Nancy Wactor v. Jackson National Life Insurance Company , 604 F. App'x 220 ( 2015 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-2367
    NANCY K. WACTOR,
    Plaintiff – Appellant,
    v.
    JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant – Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Anderson.   Timothy M. Cain, District Judge.
    (8:11-cv-03167-TMC)
    Argued:   December 9, 2014                 Decided:   March 10, 2015
    Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and Arenda Wright ALLEN,
    United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
    Virginia, sitting by designation.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    ARGUED:   Gary Walter Poliakoff, POLIAKOFF & ASSOCIATES, P.A.,
    Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellant.   Charles Franklin
    Turner, Jr., WILLSON JONES CARTER & BAXLEY, P.A., Greenville,
    South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    William Wactor (the “Decedent”) maintained a life insurance
    policy      (the    “policy”)        with    Jackson            National      Life     Insurance
    Company (“Jackson National”) from 1991 until 2010.                                    The policy
    was cancelled in February 2010 due to a missed premium payment,
    and the Decedent passed away on June 12, 2010.                                Plaintiff Nancy
    Wactor      (“Wactor”),        the     Decedent’s               wife,    is     the     personal
    representative           of   the    Decedent’s            estate       and    was     the     sole
    beneficiary         under     the     policy.              In    November       2011,        Wactor
    commenced         this    diversity     action         in        the    District       of    South
    Carolina,     asserting        five    state         law    claims      through        which    she
    sought to         enforce     the   policy       and       recover      benefits.           Jackson
    National moved for summary judgment on each of Wactor’s claims,
    which the district court awarded.                          See Wactor v. Jackson Nat’l
    Life Ins. Co., No. 8:11-cv-03167 (D.S.C. July 10, 2013), ECF No.
    49   (the    “Opinion”).            Thereafter,            the    court       denied    Wactor’s
    motion      for    reconsideration          of       the    Opinion.           See    Wactor     v.
    Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., No. 8:11-cv-03167 (D.S.C. Oct. 8,
    2013), ECF No. 55 (the “Reconsideration Order”). 1                                   On appeal,
    Wactor contests both the Opinion and the Reconsideration Order.
    1
    The   Opinion  is   found   at  J.A.  478-88,  and   the
    Reconsideration Order is found at J.A. 520-22.        (Citations
    herein to “J.A. ___” refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix
    filed by the parties in this appeal.)
    2
    As explained below, we are satisfied to affirm on the reasoning
    of the district court.
    I.
    A.
    1.
    The     Decedent      maintained       life    insurance    with   Jackson
    National from 1991 until 2010. 2              As of 2010, the policy benefit
    was   $200,000,      and    premium   payments       were   due   quarterly,   on
    January 25, April 25, July 25, and October 25 of each year. 3                  As
    term life insurance, the policy covered the Decedent for the
    three-month period following his premium payment, meaning that
    if he died during that period, Jackson National would pay the
    face value of the policy to Wactor, the named beneficiary.
    The policy set forth a series of procedures applicable in
    the event of a missed premium payment.                  If a premium was not
    timely      paid,   the    policy   became     “in   default,”    commencing   a
    2
    The facts spelled out herein are drawn from the record and
    presented in the light most favorable to Wactor, as the
    nonmoving party in the summary judgment proceedings.          See
    Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of
    Balt., 
    721 F.3d 264
    , 283 (4th Cir. 2013) (en banc).
    3
    During the period in which the policy was in effect,
    several terms were modified:        (1) the schedule of payment
    changed from semiannual to quarterly; and (2) the face value was
    decreased from $400,00 to $200,000.
    3
    thirty-one day grace period.                  See J.A. 87.            During the grace
    period, the Decedent remained covered and could reinstate the
    policy by simply paying the overdue premium.                               If the premium
    remained      unpaid    after   the    grace        period,     the    policy    would    be
    cancelled, meaning the Decedent’s coverage would lapse.                              At that
    point, the policy could be reinstated, within five years of the
    date    the   unpaid    premium    was       due,       only   upon    (1)    “receipt    of
    evidence      of    insurability       of    [the       Decedent]      satisfactory       to
    [Jackson National],” and (2) “payment of all past due premiums
    with interest [at a rate of 6 percent, compounded annually] from
    the due date of each premium.”                    
