to     the   defendants   to       place    bets    on    the   outcome    of
    certain    collegiate      and   professional          sporting      events.       Brett,
    Bryan,     Jack,     and    Douglas   thus       acted     as     “bookmakers,”        or
    “bookies,” and received a ten percent surcharge on bets their
    customers lost as well as the net value of their customers’
    losses minus their wins.
    Although these gambling operations often were conducted as
    separate enterprises, the evidence also showed that Jack and
    Douglas periodically answered the telephone line that Brett and
    Bryan used for accepting bets, and vice versa.                          Beginning in
    February 2012, Jack and Douglas transferred to Brett and Bryan
    telephone calls received from customers who wished to place bets
    on NCAA basketball games.             The proceeds or losses from these
    shared clients were distributed among the four bookmakers.                            The
    government argued from this evidence that Brett, Bryan, Jack,
    and Douglas all participated in the same gambling business (the
    6
    gambling     business)       during     the       time       period     alleged         in    the
    indictment.
    To     satisfy    the     five-participant              requirement       of       Section
    1955,     the     government        offered           evidence        regarding         several
    additional individuals linked to the gambling business through
    Brett.     The government first sought to prove that Brett’s wife,
    Tammy, not only was aware of her husband’s gambling business,
    but also participated in the business by directing the use of
    Brett’s gambling income for family expenses and by maintaining
    the family’s financial records.                  In support of this theory, the
    government       presented    the    testimony          of    Ben     Staples,      a    family
    friend, who stated that he assisted Tammy in preparing joint
    federal tax returns in which she disclosed Brett’s income from
    the gambling business.
    Through       Staples’s       testimony,          the     government         introduced
    Tammy’s    handwritten       notes     regarding         the     family’s      budget         and
    finances.         Tammy      included    several             references      to     gambling
    proceeds    in    these     notes,    including         sums     of    money     held        in   a
    “booking    fund”     and    the     share       of    profits        from   the    gambling
    business that were due to Bryan. 3                      She also indicated in her
    notes some plans she had for distributing gambling proceeds,
    3  A law enforcement investigator testified that Brett
    designated the booking fund as a cash reserve for use in the
    event that he incurred significant gambling losses.
    7
    such as one note stating, “use deposits from booking to pay for
    equity line.”
    Aside    from     Staples’s      testimony         and    Tammy’s        notes,    the
    government offered two other items of evidence regarding Tammy’s
    involvement in the gambling business.                     First, during a search of
    Brett’s and Tammy’s home after her death, law enforcement agents
    recovered from Tammy’s desk an envelope with the words “Booking
    Fund-$20,000”         written    on    the     envelope.          This        envelope    was
    introduced as an exhibit at trial.                  Second, Harold Saxby, one of
    Brett’s gambling customers, testified that when Brett was not at
    home, Tammy periodically accepted envelopes containing money for
    bets.        The government asserted that this collective evidence
    supported the conclusion that Tammy was the fifth participant in
    the gambling business.
    The    government      also     argued      that   certain       individuals       who
    worked as “layoff bookies” each could have constituted the fifth
    participant      in    the    gambling       business.          See    United    States    v.
    Jenkins,       
    649 F.2d 273
    ,    275       (4th    Cir.        1981)     (explaining
    circumstances under which a layoff bookie can be considered a
    participant in a gambling business).                      “Lay off betting” occurs
    when    a    bookmaker       “passes    on    to    another       bookmaker       [i.e.,    a
    ‘layoff bookie’] the amount of bets by which his own ‘book’ is
    unbalanced; thus to the extent he loses to his own customers, he
    wins back from the other bookmaker, or vice versa.”                                  United
    8
    States     v.   Thomas,     
    508 F.2d 1200
    ,        1202    n.2    (8th     Cir.       1975).
    Layoff betting is therefore a type of insurance for bookmakers
    to protect against losses to their own customers.                          
    Id. Several witnesses
    testified about Brett’s participation in
    layoff     betting    and   his       association       with    layoff       bookies.        An
    officer investigating the present case testified that Brett had
    admitted having engaged a layoff bookie named Ron Spence.                                 Also,
    in   recorded       conversations       with       Staples     and     Jack,       Brett    had
    discussed his practice of laying off bets.
