United States v. Oscar Santos ( 2019 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4502
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
OSCAR ROBERTO SANTOS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. (1:13-cr-00321-RDB-1)
Submitted: March 29, 2019 Decided: April 10, 2019
Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
A.D. Martin, LAW OFFICE OF ANTHONY D. MARTIN, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellant. Robert K. Hur, United States Attorney, P. Michael Cunningham, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a four-day trial in October 2017, a federal jury convicted Oscar Roberto
Santos of receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) (2012),
and possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (2012).
The district court subsequently sentenced Santos to 135 months in prison, which was at
the bottom of Santos’ Sentencing Guidelines range of 135-168 months. Santos appeals,
arguing first that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress an inculpating
statement Santos made after he was advised of his Miranda 1 rights in English, which is
not his native language. Santos also argues that his sentence is procedurally and
substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
I.
Santos first maintains that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the inculpating statement he made to Detective Joshua Rees of the Baltimore
County Police Department, who interviewed Santos while other officers executed a
search warrant for his apartment. Santos, who is a native-Spanish speaker, contends that
the totality of the circumstances weigh in favor of us finding that his Miranda waiver was
not valid because he was apprised of his rights in English. The district court considered
this argument and found that Santos “clearly understood and spoke English.” (J.A. 92). 2
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix submitted by the parties.
2
When evaluating the district court’s ruling on a suppression motion, we review
“conclusions of law de novo and underlying factual findings for clear error.” United
States v. Clarke, 842 F.3d 288, 293 (4th Cir. 2016) (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted). When, as here, the motion to suppress has been denied, the evidence is
considered in the light most favorable to the Government. Id.
Whenever a defendant is subject to a custodial interrogation, the defendant must
be advised of his Miranda rights. United States v. Azua-Rinconada, 914 F.3d 319, 325
(4th Cir. 2019). Here, the parties agreed that Santos was in custody for purposes of
Miranda, and, therefore, that Santos was entitled to his Miranda rights before being
questioned by Rees.
“A confession made during a custodial interrogation will be suppressed unless
police advise the defendant of his rights under Miranda . . . and the defendant knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntar[il]y waives those rights.” United States v. Giddins, 858 F.3d
870, 879 (4th Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “For a waiver to
be knowing and intelligent, it ‘must have been made with a full awareness of both the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’”
United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 474 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). When assessing if a Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent,
this court conducts a holistic review “of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation, including the suspect’s intelligence and education, age and familiarity with
the criminal justice system, and the proximity of the waiver to the giving of the Miranda
warnings.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The issue on appeal is whether Santos’ waiver of his Miranda rights was valid,
given the asserted limitation on Santos’ ability to understand English and the officers’
failure to apprise Santos of his rights in Spanish. We have recognized that a defendant’s
“[l]imited ability to understand English may render a waiver of rights defective[,]” but
that a language barrier will not necessarily frustrate an effective waiver. United States v.
Guay, 108 F.3d 545, 549 (4th Cir. 1997); see Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1020
(2d Cir. 1989) (“Even though [defendant’s] proficiency in the English language may have
been limited, it did not prevent him from making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his
constitutional rights.”).
Here, the district court made factual findings that, before the interview began,
Rees advised Santos of his rights in English by reading them to the group assembled in
the living room of the apartment and asked Santos if he understood his rights as they
were read to him. Prior to issuing these warnings in English, Rees asked Santos if he
“was comfortable with [Rees] speaking to him in English, and he stated that he was.”
(J.A. 39). Rees proceeded to interview Santos in English, during which Santos spoke
only English and never advised Rees that he did not understand something Rees was
saying because he was speaking English. Finally, as the district court observed, Santos’
20-year presence in the United States and his status as a naturalized citizen undermined
the claimed inability to understand the Miranda warnings. Based on the totality of the
evidence proffered at the evidentiary hearing, we discern no clear error in the district
court’s ruling that Santos understood English well enough to have comprehended his
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Miranda rights, 3 and thus hold that the court properly concluded that Santos voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly waived those rights. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-
Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Spanish-speaking
defendant’s Miranda waiver was valid because defendant indicated he understood his
rights after they were read to him in English, and there was no outward indicia that
defendant had trouble understanding English).
II.