    Id.
        The policy did not contain
    a notice provision requiring Jackson National to mail or furnish
    notice prior to cancelling coverage for an unpaid premium.
    Meanwhile, Jackson National abides by a privacy policy.                            In
    pertinent      part,    Jackson   National          collects     “nonpublic      personal
    information (financial and health)” about its insureds, and has
    implemented security practices to protect the confidentiality of
    that data.         See J.A. 143.        That information may be disclosed,
    however, “[t]o         the   extent    permitted          by   law,    . . .    to    either
    affiliated or nonaffiliated third parties.”                            
    Id.
         The policy
    specified      that,    generally,          any    disclosures        to     third-parties
    would    be   for    the     purpose   of     servicing        or     administering      the
    policy — for example, providing an insured’s name and address to
    4
    a   company   that   would     mail    newsletters         on    Jackson    National’s
    behalf.
    2.
    The Decedent was covered by the policy for approximately
    nineteen years, beginning in March 1991.                   The Decedent made most
    of the payments for policy premiums from his own bank account,
    as he and Wactor generally maintained separate finances.                        Wactor
    sometimes paid the policy premiums for the Decedent, however,
    including ten premium payments since 2006.                      During his nineteen
    years under the policy, the Decedent failed to timely pay his
    premiums on twenty-two occasions.                   In each instance, Jackson
    National mailed a grace-period notice to the Decedent, and the
    Decedent thereafter paid the premium within the grace period.
    The   Decedent   last    paid    the       policy   premium     that    was    due
    October 25, 2009.       After the Decedent failed to pay the January
    25, 2010 premium, Jackson National’s records indicate that it
    sent two notices via regular mail to the Decedent — a grace-
    period    notice,    followed    by     a       lapse   notice     —   although       the
    Decedent did not actually receive either notice.                           The grace-
    period notice, sent by letter dated February 4, 2010, stated
    that   Jackson   National      had    not       received   the    January     25,    2010
    premium payment; that, as of that date, the policy had entered a
    grace period; and that the policy “will lapse and all coverage
    5
    . . . will end on February 25, 2010,” absent Jackson National’s
    receipt of the premium payment by that date.                          See J.A. 80.
    The Decedent did not submit the overdue premium payment
    during the grace period, and Jackson National mailed the lapse
    notice      to    the     Decedent       by    letter    dated    February        25,       2010,
    cancelling the policy.              Therein, Jackson National explained that
    “your policy has now lapsed and . . . all coverage under this
    policy has ended.”            J.A. 82.          The lapse notice advised that, if
    the Decedent submitted the January 25, 2010 premium payment by
    March       26,    2010,     then        “the    policy        will    be   automatically
    reinstated and we will waive additional requirements.”                                
    Id.
        The
    notice clarified that “[t]his offer to reinstate automatically
    is not a waiver of the terms of the policy in the event of any
    future default of payment of premiums.”                          
    Id.
         The notice also
    specified that, unless payment was received by March 26, 2010,
    the policy could only be reinstated if all unpaid premiums were
    paid    along      with    accrued       interest,       the    Decedent    completed          an
    enclosed         application       for     policy       reinstatement,          and    Jackson
    National approved that reinstatement application.
    By    January       2010,    the       Decedent    was    experiencing          several
    health       problems,       including          Parkinson’s           disease     and        mild
    dementia.         His cognitive state vacillated between confusion and
    lucidity, though the Decedent continued to handle his personal
    affairs, including his finances.                    The Decedent was hospitalized
    6
    in May 2010 for a broken foot, and Wactor subsequently became
    aware that the Decedent had neglected to timely pay several of
    his bills.