    Government       witness        Harry    Benenhaley,           another       bookmaker,
    testified that Brett’s conduct of placing bets with Benenhaley
    was “consistent with” the practice of laying off bets.                                  However,
    Benenhaley also stated that he eventually suspected that Brett
    was using the purported layoff account to place personal bets on
    his own behalf.         The government nevertheless asserted that the
    evidence regarding Brett’s layoff betting supported a finding
    that one of the layoff bookies was a fifth participant in the
    gambling business.
    Finally,       the    government            offered      evidence        that       Brett
    received “lines” from another bookmaker, Vincent Sanford, that
    could      render    Sanford      a    fifth       participant        in     the    gambling
    business.       A “line” “constitutes the ‘odds’ or ‘handicaps’ or
    ‘point spreads’ on the wagered contests,” and includes “a list
    of   the    teams     and   events       with      a   certain        number       of    points
    9
    attributed to the nonfavored team.                     To win a bet on the favored
    team . . . that team must win by a score exceeding the point
    spread given to the nonfavored team.”                     United States v. George,
    
    568 F.2d 1064
    , 1067 n.4 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting 
    Thomas, 508 F.2d at 1202
    ).
    Sanford testified that he provided Brett with lines on a
    daily basis during a three-year period between 2009 and 2012,
    and suggested that these lines assisted Brett in placing his
    personal      bets.           After    receiving          Sanford’s       lines,       Brett
    frequently placed such personal bets with Sanford.                              The record
    does   not    indicate       whether   Brett      used     Sanford’s      lines       in   the
    gambling business.             However, bookies may cooperate with each
    other in order to set consistent lines and to prevent bettors
    from winning on competing teams.                  See 
    id. at 1067
    n.7, 1069-70.
    In this case, the government sought to prove a link connecting
    Sanford      to    Brett’s    gambling      business       by    eliciting      the    above
    evidence of Sanford’s sharing of information.
    C.
    The jury trial began on Monday, September 16, 2013.                            On the
    preceding         Friday,    September      13,     2013,       Staples    advised         the
    prosecution team from the United States Attorney’s Office for
    the    District      of    South   Carolina       that    the    Utah   office        of   the
    Securities         and      Exchange     Commission             (SEC)     was     actively
    investigating        him     for   fraud.        The     prosecution      team    did      not
    10
    disclose its knowledge of this investigation to the defendants’
    attorneys.      When the government presented Staples’s testimony on
    Tuesday, September 17, 2013, the defendants’ counsel did not
    cross-examine him.
    Also on Tuesday, September 17, 2013, an attorney in the
    civil division of the same United States Attorney’s Office that
    was prosecuting the defendants (the civil division) received a
    draft   civil    complaint   from     the    SEC   identifying    Staples    as   a
    defendant.      The complaint was to be filed in the district court
    in South Carolina, with the United States Attorney’s Office for
    the District of South Carolina acting as local counsel.                     In the
    complaint, the government alleged that Staples had engaged in
    “fraudulent conduct . . .        designed to profit from the deaths of
    terminally      ill   individuals.”         Staples   allegedly   purchased       on
    these individuals’ behalf discounted corporate bonds containing
    a survivor’s option, which option Staples fraudulently redeemed
    at full value for his own benefit upon the death of each client.
    Staples allegedly obtained profits of at least $6.5 million as a
    result of this scheme.
    One day after the civil division received the complaint, on
    Wednesday, September 18, 2013, the jury in the defendants’ case
    began its deliberations, and returned guilty verdicts the same
    day against Jack, Brett, and Douglas.                 Also on that day, the
    chief attorney of the civil division read a newspaper article
    11
    about Staples’s testimony in the present case, and contacted the
    Utah office of the SEC to determine whether Staples was the same
    person who was the subject of the SEC complaint.                               However, the
    record       does    not    show   whether,         or    in   what      manner,     the     SEC
    responded to this request for information.
    On    Friday,      September   20,     2013,       two    days      after    the    jury
    returned the guilty verdicts, an attorney in the civil division
    filed    the     SEC    complaint      in    the     district       court.          After   the
    complaint was filed, an attorney in that division discussed the
    contents of the complaint with the prosecutors in this case.