Santos next asserts that his 135-month sentence is procedurally unreasonable
because the district court failed to address each of the nonfrivolous reasons he asserted
for a below-Guidelines sentence. Assuming the court finds no reversible procedural
error, Santos alternatively argues that his within-Guidelines sentence is substantively
unreasonable given many of these same considerations. We find no merit in either
contention.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 111 (4th Cir. 2015). In conducting this review, we first
consider whether the district court committed a significant procedural error, such as
failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors or failing to adequately explain
the chosen sentence. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). When rendering a
sentence, the district court must make and “place on the record an individualized
3
We have reviewed the excerpt of the recorded interview provided by the parties
and agree that it amply substantiates this factual finding. (See J.A. Vol. III).
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assessment based on the particular facts of the case.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 328, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s explanation
must be sufficient “to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’
arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking
authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). “Where the defendant or
prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence than that set
forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge should address the party’s arguments and
explain why he has rejected those arguments.” United States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201,
220 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Santos does not contest the computation of his Guidelines range or the adequacy
of the district court’s explanation for the selected sentence. He does contend, however,
that the district court procedurally erred in failing to address each of the nonfrivolous
reasons advanced in favor of a below-Guidelines sentence.
As a starting point, we observe that the court did an exemplary job explaining the
selected 135-month sentence in terms of the particular § 3553(a) factors it found to be
most relevant in this case, particularly that Santos absconded prior to trial and remained a
fugitive for three years, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); the serious and egregious nature of
the offense, which included violent images of child pornography, and that Santos had
shown his consistent and enduring disrespect for the law, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A);
and the need to avoid an unwarranted sentencing disparity between Santos and other
defendants convicted of similar child pornography offenses, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
While the record confirms that the district court did not speak directly to the primary
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arguments offered in mitigation—namely, Santos’ age and medical conditions; the
likelihood of his denaturalization and removal to Honduras; and that his was a non-
contact offense and did not involve transmission of child pornography—what statements
the court did make demonstrate that the sentencing judge considered the defendant’s
individual characteristics and history, as well as the circumstances of this offense, see 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), in fashioning its sentence, see Rita, 551 U.S. at 357-59. Further, the
district court expressly rejected defense counsel’s argument that a five-year sentence was
appropriate because it did not account for the three years that Santos was a fugitive and
opined that there was “absolutely no basis” to impose a sentence below the Guidelines
range in this case. (J.A. 203). Thus, while “the district court did not engage counsel in a
discussion about the merits of [the defendant]’s arguments for a downward departure,”
United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 521 (4th Cir. 2017), the district court’s statement
that there was no basis for a below-Guidelines sentence, coupled with its robust
explanation for the selected sentence, satisfies us that the court considered, and simply
rejected, the proffered reasons for a below-Guidelines sentence. Accordingly, we reject
Santos’ assignment of procedural error. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 584
(4th Cir. 2010) (observing that, in Rita, “the appellate court could look to the district
court’s lengthy discussion with, and questioning of, defense counsel and determine that
the district court understood the defendant’s arguments for a reduced sentence and had
reasons for rejecting those arguments”).
Finally, we turn to Santos’ challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his
sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We presume that a sentence within or below a properly
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calculated Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d
278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012); see Blue, 877 F.3d at 519-20. “Such a presumption can only be
rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
Santos’ 135-month sentence was the lowest sentence available under the
calculated Guidelines range. To undermine the presumption of reasonableness that thus
attaches to this sentence, Santos relies on the same core reasons advanced to support his
request for a downward variance: that the selected sentence “is unduly harsh” given his
lack of criminal history, “age, health, likelihood of denaturalization, deportation and the
difficulties he and his family will face in Honduras.” (Appellant’s Br. (ECF No. 12) at
11).
But this argument simply invites us to reweigh the § 3553(a) factors and the
relevant circumstances in this case, which is outside our purview. See United States v.
Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that “district courts have
extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to be given each of the
§ 3553(a) factors”). On this record, we discern no abuse of the district court’s
considerable sentencing discretion in electing to give controlling weight to the need to
promote respect for the law, given Santos’ three-year flight from justice, and to the need
to penalize Santos for his egregious offense conduct, which reflects the seriousness of
child pornography offenses. Accordingly, we hold that Santos fails to overcome the
presumption of substantive reasonableness afforded his within-Guidelines sentence.
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For these reasons, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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