United States v. Shaquille Hunter , 590 F. App'x 261 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4470
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHAQUILLE DISHAWN HUNTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:13-cr-00271-BO-1)
Submitted: January 22, 2015 Decided: January 26, 2015
Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shaquille Dishawn Hunter appeals the seventy-two-month
sentence imposed after he pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of being a felon in possession of a
firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2012). Hunter asserts that his sentence should be vacated
because the district court: (1) procedurally erred when it
imposed upon him an upward variant sentence without addressing
his non-frivolous arguments for a lesser sentence; and (2)
substantively erred because his sentence is greater than
necessary to comply with the statutory purposes of sentencing
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). Finding no error, we
affirm.
We review Hunter’s sentence for abuse of discretion.
See United States v. Cobler, 748 F.3d 570, 581 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 229 (2014). “The first step in our review of
a sentence mandates that we ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error, such as improperly
calculating the Guidelines range or selecting a sentence based
on clearly erroneous facts.” United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d
381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted). And when a district court has imposed an
upward variant sentence, we consider the reasonableness of
imposing a variance and the extent of the variance. United
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States v. Tucker, 473 F.3d 556, 561 (4th Cir. 2007). A greater
variance requires more substantial justification. United States
v. Diosdado–Star, 630 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2011).
“Generally, if the reasons justifying the variance are tied to
§ 3553(a) and are plausible, the sentence will be deemed
reasonable.” Tucker, 473 F.3d at 561 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
Upon review of the parties’ briefs and the record, we
conclude that the seventy-two-month sentence, which represents a
fifteen-month upward variance from Hunter’s advisory Guidelines
range, is reasonable. In particular, the record establishes
that the district court listened to counsel’s arguments for an
appropriate sentence but disagreed with those arguments,
believing instead that an upward variant sentence was warranted
and necessary.
We also conclude that the district court adequately
explained Hunter’s sentence and appropriately tied its rationale
for the variant sentence to the § 3553(a) factors it deemed
relevant. Thus, we find that the seventy-two-month sentence is
reasonable. See United States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 283-84
(4th Cir. 2012) (concluding that upward variant sentence was
reasonable as it was adequately supported by reference to those
§ 3553(a) factors that “the court determined required the
sentence ultimately imposed”); Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d at 366-67
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(holding that an upward variant sentence six years longer than
the Guidelines range was substantively reasonable because the
district court expressly relied on several § 3553(a) factors to
support the variance).
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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