    On       Tuesday,      September       24,     2013,      after     defense       counsel
    learned of the SEC complaint, the defendants requested a new
    trial        based    on    the    government’s           failure      to     disclose      the
    impeachment evidence involving the SEC investigation, which the
    defendants contended was material to the jury’s verdict.                                      In
    assessing       the     defendants’         Brady        claim,   the       district       court
    assumed that the prosecutors knew during the trial that Staples
    was being investigated by the SEC, and that there was a pending
    civil complaint.            Although the court found that the defendants
    did not know about the SEC investigation, the court concluded
    that a Brady violation had not occurred because evidence of the
    SEC investigation was not material to the jury’s determination
    of the defendants’ guilt.               Thus, the district court found that
    the defendants had failed to show that there was a reasonable
    12
    probability of a different result had they been informed in a
    timely manner of the SEC investigation.
    The    district       court        reasoned      that     although         Staples’s
    testimony      helped       to     establish      Tammy’s       involvement         in     the
    gambling     business,       “the    Government’s        case    did       not    depend    on
    Tammy Parker being the fifth participant.”                           The court further
    explained that Staples’s testimony was limited to authenticating
    Tammy’s      notes    and    the    audio    recordings        and    to    matters      that
    largely were not in dispute, and that, therefore, an attack on
    Staples’s credibility was unlikely to have had an impact on the
    jury   verdict.        The       court    accordingly     denied       the       defendants’
    motions for a new trial, and this appeal followed.
    II.
    The    defendants         argue    that    the   district       court       erred    in
    denying their motions for a new trial based on the government’s
    failure      to      disclose       its     knowledge       of       the     active        SEC
    investigation, in violation of Brady.                       The defendants assert
    that the SEC investigation was material to the outcome of the
    trial, because the jury could have found that Tammy was the
    fifth participant based primarily on Staples’s testimony linking
    her to the gambling business.
    In response, the government contends that its failure to
    disclose information about the ongoing SEC investigation did not
    13
    result in a Brady violation because: (1) the fraud investigation
    conducted by the SEC was not proper impeachment evidence under
    Federal       Rule      of     Evidence    608(b);        (2)   Staples      provided     only
    “limited”         and       “uncontroversial”        testimony;      (3)     the    defendants
    already had knowledge of Staples’s business practices underlying
    the SEC complaint; and (4) the prosecution team did not have a
    duty     to       “uncover”          an   investigation         conducted          by   another
    government agency.                 We disagree with the government’s arguments.
    We review the district court’s denial of a motion for a new
    trial for abuse of discretion.                        United States v. Stokes, 
    261 F.3d 496
    , 502 (4th Cir. 2001).                        A district court abuses its
    discretion when it commits a legal error in determining whether
    a Brady violation has occurred; we therefore review the district
    court’s Brady ruling de novo.                   United States v. Bartko, 
    728 F.3d 327
    , 338 (4th Cir. 2013).                  In conducting this de novo analysis,
    we review the district court’s accompanying factual findings for
    clear error.            United States v. King, 
    628 F.3d 693
    , 702 (4th Cir.
    2011).
    Under       the        Supreme      Court’s        decision      in     Brady,      “the
    suppression            by    the    prosecution      of    evidence     favorable        to   an
    accused       .    .    .     violates    due   process         where   the    evidence       is
    material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
    good faith or bad faith of the 
    prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87
    .
    To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show (1) that
    14
    the undisclosed information was favorable, either because it was
    exculpatory    or     because      it     was      impeaching;       (2)    that    the
    information    was    material;     and      (3)    that    the    prosecution     knew
    about the evidence and failed to disclose it.                       United States v.
    Wilson, 
    624 F.3d 640
    , 661 (4th Cir. 2010); see also Giglio v.
    United   States,     
    405 U.S. 150
    ,      153-54      (1972)    (explaining     that
    material impeachment information is encompassed within the Brady
    rule).
    Evidence is material if there is a “reasonable probability
    that its disclosure would have produced a different result.”
    
    Bartko, 728 F.3d at 340
    (citation omitted).                       This standard does
    not require a showing that a jury more likely than not would
    have returned a different verdict.                 
    Id. Rather, the
    “reasonable
    probability”    standard      is   satisfied        if     “the    likelihood      of   a
    different result is great enough to undermine confidence in the
    outcome of the trial.”             
