Israel Adamu v. Loretta Lynch ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1452
ISRAEL GIMMUH ADAMU,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: December 28, 2016 Decided: January 13, 2017
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Danielle Beach-Oswald, Holly Klein, BEACH-OSWALD IMMIGRATION LAW
ASSOCIATES, PC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Benjamin C.
Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Douglas E.
Ginsburg, Assistant Director, Jenny C. Lee, Office of
Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Israel Gimmuh Adamu, a native and citizen of Cameroon,
petitions for review of orders from the Board of Immigration
Appeals (Board) dismissing his appeal from the immigration
judge’s (IJ) decision denying his applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention
Against Torture (CAT). For the reasons set forth below, we deny
the petition for review.
The Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) vests in the
Attorney General the discretionary power to grant asylum to
aliens who qualify as refugees. Djadjou v. Holder, 662 F.3d
265, 272 (4th Cir. 2011). A refugee is someone “who is unable
or unwilling to return to” his native country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
An asylum applicant has the burden of proving that he satisfies
the definition of a refugee to qualify for relief. Djadjou, 662
F.3d at 272. He may satisfy this burden by showing that he was
subjected to past persecution or that he has a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of a protected ground. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.13(b)(1) (2016). If the applicant establishes past
persecution, he has the benefit of a rebuttable presumption of a
well-founded fear of persecution. Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 272.
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If the applicant is unable to establish that he was the
victim of past persecution, he must establish a well-founded
fear of future persecution. Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594,
600 (4th Cir. 2010). An applicant faces a heightened burden of
proof to qualify for withholding of removal to a particular
country under the INA because he must show a clear probability
of persecution on account of a protected ground. Djadjou, 662
F.3d at 272. If he meets this heightened burden, withholding of
removal is mandatory. However, if the applicant cannot
demonstrate asylum eligibility, his application for withholding
of removal will necessarily fail as well. Id.
To qualify for protection under the CAT, an applicant bears
the burden of proof of showing “it is more likely than not that
he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country
of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2016). The applicant
need not prove the torture would be inflicted on account of a
protected ground. Dankam v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 115-16 (4th
Cir. 2007).
Because the Board “issued its own opinion without adopting
the IJ’s opinion . . . we review that opinion and not the
opinion of the IJ.” Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 908 (4th
Cir. 2014). We will uphold the Board’s decision unless it is
manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.
Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 273. The standard of review of the
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agency’s findings is narrow and deferential. Factual findings
are affirmed if supported by “substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole.” Mulyani v. Holder, 771 F.3d 190, 197
(4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial
evidence exists to support a finding unless the evidence was
such that any reasonable adjudicator would have been compelled
to conclude to the contrary. Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 273. “Even
if the record plausibly could support two results: the one the
IJ chose and the one the petitioner advances, reversal is only
appropriate where the court finds that the evidence not only
supports the opposite conclusion, but compels it.” Mulyani, 771
F.3d at 197 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Because the IJ did not make an adverse credibility
determination in this case, Adamu had “a rebuttable presumption
of credibility on appeal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)
(2012); Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 600-01 & n.*; see also Lin-
Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 191 (4th Cir. 2007) (“When an IJ
is silent on the issue of credibility, it is appropriate to
presume that the applicant testified credibly.”). Where the
applicant is deemed credible, his testimony “‘may be sufficient
to sustain his burden of proof without corroboration.’”
Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 601 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)
(2016)). “However, even for credible testimony, corroboration
may be required when it is reasonable to expect such proof and
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there is no reasonable explanation for its absence.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n asylum applicant
should provide documentary support for material facts which are
central to his or her claim and easily subject to verification.
. . . The absence of such corroborating evidence can lead to a
finding that an applicant has failed to meet his burden of
proof.” In re J-Y-C-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 260, 263 (B.I.A. 2007)
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Also, the
applicant’s corroborating evidence may be rejected so long as
the agency provides “specific [and] cogent reasons.” Djadjou,
662 F.3d at 276.
First, we conclude that the Board properly reviewed the
IJ’s factual findings. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) (2016). We
further conclude that Adamu’s applications for relief could be
rejected due to insufficient corroborating evidence. See
Djadjou, 662 F.3d at 276; see also Eta-Ndu v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d
977, 985 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming the denial of relief because
corroborating evidence lacked authenticity). Finally, we
conclude that specific and cogent reasons were offered in
support of the diminished weight given to most of Adamu’s
corroborating evidence and that substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole supports the Board’s conclusion
that Adamu provided insufficient corroborating evidence in
support of his claim. Thus, we conclude that the Board did not
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abuse its discretion in finding that Adamu did not establish his
eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection
under the CAT.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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