    Wactor called Jackson National’s service center on June 11,
    2010, inquiring as to the status of the policy.                              The Jackson
    National representative informed Wactor that the policy was no
    longer in force, and that the last premium payment had been
    received on October 25, 2009.                      The representative refused to
    provide Wactor with information on paying missed premiums or
    reinstating the policy.            Rather, the representative told Wactor
    that the Decedent would need to contact Jackson National for
    instructions      on    reinstatement.               Wactor    explained          that    the
    Decedent might not be able to call the company because he was
    then    hospitalized.             The        Jackson       National     representative
    ascertained that Wactor did not have the Decedent’s financial
    power of attorney, and then suggested that the Decedent could
    call    Jackson        National        and     authorize       Wactor        to     receive
    information.      The next day — before any further action was taken
    with   respect    to     the    policy       and     the   unpaid     premiums      —     the
    Decedent passed away.
    Wactor and her daughter Lisa Gunter worked on sorting out
    the Decedent’s affairs.                They searched through the Decedent’s
    records   for     paperwork       from       Jackson       National,    but       found   no
    correspondence     from        2010.     A     few     days   after    the    Decedent’s
    7
    death, Gunter telephoned Jackson National to make a claim on the
    policy on Wactor’s behalf.          The Jackson National representative
    informed    Gunter    that   the   policy     had   lapsed.     Following   that
    phone call, Gunter wrote Jackson National a letter, dated June
    15, 2010, in which Gunter described her father’s health problems
    and enclosed three letters from his health care providers, which
    gave information about the cognitive problems that the Decedent
    was experiencing in 2010.
    Before    Gunter’s      letter     was    received,      Jackson   National
    formally denied Wactor’s claim, by letter to Wactor dated June
    16, 2010.     Therein, Jackson National informed Wactor that the
    policy had “lapsed with no value on February 25, 2010 and there
    are no benefits payable to the beneficiary.”                   J.A. 288.    The
    decision to deny Wactor’s claim was premised solely on Jackson
    National’s record that the policy had been cancelled prior to
    the Decedent’s death.        The June 16, 2010 letter was generated by
    Jackson National’s computer system and electronically signed by
    Jackson National Vice President Charles F. Field.                Field was not
    actually involved in writing the letter, but his signature was
    affixed    pursuant    to    company    procedures      for   systems-generated
    claims correspondence.
    Once Jackson National received Gunter’s letter — and after
    Wactor’s claim for benefits under the policy had been denied —
    Jackson     National’s       customer       relations      department    became
    8
    involved.           Representative        Kevin       Schweda    was      assigned      to   the
    case.        He     was    aware    of    the    information      provided         by   Gunter
    indicating that the Decedent had cognitive problems during the
    last       five   to      six   months    of    his    life,    but       Schweda    did     not
    consider that information in reviewing Jackson National’s denial
    of   Wactor’s          claim.       Rather,     Schweda      reviewed       “the     computer
    system       that      administers       the    policy,     confirming       that       it   had
    lapsed for nonpayment and the date that that occurred, confirmed
    that that occurred prior to the date of [the Decedent]’s death,
    confirmed         that    premium    notices         were   mailed     appropriately         and
    that there was no coverage at the time of death.”                                   J.A. 245.
    From that review, Schweda determined that Wactor’s claim had
    properly been denied.
    B.
    Wactor       initiated       this       civil    action       in    November      2011,
    alleging five causes of action — breach of contract, equitable
    estoppel, unjust enrichment, bad faith refusal to pay insurance
    benefits, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
    fair dealing predicated on Jackson National’s handling of the
    claim. 4      Under each of those theories of relief, Wactor sought
    4
    South Carolina law governs our assessment of Wactor’s
    claims. First, “[t]he elements for a breach of contract are the
    existence of the contract, its breach, and the damages caused by
    such breach.”   S. Glass & Plastics Co. v. Kemper, 
    732 S.E.2d 205
    , 209 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012).        Second, a party claiming
    (Continued)
    9
    enforcement      of    the   policy,    including        payment      of   the   policy
    benefits to her as the sole beneficiary.                      Additionally, on her
    bad   faith    and    implied   covenant         of   good    faith   claims,     Wactor
    asserted that Jackson National acted with reckless disregard,
    entitling     her     to   recover   consequential           and   punitive     damages,
    along with attorney’s fees and costs.