    Id. (citation and
    internal quotation
    marks omitted).       And, in particular, impeachment evidence may be
    material    when     the    witness     in      question     “supplied      the    only
    evidence of an essential element of the offense,” especially if
    the undisclosed evidence was the only significant impeachment
    material.      
    Id. at 339
      (citation         omitted).         In   contrast,
    impeachment evidence is not material if it is “cumulative of
    evidence of bias or partiality already presented and thus would
    15
    have provided only marginal additional support for the defense.”
    
    Id. (citation, internal
    quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
    Initially, we conclude that the ongoing nature of the SEC
    investigation    was    admissible,       favorable          impeachment         evidence.
    If the defendants had been able to cross-examine Staples about
    the   SEC    investigation,       they    could       have       impeached       Staples’s
    credibility     in   two   ways.         First,    such         evidence     would    have
    demonstrated     Staples’s        potential       bias       in     testifying       as   a
    government    witness      when    he    knew    that       a    significant       federal
    investigation was pending against him.                          “[T]he exposure of a
    witness’    motivation     in     testifying      is    a       proper    and    important
    function” of cross-examination.                 United States v. Ambers, 
    85 F.3d 173
    , 176 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 
    415 U.S. 308
    , 316-17 (1974)).            As the Supreme Court observed in United
    States v. Abel, 
    469 U.S. 45
    (1984), an effective showing of bias
    held by a witness “would have a tendency to make the facts to
    which he testified less probable in the eyes of the jury than it
    would be without such testimony.”               
    Id. at 51.
    Second,   questions        regarding      the    SEC        fraud   investigation
    could have been used under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) to
    show Staples’s general character for untruthfulness.                            Under Rule
    608(b), “specific instances of a witness’s conduct” may be the
    subject of cross-examination if such instances “are probative of
    16
    the    character       for     truthfulness           or    untruthfulness          of   []    the
    witness.”          Fed. R. Evid. 608(b).
    Fraudulent           conduct       is     an        “instance[]       of     misconduct
    . . . clearly probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness” and
    such evidence is admissible under Rule 608(b).                            United States v.
    Leake,       
    642 F.2d 715
    ,     718-19      (4th      Cir.    1981).      Although        the
    allegations in the SEC complaint had not yet been proven at the
    time of the defendants’ trial, the alleged conduct underlying
    the    SEC     complaint       and      the     government’s        pursuit       of     a   fraud
    investigation against Staples unquestionably were probative of
    Staples’s          character        for    untruthfulness           under     Rule       608(b).
    Therefore,          evidence       of     the    ongoing          SEC   investigation          was
    favorable          impeachment       information           under    the     first      prong    of
    Brady. 4      See 
    Wilson, 624 F.3d at 661
    .
    We next conclude that evidence of the SEC investigation
    was material under the standard articulated in Brady, and under
    decisions applying the Brady rule.                          As we already have noted,
    for    the    jury     to    have    convicted        the     defendants      under      Section
    1955, it was not necessary that all twelve jurors agree on the
    identity of the fifth participant.                          See 
    Nicolaou, 180 F.3d at 571
    .       The jury could have reached a guilty verdict against the
    4
    We observe that, in its consideration of the defendants’
    motions for a new trial, the district court noted that it would
    have permitted limited cross-examination regarding the SEC
    investigation.
    17
    defendants     if       only     one   juror     had    based     her   determination          of
    guilt on a finding that Tammy was the fifth participant in the
    business, and the remaining eleven jurors had concluded instead
    that a layoff bookie was the fifth participant.
    The verdict form did not ask the jurors to specify the
    identities of the participants in the gambling business and,
    thus,    we   do     not       know    whether      any    juror      relied     on     Tammy’s
    involvement        in     the     gambling     business        to   satisfy       the    five-
    participant       requirement.              However,      in   light    of     the    relative
    strength of the government’s theories, we conclude that there is
    a    reasonable      probability        that     at    least    one     juror    would       have
    viewed Tammy as the fifth participant.
