United States v. Mario Alvarez-Aldana ( 2014 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-4094
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    MARIO ALVAREZ-ALDANA,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Dever III,
    Chief District Judge. (7:12-cr-00078-D-1)
    Submitted:   January 30, 2014              Decided:   February 12, 2014
    Before WYNN and    FLOYD,   Circuit   Judges,   and   HAMILTON,   Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellant.   Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
    P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
    Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    In 2002 Mario Alvarez-Aldana entered no contest pleas
    in North Carolina state court to two counts of taking indecent
    liberties with a minor.                  In October 2012 Alvarez-Aldana pled
    guilty to illegal reentry of an aggravated felon, under 8 U.S.C.
    § 1326(a), (b)(2) (2012), and was sentenced to forty-one months
    of     imprisonment,         the       bottom       of   his     advisory        Sentencing
    Guidelines range.
    On    appeal,          Alvarez-Aldana           contests       his   Sentencing
    Guidelines range enhancement of sixteen levels because his North
    Carolina convictions for taking indecent liberties with a child
    were    considered       crimes         of     violence      under        U.S.   Sentencing
    Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012), arguing
    that the enhancement as applied to non-citizens is a violation
    of equal protection.               In assessing a challenge to a district
    court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we review the
    court’s    factual        findings           for    clear      error      and    its   legal
    conclusions de novo.            United States v. Sosa–Carabantes, 
    561 F.3d 256
    , 259 (4th Cir. 2009).
    The        Equal       Protection        Clause      of       the    Fourteenth
    Amendment prohibits “governmental decisionmakers from treating
    differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.”
    Nordlinger v. Hahn, 
    505 U.S. 1
    , 10 (1992) (citation omitted).
    “To    succeed    on    an     equal    protection       claim,       a   [claimant]    must
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    first    demonstrate          that    he     has       been    treated        differently         from
    others with whom he is similarly situated and that the unequal
    treatment        was     the        result        of     intentional            or       purposeful
    discrimination.”          Morrison v. Garraghty, 
    239 F.3d 648
    , 654 (4th
    Cir. 2001).        If a claimant succeeds in making such a showing,
    the   court      must    determine         whether        the    disparity          is    justified
    under the requisite level of scrutiny.                          
    Id. The Sentencing
    Guidelines may properly be challenged
    on equal protection grounds, and the “relevant test is whether
    the     classification          is       rationally           related     to        a    legitimate
    government interest.”                 United States v. Ruiz-Chairez, 
    493 F.3d 1089
    ,     1091     (9th       Cir.        2007)        (addressing        equal          protection
    challenge     to    USSG       §    2L1.2(b)(1)(A))             (citations          and    internal
    quotation omitted); see United States v. D’Anjou, 
    16 F.3d 604
    ,
    612 (4th Cir. 1994) (applying rational basis test to Guidelines
    equal protection challenge).                       Rational basis review does not
    require the court to identify Congress’ actual rationale for the
    distinction.            The        statute    will        be     upheld        if       “there     are
    ‘plausible       reasons’          for     Congress’          action.”          FCC       v.     Beach
    Commc’ns,     Inc.,      
    508 U.S. 307
    ,        313-14    (1993)        (quoting        United
    States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 
    449 U.S. 166
    , 179 (1980)).                                          The
    burden is on the one raising the equal protection challenge to
    negate    “every        conceivable          basis       which        might    support         it[.]”
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    Heller v. Doe, 
    509 U.S. 312
    , 320 (1993) (citation and internal
    quotation omitted).
    We have reviewed Alvarez-Aldana’s arguments on appeal
    and conclude that he has failed to establish any violation under
    the Equal Protection Clause.          See 
    Ruiz-Chairez, 493 F.3d at 1091
    (denying equal protection challenge to § 2L1.2 on rational basis
    review,    finding      that    “enhancement        serves      the    legitimate
    government interest of deterring illegal reentry by those who
    have committed drug-related and violent crimes”); United States
    v. Adeleke, 
    968 F.2d 1159
    , 1160-61 (11th Cir. 1992) (rejecting
    equal    protection     argument   that      §   2L1.2    effectively    punishes
    illegal reentrants, and not citizens, twice for the same crime).
    Moreover, the burden is on Alvarez-Aldana to negate any basis
    which might support the enhancement, see 
    Heller, 509 U.S. at 320
    , and he has failed to meet this burden.                     See also United
    States    v.    Perez-Perez,    
    737 F.3d 950
    ,    952   (4th    Cir.   2013)
    (finding that taking indecent liberties with a minor under N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 14–202.1(a) qualified categorically as sexual abuse
    of a minor and therefore was a crime of violence within the
    meaning of USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)).
    Accordingly, we affirm Alvarez-Aldana’s sentence.                   We
    dispense       with   oral   argument     because       the    facts   and    legal
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    contentions   are   adequately   presented   in   the   materials   before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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