    Following       the    close     of    discovery        proceedings,       Jackson
    National      moved    for   summary    judgment       as     to   each    of   Wactor’s
    claims, contending that no material fact was in dispute, and
    estoppel must demonstrate that she lacked knowledge or the means
    of knowledge as to the truth of relevant facts, that she
    reasonably relied on the other party’s conduct, and that she
    suffered prejudicial detriment.   See Provident Life & Accident
    Ins. Co. v. Driver, 
    451 S.E.2d 924
    , 928 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
    Third, unjust enrichment is an available remedy where a party
    conferred a benefit on the defendant, the defendant realized
    that benefit, and it would be unjust for the defendant to retain
    that benefit without paying its value.     See Pitts v. Jackson
    Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 
    574 S.E.2d 502
    , 512 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002).
    Fourth, to demonstrate that an insurance company denied a claim
    in bad faith, an insured must show the existence of a mutually
    binding insurance contract; that the insurer refused to pay
    benefits due under that contract; that the denial of benefits
    resulted from the insurer’s bad faith or unreasonable action,
    breaching its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing; and
    that the insured suffered damages. See Cock-N-Bull Steak House,
    Inc. v. Generali Ins. Co., 
    466 S.E.2d 727
    , 730 (S.C. 1996).
    Finally, an insured may recover in tort based on an insurer’s
    violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
    with respect to the insurer’s processing of a claim by
    “demonstrate[ing] bad faith or unreasonable action by the
    insurer in processing a claim under their mutually binding
    insurance contract.” Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
    
    306 S.E.2d 616
    , 619 (S.C. 1983).
    10
    that       it   was    entitled    to    judgment          as   a    matter    of   law.    In
    opposing that motion, Wactor maintained that four material facts
    remained at issue, precluding summary judgment:                              (1) whether the
    grace-period and lapse notices (collectively, the “cancellation
    notices”) effectively cancelled the policy; (2) whether Jackson
    National         acted      in   bad    faith     in       refusing     to    pay    benefits;
    (3) whether Jackson National was estopped from asserting that
    the policy was cancelled; and (4) whether Jackson National acted
    in good faith in processing the claim under the policy. 5
    1.
    By it July 10, 2013 Opinion, the district court awarded
    summary judgment to Jackson National on all claims.                                 The court
    addressed each of Wactor’s contentions in turn.
    a.
    First,         the   district      court       addressed        Wactor’s      arguments
    relating to the cancellation notices.                               Wactor contended that
    Jackson National — through its course of dealing in providing
    written         grace-period      notices       to        the   Decedent      on    twenty-two
    occasions        —     waived     its   right        to    cancel     the     policy   without
    5
    In their briefings on Jackson National’s summary judgment
    motion in the district court, the parties ordered their
    arguments in a slightly different manner than Wactor presented
    her claims in the Complaint.      We, like the district court,
    review the parties’ arguments in the manner presented in the
    summary judgment proceedings.
    11
    furnishing notice.          Wactor relied on the Supreme Court of South
    Carolina’s      decision        in   Edens        v.    South       Carolina      Farm    Bureau
    Mutual      Insurance     Co.,       
    308 S.E.2d 670
    ,       671    (S.C.    1983),    as
    establishing that Jackson National could cancel the policy only
    if    the    Decedent     actually         received          the   cancellation       notices;
    simply sending the notices was ineffective.                                Wactor submitted
    evidence from an expert witness, Gerald M. Finkel, opining that
    Edens applies.          Because genuine disputes exist as to whether the
    Decedent       actually    received         the        cancellation        notices,       Wactor
    maintained that summary judgment could not be granted.