    The government depicted Tammy as the only purported fifth
    participant        who     had    a    role    in      managing     money    made       in    the
    gambling business.              Tammy’s payment of taxes on gambling income
    illustrated her detailed knowledge of and direct involvement in
    the gambling business’ finances.                    Tammy also physically accepted
    payments      from       one     of    Brett’s      customers,        accounted       for     the
    “booking fund,” set aside the share of profits owed to Bryan,
    Brett’s employee in the gambling business, and directed the use
    of    gambling      proceeds          for   household      expenses.            These    facts
    constituted sufficient evidence from which the jury could have
    concluded that Tammy was a fifth participant in the gambling
    18
    business based on her role in actively managing the business’
    proceeds.
    We    further       observe      that      the    government’s     evidence
    supporting the layoff bookie theory was no stronger than the
    evidence     supporting       Tammy’s   involvement.        While   the   evidence
    regarding Brett’s use of layoff bookies involved the testimony
    of several witnesses, this evidence was general and cumulative
    in nature.       Although the jury could have inferred from this
    evidence that Brett engaged in layoff betting during the time
    period      alleged   in   the      indictment,    the   government’s     evidence
    supporting this theory was far from overwhelming, and was not
    sufficiently strong to permit us to conclude that all twelve
    jurors convicted the defendants on this theory regarding the
    fifth participant.
    The government’s evidence concerning Sanford’s involvement
    in the gambling business, which involved providing “lines” to
    Brett, was even less substantial than the evidence supporting
    the layoff bookie theory.               Sanford testified that he was not
    concerned with other bookmakers’ lines, and suggested that he
    sent   lines    to    Brett    in   order    to   facilitate   Brett’s    personal
    betting.      Although the government contends otherwise, Sanford’s
    testimony could only support the conclusion that Brett used the
    lines to place his own personal bets with Sanford.
    19
    Upon review of this evidence supporting each of the three
    theories advanced by the government, we conclude that there is a
    reasonable       probability         that      at    least      one     juror      would      have
    rejected the government’s theories with respect to the layoff
    bookies and Sanford, and found that Tammy was the only fifth
    participant       in        the     gambling        business. 5            Accordingly,         in
    considering the materiality prong of Brady, we must determine
    whether the ability to impeach Staples’s testimony would have
    had a reasonable probability of changing a single juror’s view
    regarding Tammy’s involvement in the gambling enterprise.
    Aside       from       Staples’s    testimony,        the       government      presented
    only minimal evidence of Tammy’s involvement in the gambling
    operation.            The    only    other      evidence        linking       Tammy      to   the
    business    was       her    periodic     acceptance           of    envelopes      containing
    betting payments when Brett was not at home, and the “booking
    fund”    envelope       that      was   found       on   her    desk       after   her     death.
    Although     a    jury       could      have    concluded           from    this    additional
    evidence that Tammy physically handled betting funds, Staples’s
    testimony,       if     believed,       affirmatively          established         that    Tammy
    5 We also observe that during its deliberations, the jury
    submitted to the court a question concerning whether all jurors
    must unanimously agree on the identity of the fifth participant.
    This jury question, although not definitive in any respect,
    provides additional support for a conclusion that there is a
    reasonable probability that at least one member of the jury
    relied on Tammy’s involvement to satisfy the five-participant
    requirement.
    20
    actively managed the gambling proceeds as part of the family’s
    budget    and    paid    taxes    on   gambling     income   on   Brett’s   behalf.
    Staples’s       testimony       therefore    supplied     critical    evidence    in
    support of the government’s theory that Tammy acted as a fifth
    participant in the gambling business.                 Moreover, such testimony
    was particularly significant because no evidence directly linked
    Tammy to the gambling business conducted by Jack and Douglas.
    The    evidence       in    the   present    case    thus    stands   in   stark
    contrast to the evidence in Bartko, in which we identified an
    egregious pattern of Brady violations by the government, but
    concluded       that    these    failures    were   not   material    due   to   the
    strength of the government’s case and the defendant’s already
    extensive impeachment of a key government 
    witness. 728 F.3d at 337-40
    .     Here, however, defense counsel did not even attempt to
    cross-examine Staples in the absence of available impeachment
    evidence concerning Staples’s fraudulent activities. 6
    Additionally, in Bartko, we emphasized that the government
    had presented “overwhelming” evidence of Bartko’s guilt “beyond
    6 The government contends that defense counsel could have
    cross-examined Staples regarding his past romantic relationship
    with Tammy, even though Staples already had admitted the fact of
    the relationship on direct examination. This argument, however,
    misses the point that evidence of an active federal fraud
    investigation of Staples’s activities involving terminally ill
    victims would have been far more damaging to Staples’s
    credibility   than  his   romantic  liaison   with   a  deceased
    acquaintance.
