United States v. Travis Williams-Jeffers ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4694
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TRAVIS D. WILLIAMS-JEFFERS,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:05-cr-00306-HEH-1)
Submitted: March 17, 2015 Decided: March 19, 2015
Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H.
Pratt, Carolyn V. Grady, Assistant Federal Public Defenders,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Peter Sinclair Duffey,
Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Travis Williams-Jeffers appeals his twelve-month sentence
imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. On appeal,
Williams-Jeffers’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Williams-
Jeffers’s sentence is plainly unreasonable. Although notified
of his right to do so, Williams-Jeffers has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We will affirm a
sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release if it is
within the applicable statutory maximum and not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th
Cir. 2006). In determining whether a revocation sentence is
plainly unreasonable, we first assess the sentence for
procedural and substantive unreasonableness. Id. at 438-39. In
this initial inquiry, we take a “more deferential appellate
posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion
than reasonableness review for guidelines sentences.” United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “In exercising its discretion . . .,
a district court is guided by the Chapter Seven policy
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statements in the federal Guidelines manual, as well as the
statutory factors applicable to revocation sentences under 18
U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e).” Webb, 738 F.3d at 641.
A supervised release revocation sentence is procedurally
reasonable if the district court properly calculates the
Guidelines range and adequately explains the sentence after
considering the Chapter Seven advisory policy statements and the
appropriate § 3553(a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012);
United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A
revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the district
court states a proper basis for concluding that the defendant
should receive the sentence imposed, up to the statutory
maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a sentence is
procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we “then decide
whether the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439. A
sentence is plainly unreasonable if it is clearly or obviously
unreasonable. Id.
In this case, the record reveals no procedural or
substantive error by the district court. We thus conclude that
Williams-Jeffers’s sentence is not plainly unreasonable. In
accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s order. This court
requires that counsel inform Williams-Jeffers, in writing, of
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the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Williams-Jeffers requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Williams-Jeffers. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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