    The district court found no merit to Wactor’s arguments.
    The    court    determined       that       the    expert          opinions      submitted    by
    Wactor regarding Edens constituted legal conclusions and should
    be disregarded.           The court then recognized that neither South
    Carolina law nor the terms of the policy require any notice
    prior to cancelling the policy.                        See Opinion 3-6.              Given the
    policy’s silence, the court reasoned that the policy contains no
    ambiguity as to notice, rendering Edens inapplicable.                                    See id.
    at    4-5;     Edens,     308    S.E.2d      at        671    (finding      life     insurance
    policy’s      provision     stating        cancellation            could    be     effected    by
    “giving written notice” to be ambiguous, and that, as a matter
    of law, contract must be interpreted to require “actual receipt
    [as]   a     condition     precedent        to     cancellation”).               Further,     the
    court rejected Wactor’s contention that Jackson National waived
    12
    its right to cancel the policy based on its prior course of
    dealings    with    the      Decedent.           Although     Jackson         National         had
    accepted late payments from the Decedent on twenty-two occasions
    before 2010, each of those payments was made during the grace
    period.     Jackson National had never accepted payments from the
    Decedent    after      the   grace       period,    and   thus        “did    nothing         that
    would     have    created      a     reasonable         expectation          of     insurance
    coverage past the expiration of the grace periods.”                               See Opinion
    6.   Accordingly, Jackson National’s prior conduct “cannot in any
    way be construed as a waiver or forfeiture [of] cancelling the
    policy    for    non-payment        of    premiums      after     a    subsequent         grace
    period has lapsed.”           Id.        The court concluded that, because the
    undisputed       evidence     was        that     Jackson     National         mailed         the
    cancellation       notices,        and    because       Jackson       National          was    not
    obliged    to    provide     notice        before    cancelling         the       policy,      no
    genuine     issue       of    material           fact     existed        regarding             the
    cancellation notices.
    b.
    Second,      the    district        court     assessed     Wactor’s          contentions
    regarding bad faith.           Wactor’s bad-faith argument hinged on her
    position that the policy was not effectively cancelled because
    the Decedent had not received the cancellation notices.                                       From
    that premise, Wactor asserted that Jackson National unreasonably
    refused    to    pay    benefits         due,     again   relying        on       the    expert
    13
    opinions of Gerald Finkel.           She further maintained that Jackson
    National acted in bad faith by denying her claim for benefits
    under the policy without investigating the Decedent’s cognitive
    abilities or its prior course of dealings with the Decedent,
    because Jackson National knew that the Decedent had not received
    the cancellation notices.
    The     district   court    disagreed.      The   court    noted     that   to
    succeed on a claim of bad faith refusal to pay benefits, Wactor
    must establish, inter alia, that Jackson National’s refusal to
    pay     benefits   resulted      from   its    bad   faith    or     unreasonable
    actions.       See Opinion 7 (citing Crossley v. State Farm Mut.
    Auto. Ins. Co., 
    415 S.E.2d 393
    , 396-97 (S.C. 1992)).                       The “bad
    faith    or    unreasonable      action”     requirement     turns    on    whether
    Jackson National had a reasonable ground to contest Wactor’s
    claim.        
    Id.
     (citing Helena Chem. Co. v. Allianz Underwriters
    Ins. Co., 
    594 S.E.2d 455
    , 462 (S.C. 2004); Hansen ex rel. Hansen
    v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 
    565 S.E.2d 114
    , 119 (S.C. Ct. App.
    2002)).       The court disregarded Wactor’s expert evidence because
    it amounted to legal conclusions.              The parties agreed that the
    Decedent had not paid his premiums after 2009, and the court
    determined that, “[b]ased upon the non-payment of the premiums
    and the lapse of the policy, Jackson National had reasonable
    grounds for denying this claim.”               Id. at 8.        Accordingly, no
    genuine dispute of material fact existed as to bad faith.
