United States v. Stephanie Chapman ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4103
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEPHANIE CHAPMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District
Judge. (1:13-cr-00298-LO-1)
Submitted: December 19, 2014 Decided: January 7, 2015
Amended: January 8, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Alfred L. Robertson, Jr., ROBERTSON LAW OFFICE, PLLC,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United
States Attorney, Michael J. Frank, Assistant United States
Attorney, Stacey K. Luck, Special Assistant United States
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A federal jury convicted Stephanie Chapman of
conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a child, sex trafficking
of a child, and interstate transportation of a minor for
purposes of prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
1591(a)(1), 1594(c), 2423 (2012). The district court sentenced
Chapman to a total of eleven years’ imprisonment, and she now
appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
Chapman first argues that insufficient evidence
supported the jury’s finding of guilt. Specifically, Chapman
contends that the Government failed to prove that (1) she
benefitted financially; (2) she had knowledge or reckless
disregard of Jane Doe’s age; and (3) violence, threats of
violence, or coercion were used to engage Jane Doe in
prostitution. By these assertions, Chapman challenges the
Government’s proof of the elements of sex trafficking of a
child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). She does not
however, address elements of the other charges against her in
the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2423, 1594. By failing to
brief these issues, Chapman has waived review of them. See
United States v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004)
(“It is a well settled rule that contentions not raised in the
argument section of the opening brief are abandoned.”).
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We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence de
novo. United States v. Roe, 606 F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 2010).
“The standard for reversing a jury verdict of guilty is a high
one: the Court does so only where the prosecution’s failure is
clear.” United States v. Perry, 757 F.3d 166, 175 (4th Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The jury’s verdict
must be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the
record to support it, where substantial evidence is evidence
that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In assessing evidentiary sufficiency, the evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light
most favorable to the Government. Id. We do not reassess the
jury’s determinations of witness credibility. United States v.
Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2007).
In order to convict a defendant of a violation of
§ 1591(a)(1), the government must prove that the defendant:
(1) knowingly recruited, transported, harbored, maintained,
obtained, or enticed a person, (2) in or affecting interstate
commerce, (3) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that
the victim had not attained the age of eighteen years and would
be made to engage in a commercial sex act. United States v.
Garcia–Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2013). However,
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“[i]n a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the
defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person so
recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained or
maintained, the Government need not prove that the defendant
knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.” 18
U.S.C. § 1591(c). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and
conclude that there was substantial evidence of Chapman’s guilt
of the offenses.
Chapman also argues that the district court erred by
denying her request to issue a jury instruction on mistake of
fact. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s
refusal to give a particular jury instruction. United States v.
Shrader, 675 F.3d 300, 308 (4th Cir. 2012). The district
court’s refusal to grant a requested jury instruction is
reversible error only if the proffered instruction was
“(1) correct; (2) not substantially covered by the court’s
charge; and (3) dealing with some point in the trial so
important, that failure to give the requested instruction
seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to conduct [her]
defense.” Id. When jury instructions are challenged on appeal,
the issue is whether “the instructions, taken as a whole,
adequately state the controlling law.” United States v. Bolden,
325 F.3d 471, 486 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
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that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to give Chapman’s proposed jury instruction.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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