United States v. Douglas Holden , 624 F. App'x 826 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4207
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DOUGLAS RAY HOLDEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge.
(8:14-cr-00207-TMC-1)
Submitted: September 28, 2015 Decided: October 5, 2015
Before DUNCAN and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kimberly H. Albro, Research and Writing Specialist, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Carrie Fisher Sherard, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Douglas Ray Holden appeals the 120-month sentence imposed
following his guilty plea to brandishing a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). On appeal, he challenges the procedural
and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.
We review a sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range[,] under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We first consider whether the
district court committed significant procedural error, such as
incorrect calculation of the Guidelines range, insufficient
consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, or
inadequate explanation of the sentence imposed. United States
v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111-12 (4th Cir. 2015).
In announcing a sentence, the court “must place on the
record an individualized assessment based on the particular
facts of the case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The explanation must be adequate “to satisfy the appellate court
that the district court has considered the parties’ arguments
and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal
decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d
832, 837 (4th Cir. 2010) (brackets and internal quotation marks
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omitted). “Where the defendant or prosecutor presents
nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence than that
set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge should
address the party’s arguments and explain why he has rejected
those arguments.” Carter, 564 F.3d at 328 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The court’s explanation generally must provide
“some indication” that it considered both the § 3553(a) factors
as they relate to the defendant and the parties’ potentially
meritorious sentencing arguments. United States v. Montes-
Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 2006).
Holden analogizes to United States v. Patterson, 557 F.
App’x 558 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1517), to argue that the
district court committed procedural error in failing to
recognize its discretion to consider his substance abuse in
mitigation. We find Patterson readily distinguishable, as the
court’s statements demonstrate no misunderstanding of its
authority. At the outset of the sentencing hearing, the court
specifically noted that it had considered a forensic
psychological report in preparation for sentencing, and its
comments during the hearing reveal that it had both heard and
considered Holden’s argument regarding the evaluation. The
court also noted Holden’s substance abuse when describing
Holden’s relevant history and characteristics during its
explanation of his sentence.
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The specific sentencing claim on which Holden focuses was
but a small part of defense counsel’s lengthy sentencing
argument. The court addressed counsel’s argument and provided a
detailed, individualized explanation for its sentence, grounded
expressly in the relevant § 3553(a) factors. Viewed on the
whole, the court’s statements were sufficient to indicate that
the court considered Holden’s argument regarding his substance
abuse when determining his sentence. See Montes-Pineda, 445
F.3d at 380.
Having found no procedural error, we consider the
substantive reasonableness of Holden’s sentence under “the
totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Substantive reasonableness considers whether “the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it
chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United
States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
In evaluating substantive reasonableness, we must consider “the
extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” United
States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416, 425 (4th Cir. 2015).
A sentence is not unreasonable simply because the district
court could have weighed the § 3553(a) factors differently in
selecting a sentence. United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 290
(4th Cir. 2012). Greater variances are subject to more intense
appellate scrutiny, and “[t]he farther the court diverges from
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the advisory guideline range, the more compelling the reasons
for the divergence must be.” United States v. Hampton, 441 F.3d
284, 288 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, “[a] district court’s decision to vary from the
Guidelines for an outside-the-heartland case is entitled to the
greatest respect.” Lymas, 781 F.3d at 112 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Although the court imposed a significant upward variance,
we conclude the court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) factors and
relevant sentencing considerations sufficiently justified the
extent of the variance. The parties now dispute the type of
case to which Holden’s offense should be compared, but they
compared his offense only to domestic violence cases at
sentencing. The troubling facts of Holden’s offense, as
detailed by the sentencing court, and the sentences to which he
could have been subject for his offenses, support the court’s
conclusion that Holden’s offense fell outside the heartland of
both § 924(c) and domestic violence cases. In light of the
“extremely broad discretion” accorded sentencing courts in
weighing the § 3553(a) factors, see United States v. Jeffery,
631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011), we discern no abuse of
discretion in the sentence imposed by the court.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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