    14
    c.
    Third, the district court addressed Wactor’s estoppel-based
    arguments.         Wactor contended that Jackson National should be
    estopped      from    relying       on    the    policy’s       cancellation         based    on
    Wactor’s      June    11,    2010    phone       call    to    Jackson       National.        By
    making   that      call,     Wactor       had    sought      information       so    that    she
    might “cure any breach that may have occurred,” but “Jackson
    National refused to communicate with [Wactor], concealing all
    meaningful      information.”              J.A.      190.       Had     Jackson      National
    informed Wactor of the outstanding balance on the policy and how
    it   could    be     reinstated,         she    might    have    secured       the   policy’s
    reinstatement        before    the       Decedent       passed       away.        Wactor     thus
    maintained         that     factual       disputes          remained        “regarding       the
    inequitable and self-serving application of [Jackson National’s]
    privacy policy,” precluding summary judgment.                          Id.
    The    district      court     determined        that     Jackson       National       was
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Wactor’s estoppel
    claim.       The undisputed evidence was that, during the June 11,
    2010 phone call, Jackson National notified Wactor of several
    ways    she    could       obtain    authority          to     act    for    the     Decedent.
    Although      Wactor       hypothesized         that    she     could       have    cured    the
    Decedent’s breach had Jackson National provided her with more
    information,         the    court     concluded         that     “there      is     simply    no
    15
    evidence of any material misrepresentation by Jackson National
    or detrimental reliance by Wactor.”                 See Opinion 10.
    d.
    Fourth, the district court examined Wactor’s argument that
    disputes of material fact existed as to whether Jackson National
    breached    the    implied      duty     of    good      faith    and   fair     dealing.
    Specifically, Wactor maintained that factual disputes remained
    regarding      the      cancellation             notices,        Jackson     National’s
    investigation      of     her   claim,     and     the    procedures       and   policies
    utilized by Jackson National in its handling of the claim.
    The district court rejected Wactor’s arguments, observing
    that whether Jackson National breached its duty to act in good
    faith   depended     on    whether     a      reasonable     ground     supported    its
    decision.     See Opinion 11 (citing Crossley, 415 S.E.2d at 397;
    Helena, 594 S.E.2d at 462).                The court determined that “nothing
    in the record [would] suggest that Jackson National acted in an
    unreasonable manner in denying coverage or its handling of this
    claim,” given that the premiums had not been paid and coverage
    had lapsed.       Id.      Therefore, “no rational trier of fact could
    find that Jackson National acted unreasonably in its handling of
    this claim.”      Id. (citing Monahan v. Cnty. of Chesterfield, Va.,
    
    95 F.3d 1263
    , 1265 (4th Cir. 1996)).
    16
    In light of those conclusions, the district court granted
    Jackson National’s motion for summary judgment.                           On July 10,
    2013, judgment was entered in Jackson National’s favor.
    2.
    On July 19, 2013, Wactor moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 59(e), that the district court reconsider the
    Opinion.           Wactor asserted that the court had misunderstood or
    misconstrued her waiver argument.                    She clarified her position
    that, through its course of dealing with the Decedent, Jackson
    National undertook a duty “of not only sending, but actually
    furnishing” the cancellation notices.                     See J.A. 494.      According
    to Wactor, that course of dealing modified the terms of the
    policy.           See 
    id.
     (citing Carolina Aviation, Inc. v. Glens Falls
    Ins.    Co.,        
    51 S.E.2d 757
    ,    761    (S.C.    1949);    Keith    v.     River
    Consulting, Inc., 
    618 S.E.2d 302
    , 305 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005)).
    And, because the policy thereby contained a notice provision,
    the Edens decision applied, meaning that Jackson National could
    only cancel the policy if it first verified that the Decedent
    had actually received the cancellation notices.
