United States v. Mark Bass ( 2019 )


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  •                                      UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 19-4388
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    MARK BASS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
    Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:18-cr-00424-FL-1)
    Submitted: December 17, 2019                                Decided: December 19, 2019
    Before KING, FLOYD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief Appellate Attorney,
    OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant
    United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
    North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Mark Bass pled guilty to manufacturing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 2251(a) (2012), and the district court sentenced him to 326 months’ imprisonment to be
    followed by a lifetime term of supervised release. On appeal, Bass argues that the district
    court erred when it ordered, as special conditions of supervised release, that Bass submit
    to a psychosexual evaluation and physiological testing. According to Bass, the evaluations
    are an unnecessary deprivation of liberty and are not supported by the district court’s
    findings. We affirm.
    “District courts are afforded broad latitude to impose conditions on supervised
    release, which we review for abuse of discretion only.” United States v. Douglas, 
    850 F.3d 660
    , 663 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The sentencing court may
    impose any condition reasonably related to . . . the nature and circumstances of the offense
    and the history and characteristics of the defendant, protecting the public from further
    crimes, and providing the defendant with needed medical care or other correctional
    treatment[.]” United States v. Armel, 
    585 F.3d 182
    , 186 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations,
    quotation marks, and alterations omitted). However, the conditions imposed must involve
    “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to achieve the sentencing
    goals and must be consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements. 18 U.S.C.
    § 3583(d)(2)-(3) (2012). The district court must also “demonstrate that it considered the
    parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking
    authority.” United States v. Lynn, 
    592 F.3d 572
    , 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
    marks and brackets omitted).
    2
    We conclude that, here, the district court adequately explained that Bass’ sentence,
    including the special conditions of supervised release, was based on the need for
    deterrence, the protection of the public, and Bass’ need for treatment. See 
    Douglas, 850 F.3d at 666-67
    (finding it “well within” court’s discretion to impose sex-offender
    evaluation where it was reasonably related to offense, history and characteristics of
    defendant, protection of public, and defendant’s need for treatment). Considering Bass’
    extensive history of sexually abusing young, vulnerable family members, we find that the
    psychosexual evaluation and physiological testing are not an unnecessary deprivation of
    liberty and that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed these
    conditions of Bass’ supervised release.
    We therefore affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument
    because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-4388

Filed Date: 12/19/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/19/2019