    21
    any   shadow     of     a    doubt.”        
    Id. at 340
        (agreeing         with   these
    conclusions reached by the district court).                              In contrast, the
    government in the present case pieced together various different
    theories regarding the identity of the fifth participant, none
    of which was supported by overwhelming evidence.
    We        therefore         disagree               with         the         government’s
    characterization of Staples’s testimony as being of “limited”
    effect.     By authenticating Tammy’s handwriting and her budget
    notes for the jury, Staples’s testimony provided the only direct
    evidence of Tammy’s active management of gambling proceeds, as
    opposed    to    mere       knowledge       of    Brett’s        role    in       the    gambling
    business.         And       because    the       government       did       not    offer     into
    evidence    the       actual    tax    returns       on     which       Tammy       listed    the
    gambling    income,         Staples’s       testimony       was       the     only       evidence
    establishing that Tammy completed those tax forms.
    If   the    defendants          had    been    able        to   ask     Staples       about
    whether    his    testimony      was     influenced         by    a     desire      to    receive
    favorable        treatment       from        the     government             in      the     fraud
    investigation, and about his alleged involvement in the major
    fraud scheme, the defendants could have undermined further the
    limited evidence presented by the government that Tammy was the
    22
    fifth participant in the gambling business. 7                             For these reasons,
    we    conclude      that     the    prosecutors           violated        their     obligations
    under Brady when they failed to disclose impeachment evidence of
    the    SEC     investigation            to    defense        counsel,        and    that     this
    impeachment evidence was material to the outcome of the trial.
    Our     conclusion          is    not       altered          by     the     government’s
    contention      that    it    was       not    required        to    disclose       information
    about the SEC investigation because the defendants already were
    aware of Staples’s conduct underlying the SEC complaint.                                       In
    making this assertion, the government principally relies on a
    recorded     conversation          between        Brett      and     Jack    in    which    Brett
    stated that he thought that Staples was engaged in a “scam”
    involving      elderly        people,          and      that       “if     they     investigate
    [Staples]      he    won’t     want      to       get   on     the       stand    with     nothing
    [because]      his     credibility           is    sh*t”       (emphasis         added).      The
    government further asserts that Jack informed a Secret Service
    agent working on the federal gambling investigation that Staples
    was    being     investigated            for      certain       “questionable            business
    practices.”
    7
    We disagree with the government’s argument that evidence
    of the SEC investigation is not material because Staples would
    have denied engaging in fraud if asked during cross-examination.
    Staples had admitted to the prosecution team that he was aware
    of the SEC investigation, which knowledge itself would have
    called into question Staples’s motivation for testifying on
    behalf of the government.
    23
    We examine this issue under the established principle that
    when    “exculpatory     information      is   not    only     available      to   the
    defendant but also lies in a source where a reasonable defendant
    would have looked, a defendant is not entitled to the benefit of
    the Brady doctrine.”         United States v. Jeffers, 
    570 F.3d 557
    ,
    573 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 
    901 F.2d 378
    , 381 (4th Cir. 1990)).               Thus, a Brady violation has not
    occurred if the defense is aware, or should have been aware, of
    impeachment     evidence    in    time   to    use   it   in    a   reasonable     and
    effective manner at trial.         
    Id. After considering
    the government’s evidence, the district
    court   found    that   although     Brett     and   Jack      “may   have   thought
    Staples had stolen from elderly or sick people,” neither Jack,
    Douglas,   nor   Brett     knew   about    the   nature      of     the   fraud,   the
    active SEC investigation, or the imminent SEC complaint.                           The
    government has failed to identify anything in the record to show
    that the district court clearly erred in this determination.
