Douglas Dunlap v. Texas Guaranteed , 590 F. App'x 244 ( 2015 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-1884
    DOUGLAS C. DUNLAP,
    Plaintiff – Appellant,
    v.
    TEXAS GUARANTEED; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; SUNTRUST
    BANK; SALLIE MAE; SAN ANTONIO FEDERAL CREDIT UNION; NAVIENT
    SOLUTIONS, INC.,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Richmond.     John A. Gibney, Jr.,
    District Judge. (3:14-cv-00256-JAG)
    Submitted:   January 5, 2015                 Decided:   January 16, 2015
    Before NIEMEYER   and   DIAZ,   Circuit   Judges,   and   DAVIS,   Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Douglas C. Dunlap, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Field Moorman, LAW
    OFFICE OF ROBERT F. MOORMAN, PLC, Richmond, Virginia; Maurice
    Francis Mullins, Jr., SPOTTS FAIN, PC, Richmond, Virginia;
    Stephen M. Faraci, Sr., LECLAIR RYAN, PC, Richmond, Virginia;
    Douglas P. Rucker, Jr., Eric C. Howlett, SANDS ANDERSON, PC,
    Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Douglas C. Dunlap appeals the district court’s order
    dismissing his claims pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2) (2012).
    On appeal, Dunlap contends that the judge erred in holding that
    his     fraud    claims       were    barred        by   the    Virginia        statute    of
    limitations.       He does not contest the district court’s reasons
    for dismissing his remaining claims, instead simply reiterating
    the merits of those claims, which the district court did not
    address.    Finding no error, we affirm.
    We    review       a    dismissal       pursuant     to   §    1915(e)(2)      de
    novo.     De’lonta v. Angelone, 
    330 F.3d 630
    , 633 (4th Cir. 2003).
    Virginia    imposes       a    two-year       statute      of   limitations       on    fraud
    claims.     
    Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243
    (A) (West 2014); see Hansen v.
    Stanley Martin Cos., Inc., 
    266 Va. 345
    , 355, 
    585 S.E.2d 567
    , 573
    (2003).     The statute “begins to run from the date the fraud or
    negligent misrepresentation ‘is discovered or by the exercise of
    due diligence reasonably should have been discovered.’”                             Hansen,
    
    266 Va. at 355
    ,        
    585 S.E.2d at
       573    (citing       
    Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-249
    (1) (West 2014)).
    Furthermore, the plaintiff bears the burden “to prove
    that, despite the exercise of due diligence, he could not have
    discovered the alleged fraud [except] within the two-year period
    before he commenced the action[.]”                       Schmidt v. Household Fin.
    Corp., II, 
    276 Va. 108
    , 117, 
    661 S.E.2d 834
    , 839 (2008).                                  Due
    2
    diligence        is    “such       a     measure       of     prudence,       activity,         or
    assiduity, as is properly to be expected from, and ordinarily
    exercised        by,     a     reasonable            and     prudent       man     under        the
    circumstances;         not     measured         by     any    absolute       standard,          but
    depending on the relative facts of the special case.                                      Id. at
    118, 
    661 S.E.2d at 839
     (internal alterations omitted).
    Based on our review of the record and the parties’
    briefs,    we     conclude      that      the    district       judge      did     not    err    in
    dismissing Dunlap’s claims.                    Dunlap has not presented sufficient
    evidence to show that, had he exercised due diligence, he would
    not have discovered the Appellees’ allegedly fraudulent conduct
    until     less    than       two       years    before       the    date     he     filed       his
    complaint.
    Accordingly,           we     affirm       the    order     of       the     district
    court.     We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions         are       adequately      presented        in   the       materials
    before    this    court      and       argument      would    not   aid      the       decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-1884

Citation Numbers: 590 F. App'x 244

Judges: Niemeyer, Diaz, Davis

Filed Date: 1/16/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024