    By    its        Reconsideration    Order    of    October    8,     2013,    the
    district court denied Wactor’s Rule 59(e) motion.                            The court
    observed that a judgment should only be amended pursuant to Rule
    59(e)        in    extraordinary     situations       involving      an    intervening
    change in law, previously unavailable evidence, or a need to
    17
    “correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”
    See Reconsideration Order 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The court determined, however, that Wactor had not demonstrated
    that she was entitled to relief based on waiver, which is “‘a
    voluntary    and    intentional         abandonment       or     relinquishment     of    a
    known right.’”      Id. at 2 (quoting Janasik v. Fairway Oaks Villas
    Horizontal    Prop.       Regime,       
    415 S.E.2d 384
    ,    387    (S.C.   1992)).
    Additionally,      the    court        recognized       that   “‘the     party   claiming
    waiver must show that the party against whom waiver is asserted
    possessed,    at    the    time,       actual      or   constructive      knowledge      of
    [its]    rights    or    of    all     the    material     facts    upon    which   they
    depended.’”       
    Id.
     (quoting Janasik, 415 S.E.2d at 387-88)).                       The
    court    observed       that     the    record      contained      no    evidence   that
    Jackson    National       took    measures         to   ensure    that    the    Decedent
    received any of the twenty-two grace-period notices sent before
    2010.     Nor did the record show that any of those twenty-two
    notices were actually received by the Decedent; Wactor asserted
    only that “[the] Decedent ‘apparently’ received” those notices.
    Id.     The court thus concluded that, although “Jackson National
    may have established a course of dealing and waived its right to
    cancel during the grace period by mailing the lapse notices, the
    intent to waive its right to cancel based upon receipt cannot be
    established through Jackson National’s prior conduct.”                            Id. at
    2-3.    Accordingly, the court denied Wactor’s Rule 59(e) motion.
    18
    This appeal ensued, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    II.
    In this appeal, Wactor reiterates several contentions that
    she had advanced in the district court in opposition to Jackson
    National’s summary judgment motion and in support of her own
    motion for reconsideration. 6          We review de novo the district
    court’s summary judgment award, crediting Wactor’s evidence and
    drawing all justifiable inferences in her favor.               See Anderson
    v.   Liberty   Lobby,   Inc.,   
    477 U.S. 242
    ,   255   (1986).   Summary
    judgment may be awarded only if “there is no genuine issue as to
    any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment
    as a matter of law.”        Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).           We review the
    court’s denial of Wactor’s reconsideration motion for abuse of
    discretion.    See Bogart v. Chapell, 
    396 F.3d 548
    , 555 (4th Cir.
    6
    On appeal, Wactor asserts that a factual dispute exists
    regarding whether Jackson National mailed the cancellation
    notices because computer-system records upon which Jackson
    National relies are unreliable.     Wactor failed to raise that
    contention, however, in the summary judgment proceedings in the
    district court.     See J.A. 171-92.      Wactor did raise that
    contention in support of her reconsideration motion, but the
    district court declined to address it.        See Reconsideration
    Order 3 n.3.      Because Wactor failed to timely assert her
    argument about Jackson National’s computer system, she has not
    preserved that contention for appeal. See In re Under Seal, 
    749 F.3d 276
    , 287 (4th Cir. 2014); Holland v. Big River Minerals
    Corp., 
    181 F.3d 597
    , 605 (4th Cir. 1999).
    19
    2005).     Relief from a judgment is available under Rule 59(e)
    only “(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling
    law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or
    (3) to     correct    a    clear   error      of    law    or    prevent      manifest
    injustice.”      
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Having      carefully     examined       the   record       and    assessed    the
    parties’    written       submissions,     together       with    the    argument    of
    counsel, we are satisfied that summary judgment was properly
    awarded    and   reconsideration      properly       denied       in    the   district
    court.     We are therefore content to affirm the judgment on the
    sound reasoning of the district court’s Opinion and subsequent
    Reconsideration Order.
    AFFIRMED
    20