    See 
    King, 628 F.3d at 702
    .               Moreover, even if the defendants
    were    aware     of     Staples’s       alleged     “questionable           business
    practices,” the impeachment value of such information would have
    been far less than the value of showing that Staples was the
    subject of an imminent civil fraud action and may have been
    testifying in an effort to receive favorable treatment from the
    government.      Thus, the proffered evidence of Brett’s and Jack’s
    24
    knowledge       did    not   relieve      the       government       of   its   disclosure
    obligations. 8
    We likewise disagree with the defendants’ contention that
    the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions.                                In
    evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
    must       determine    whether     a    reasonable         fact     finder     could    have
    accepted the evidence “as adequate and sufficient to support a
    conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,”
    viewing       the     evidence     in    the        light   most     favorable     to     the
    government.          United States v. Cornell, 
    780 F.3d 616
    , 630 (4th
    Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
    As we already have observed, the sole disputed element of
    the    crime    was     whether     there      were     five       participants     in    the
    gambling       business      for   the    required          time    period.       Although
    Section       1955     requires     that        an     illegal       gambling     business
    8
    We similarly are unpersuaded by the government’s argument
    that its disclosure obligations were not triggered because the
    prosecution team was unaware before trial of the imminent civil
    complaint initiated by the SEC and filed by a different division
    of the United States Attorney’s Office in South Carolina.         The
    government contends that the prosecution team did not have to
    uncover   impeachment   information    held   by   other   government
    agencies.    See Kyles v. Whitley, 
    514 U.S. 419
    , 437 (1995)
    (“[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any
    favorable   evidence   known    to   the   others   acting   on   the
    government’s behalf in the case.”) (emphasis added).          We need
    not   consider   whether   this    distinction   advocated   by   the
    government has any merit, in light of the prosecution team’s
    admission that Staples personally had advised the prosecutors
    about the active SEC investigation three days before trial.
    25
    “involve[] five or more persons” who engage in certain business-
    related       activities,        the    jurors      need       not    reach       a    unanimous
    agreement regarding which five persons comprised the gambling
    business.       See 
    Nicolaou, 180 F.3d at 571
    .                        In other words, the
    disputed      element       of   Section     1955       on    which    the    jury          must    be
    unanimous       is    the    size       of   the    gambling         operation,          not       the
    “particular          set    of    facts”      underlying         the     five-participant
    element.       Id.; see also Schad v. Arizona, 
    501 U.S. 624
    , 631-32
    (1991) (explaining that jurors returning a general verdict need
    not    agree     on    a    single       means     of    commission          of       the    crime)
    (plurality opinion); United States v. Griggs, 
    569 F.3d 341
    , 343
    (7th Cir. 2009) (“The law distinguishes between the elements of
    a crime, as to which the jury must be unanimous, and the means
    by    which    the     crime     is     committed.”).           As     the    Supreme          Court
    explained in Griffin v. United States, we will not overturn a
    jury’s guilty verdict merely because the jury had the “option of
    relying upon a factually inadequate theory” proffered by the
    government, so long as “there existed alternative grounds for
    which the evidence was sufficient.”                          
    502 U.S. 46
    , 59-60 (1991)
    (citation omitted).
    We     therefore          must    determine           whether     the           government
    presented sufficient evidence to support one of its theories
    regarding the fifth participant.                        We initially hold that the
    government offered sufficient evidence for the jury to find that
    26
    Brett,      Jack,      Douglas,   and    Bryan   worked       together    in    a   single
    gambling business.            The evidence, construed in the light most
    favorable to the government, showed that the bookmakers from
    each       business      periodically     answered      the    telephone       lines   the
    other business used to accept bets, and that the two operations
    shared clients beginning in February 2012.                        In addition, as we
    explained in our Brady analysis, the evidence was sufficient to
    support      a    jury    finding    that   Tammy     was     a   fifth   participant.
    Although         the     government’s     case    was     not      overwhelming,       the
    evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government
    formed a sufficient basis for the defendants’ convictions. 9                           We
    therefore do not enter judgments of acquittal, but vacate the
    defendants’            convictions      based    on     the       government’s      Brady
    violation and remand the cases to the district court.
    9
    The defendants additionally argue that Tammy’s notes are
    inadmissible hearsay and should have been excluded from the
    trial.   We disagree.   The notes were not “offer[ed] . . . to
    prove the truth of the matter asserted” such as, for example,
    the value of the money actually held in the booking fund.      See
    Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Rather, the government offered the notes
    to illustrate Tammy’s knowledge of and participation in the
    gambling business.    Because the notes are not hearsay, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting them.
    27
    III.
    Accordingly, we vacate the convictions of Jack Parker and
    Douglas Taylor.   We remand their cases to the district court for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    28