United States v. Clayton Bullin , 582 F. App'x 176 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4920
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CLAYTON DOYLE BULLIN, a/k/a Doyle Bullin,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:04-cr-00043-RLV-DCK-2)
Submitted: August 21, 2014 Decided: August 25, 2014
Before SHEDD, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michelle Anderson Barth, LAW OFFICE OF MICHELLE ANDERSON BARTH,
Burlington, Vermont, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United
States Attorney, William M. Miller, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Clayton Doyle Bullin appeals from the district court’s
judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing a
sixty-month term of imprisonment. On appeal, Bullin claims that
his Due Process Clause and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32.1 rights were violated when his attorney did not call a
witness that he requested to testify. He also challenges his
sentence, alleging that the court did not consider the need to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Finding no error, we
affirm.
We review a district court’s judgment revoking
supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th
Cir. 1992). On appeal, Bullin alleges that his rights under
Rule 32.1 and the Due Process Clause were violated because
counsel would not call Parole Officer Chelsey Padilla, as Bullin
requested. Although Bullin claims that he was denied his right
to confront witnesses, this claim is without merit as counsel’s
decision was a strategic one, and the claim is better raised as
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Bullin fails to
show that the district court violated his confrontation rights
and, further, no ineffective assistance conclusively appears on
the record.
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Next, Bullin argues that his sentence was unreasonable
because the court did not fully consider his arguments that his
original sentence would have been lower had the Fair Sentencing
Act been enacted before he was sentenced and had his
consolidated North Carolina convictions be counted as a single
offense, instead of multiple offenses. “A district court has
broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640
(4th Cir. 2013). In exercising such discretion, the court “is
guided by the Chapter Seven policy statements in the federal
Guidelines manual, as well as the statutory factors applicable
to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e)
[2012].” Id. at 641.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). The court first considers
whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable. Id. at 438. In this initial inquiry, the court
takes a more deferential posture concerning issues of fact and
the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for
Guidelines sentences. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if this court finds the sentence
procedurally or substantively unreasonable, must the court
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decide whether it is plainly so. Id. at 657; see also United
States v. Bennett, 698 F.3d 194, 200 (4th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1506 (2013). This court presumes a sentence
within the Chapter Seven policy statement range is reasonable.
Webb, 738 F.3d at 642.
We have reviewed the record and conclude that Bullin’s
sentence is reasonable, and the district court did not err or
abuse its discretion. The sentence is within both the
prescribed statutory range and the policy statement range, and
the district court reasonably determined that a sentence at the
high end of the policy statement range was appropriate in this
case.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We deny Bullin’s
motions to file a pro se supplemental brief. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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