United States v. Mustapha Zico , 553 F. App'x 318 ( 2014 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-4408
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    MUSTAPHA ISSAKA ZICO, a/k/a Mustafa Zico, a/k/a Alhaji,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria.   Liam O’Grady, District
    Judge. (1:12-cr-00117-LO-1)
    Submitted:   December 20, 2013            Decided:   January 29, 2014
    Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Joseph R. Conte, Charles J. Soschin, LAW OFFICE OF J. R. CONTE,
    P.L.L.C., Washington, D.C., for Appellant.      Dana J. Boente,
    Acting United States Attorney, Julia K. Martinez, James P.
    Gillis, Assistant United States Attorneys, Alexandria, Virginia,
    for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Mustapha     Issaka   Zico       appeals    the    district   court’s
    judgment imposing a sentence of 216 months in prison after the
    jury convicted him of conspiracy to import one kilogram or more
    of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 960(b)(1)(A), 963 (2012),
    and distribution for the purpose of unlawful importation of one
    kilogram or more of heroin in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012),
    21    U.S.C.       §§ 959(a),    960(b)(1)(A)       (2012).       On   appeal,    Zico
    raises   the       issues   of   whether    the    evidence      was   sufficient   to
    convict him and whether his sentence was improper.                     We affirm.
    A    defendant     challenging        the    sufficiency      of     the
    evidence faces a heavy burden.                  United States v. Cone, 
    714 F.3d 197
    , 212 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation and quotations omitted).                         We
    must uphold a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence,
    viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, to support
    it.    United States v. Al Sabahi, 
    719 F.3d 305
    , 311 (4th Cir.
    2013) (citation and quotations omitted).                      Substantial evidence
    is “evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
    adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”                  United States v. Burgos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    , 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
    Zico argues that the evidence was insufficient because
    it “came solely from the testimony of unreliable drug dealers
    and drug couriers,” and “a conviction based entirely on such
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    biased testimony should not stand.”             (Appellant’s br. at 13).
    However, the jury has already assessed the credibility of the
    witnesses, and we cannot do so on appeal.              See United States v.
    Cabrera-Beltran, 
    660 F.3d 742
    , 754 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation
    omitted); see also Perry v. New Hampshire, 
    132 S. Ct. 716
    , 723
    (2012)   (“[J]uries   are    assigned     the   task   of   determining     the
    reliability of the evidence presented at trial.”).                   Moreover,
    “[t]he settled law of this circuit recognizes that the testimony
    of a defendant’s accomplices, standing alone and uncorroborated,
    can provide an adequate basis for conviction.”              United States v.
    Burns, 
    990 F.2d 1426
    , 1439 (4th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
    Deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations, we conclude
    that substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict.
    We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness using
    an abuse of discretion standard.          United States v. McManus, 
    734 F.3d 315
    , 317 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007)).        First, we consider whether the district
    court    committed    a   significant      procedural       error,   such   as
    improperly   calculating     the    Guidelines    range     or   inadequately
    explaining the sentence.           United States v. Allmendinger, 
    706 F.3d 330
    , 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 2747
    (2013).
    If the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we then consider its
    substantive reasonableness, taking into account the totality of
    the circumstances.        
    Gall, 552 U.S. at 51
    .          We presume that a
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    sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range
    is substantively reasonable.               United States v. Susi, 
    674 F.3d 278
    , 289 (4th Cir. 2012).
    In sentencing, the district court must first correctly
    calculate the defendant’s sentencing range under the Sentencing
    Guidelines.     
    Allmendinger, 706 F.3d at 340
    .                  The district court
    is next required to give the parties an opportunity to argue for
    what they believe to be an appropriate sentence, and the court
    must consider those arguments in light of the factors set forth
    in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).             
    Id. When rendering
      a   sentence,           the   district     court    must
    make and place on the record an individualized assessment based
    on the particular facts of the case.                    United States v. Carter,
    
    564 F.3d 325
    , 330 (4th Cir. 2009).                    In explaining the sentence,
    the “sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the
    appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments
    and   has   a      reasoned   basis        for    exercising       his     own     legal
    decisionmaking authority.”          Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    ,
    356 (2007).     While a court must consider the statutory factors
    and   explain   its    sentence,      it       need    not    explicitly    reference
    § 3553(a) or discuss every factor on the record.                     United States
    v. Johnson, 
    445 F.3d 339
    , 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
    Zico first contends that the district court erred in
    applying a three-level enhancement for his role as a manager or
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    supervisor in the offense pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
    Manual § 3B1.1(b) (2012).           We review this issue for clear error.
    
    Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d at 756
    .              The adjustment applies “[i]f
    the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer
    or    leader)   and    the   criminal    activity      involved    five   or   more
    participants or was otherwise extensive.”                  USSG § 3B1.1(b).      The
    Guidelines list seven factors to be considered in making the
    determination.         See   USSG    § 3B1.1   cmt.    n.4;   United    States   v.
    Otuya, 
    720 F.3d 183
    , 192 (4th Cir. 2013) (applying some of these
    factors in assessing propriety of three-level enhancement).
    “[T]he      aggravating     role    adjustment        is   appropriate
    where the evidence demonstrates that the defendant controlled
    the   activities      of   other    participants      or   exercised    management
    responsibility.”           United States v. Llamas, 
    599 F.3d 381
    , 390
    (4th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see
    also United States v. Slade, 
    631 F.3d 185
    , 190 (4th Cir. 2011)
    (noting this Court has affirmed application of an aggravating
    role adjustment under USSG § 3B1.1(b) where there was “record
    evidence that the defendant actively exercised some authority
    over other participants in the operation or actively managed its
    activities”).         The defendant need only have exercised control
    over one participant.              See USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2.             Applying
    these standards to the facts of this case, we conclude that the
    district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement.
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    Finally, Zico contends that the district court failed
    to consider pertinent sentencing factors when imposing his 216-
    month    sentence     because    the     court      failed    to    discuss       certain
    factors on the record and because his sentence was longer than
    the sentences imposed on related defendants.                     We disagree.
    The     district    court     first      properly      calculated     Zico’s
    Guidelines range to be 262 to 327 months.                    The court noted that
    it had considered the parties’ written positions on sentencing
    and gave them an opportunity to argue for the sentence they
    believed to be appropriate.             Zico requested a sentence below his
    Guidelines    range    based     in    part    on    the    factors    he   raises      on
    appeal.    He contended that the low end of his Guidelines range
    was “100 months more than any other defendants in this case,”
    and a sentence below the Guidelines range was appropriate based
    on “the nature of the offense and the nature of Mr. Zico.”
    The     district     court     granted         Zico’s    request      for    a
    variance and sentenced him substantially below his Guidelines
    range.     While the sentence was not as low as Zico wanted, the
    court    explained    its   sentence      was       appropriate     because,       unlike
    other defendants, Zico had failed to accept responsibility and
    had obstructed justice.
    We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.                         We
    dispense     with    oral      argument       because      the     facts    and    legal
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    contentions   are   adequately   presented   in   the   materials   before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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