United States v. Larkin Viers , 668 F. App'x 458 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4690
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LARKIN THADDAEUS VIERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Bruce H. Hendricks, District
Judge. (4:14-cr-00552-BHH-1)
Submitted: August 25, 2016 Decided: August 29, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
M.W. Cockrell, III, COCKRELL LAW FIRM, P.C., Chesterfield, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William E. Day, II, Assistant United
States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina; Anne Hunter Young,
Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Larkin Thaddaeus Viers pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to knowingly engaging in monetary transactions
through a financial institution and affecting interstate
commerce, in criminally derived property of a value of greater
than $10,000, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). The
district court sentenced Viers to 37 months’ imprisonment, a
sentence at the bottom of the applicable U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (2014) range. Counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
whether the district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in
accepting Viers’ guilty plea. Although notified of his right to
do so, Viers has not filed a pro se brief.
Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a court must conduct a
plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and
determines that the defendant understands, the nature of the
charge to which he is pleading guilty, the maximum possible
penalty he faces, and the various rights he is relinquishing by
pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The district court
also must ensure that the defendant’s plea is voluntary,
supported by a sufficient factual basis, and not the result of
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force, threats, or promises not contained in the plea agreement.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2)-(3); DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 119-20.
Because Viers did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in
the district court or otherwise preserve any allegation of Rule
11 error, we review the plea colloquy for plain error. United
States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014). “To prevail
on a claim of plain error, [Viers] must demonstrate not only
that the district court plainly erred, but also that this error
affected his substantial rights.” Id. at 816. In the guilty
plea context, a defendant establishes that an error affected his
substantial rights if he demonstrates a reasonable probability
that he would not have pled guilty but for the error. Id.The record reveals that the district court conducted a
thorough plea colloquy with Viers. The court erred only in
failing to state the statutory maximum sentence that Viers faced
and failing to correct the Government’s erroneous statement that
the offense carried no statutory maximum sentence. However,
neither Viers nor the record suggest that, but for the failure
to alert Viers of the correct statutory maximum sentence, he
would not have pled guilty. Viers’ plea agreement, which he
signed before his plea hearing, correctly stated the 10-year
statutory maximum sentence. Likewise, defense counsel stated
the correct statutory maximum during the plea hearing.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in
accepting Viers’ guilty plea.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Viers’ conviction and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform Viers, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Viers requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Viers.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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