Reaching Hearts International, Inc. v. Prince George's County , 478 F. App'x 54 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1399
REACHING HEARTS INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff − Appellee,
v.
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY; COUNTY COUNCIL OF PRINCE GEORGE'S
COUNTY, Sitting As The District Council,
Defendants − Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge.
(8:05−cv−01688−RWT)
Argued: March 21, 2012 Decided: April 25, 2012
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: William Walter Wilkins, NEXSEN PRUET, LLC, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellants. Ward Baldwin Coe, III,
GALLAGHER EVELIUS & JONES, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Tonia Y. Belton-Gofreed, OFFICE OF LAW,
Upper Marlboro, Maryland; Kirsten E. Small, NEXSEN PRUET, LLC,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellants. David W. Kinkopf,
Brian T. Tucker, GALLAGHER EVELIUS & JONES, LLP, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
This is the second time this case has been before us. In
the first appeal, we affirmed a jury verdict in favor of
Reaching Hearts International (“RHI”), a Seventh Day Adventist
congregation that sought to build a church on its land in Prince
George’s County, Maryland. 1 In this appeal, Prince George’s
County and its County Council (collectively “the County”) raise
a number of challenges to the district court’s award of
attorneys’ fees and expenses to RHI. For the reasons discussed
below, we affirm the order of the district court.
I.
After the appeal by the County had concluded and our
mandate issued, RHI filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and
expenses on July 30, 2010. 2 The motion, supported by a
memorandum, affidavit, and verified exhibits, sought almost
$725,000 in fees (including fees for attorneys and other non-
1
The jury awarded $3,714,822.36, based on the County’s
violation of RHI’s rights under the Equal Protection Clause and
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).
For a fuller description of the case and its facts, see Reaching
Hearts Int’l, Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 368 F. App’x 370
(4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished).
2
Although RHI had filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and
expenses after trial, the July 30, 2010 motion was a renewed
motion that incorporated a request for additional fees for work
associated with the first appeal.
2
attorney timekeepers), based on 2,635 hours of work through the
date it was filed. RHI also sought approximately $40,000 in
expenses. The rates used in the motion were the historical
hourly rates customarily charged to other clients by the various
timekeepers at the time that the services were rendered. 3 The
rates for the attorneys ranged from $200 to $470 per hour.
The historical rates requested in the motion for fees were
different (and generally higher) than the rates RHI had
previously negotiated to pay its attorneys. Specifically, at the
outset of the litigation, RHI and its attorneys had agreed that
RHI would make payments as the litigation progressed pursuant to
a blended, discounted fee structure, with an hourly rate of $250
for all attorneys and $130 for all paralegals. This “reduced”
rate was agreed upon “out of consideration of [RHI’s] ability to
pay and its charitable mission, with the express understanding
that [RHI’s attorneys] would seek full and proper compensation
for fees and expenses from the County should RHI prevail.” (J.A.
206.) At the time of RHI’s renewed fee petition, RHI had
previously paid to its attorneys $560,975.16, although RHI’s
payments were “often [made] in a less than timely fashion
3
Many of those rates increased during the course of the
litigation, which began with the filing of the Complaint in June
2005.
3
because of [RHI’s] limited resources.” (Br. of Appellees at 8
(citing Affidavit of Ward B. Coe, III, at J.A. 206).)
At a hearing on the motion for fees and expenses held on
March 14, 2011, the district court heard argument from counsel
and then determined the lodestar amount, or the “reasonable
hourly rate multiplied by hours reasonably expended.” United
States ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 356 (4th Cir.
2009). In doing so, the court expressly considered the twelve
factors pertinent to the lodestar analysis:
(1) the time and labor expended; (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions
raised; (3) the skill required to properly
perform the legal services rendered; (4) the
attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the
instant litigation; (5) the customary fee
for like work; (6) the attorney's
expectations at the outset of the
litigation; (7) the time limitations imposed
by the client or circumstances; (8) the
amount in controversy and the results
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and
ability of the attorney; (10) the
undesirability of the case within the legal
community in which the suit arose; (11) the
nature and length of the professional
relationship between attorney and client;
and (12) attorneys' fees awards in similar
cases.
See Jadhav, 555 F.3d at 356-57 (citations omitted); see J.A.
182-191.
As part of its analysis of these various factors, the
district court recognized that this was the first RLUIPA case in
the country where money damages had been awarded by a jury. As
4
described by the district court, this “was a very novel case
with extremely difficult questions raised.” (J.A. 185.) It was
“a needle in the haystack case” that “required a lot of skill on
the part of the plaintiff’s lawyers, not just because of the
novelty and difficulty . . . but because of the extremely
tenacious defense raised by Prince George’s County in defending
this case.” (J.A. 185, 188.) As to the “most critical factor[,]
. . . the degree of success obtained,” see Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983), the district court stated that this
case “can only be described as a home run in a very adverse
ballpark with your adversary being the New York Yankees, this
was not an easy case.” (J.A. 190-91.)
The district court ultimately concluded that the hours set
forth in the fee petition were reasonably expended and that the
rates sought were reasonable. Indeed, at different points in the
hearing, the district court referred to the rates sought as
“very reasonable,” “extremely reasonable,” and “very fair and
reasonable,” and further concluded that it was “more than
satisfied that the rates being sought are those predominantly
charged by attorneys practicing in this court.” (J.A. 188, 193,
199.)
The district court also considered RHI’s request for an
enhancement for superior results, but concluded that under the
5
Supreme Court’s decision in Perdue v. Kenny A., 130 S. Ct. 1662(2010), a fee enhancement would not be awarded.
RHI had also asked for additional compensation, over and
above the historical rates charged. This additional amount was
to account for the “effect of delay in payment on the value of
the fee,” an adjustment we have explained is required in order
to render the fee award “fully compensatory.” Daly v. Hill, 790
F.2d 1071, 1081 (4th Cir. 1986); see Ohio River Valley Envtl.
Coal., Inc. v. Green Valley Coal Co., 511 F.3d 407, 419 (4th
Cir. 2007) (hereinafter “Ohio River”) (“a fee award must account
for the effect of delay in payment”). The district court
concluded that use of RHI’s otherwise reasonable historical
rates failed to fully compensate it for the lost time value of
money. Although the district court recognized that it could
calculate interest on each monthly fee paid by RHI and owed to
RHI’s attorneys, the court stated that it “would almost be a
death defying mathematical calculation.” (J.A. 194.) Thus, the
district court instead accounted for the lost time value of
money by applying the current hourly billing rates of the
timekeepers (as opposed to the historical rates) to the number
of hours awarded. This resulted in a total fee award, including
time spent at the district court fee hearing and recalculating
the fees using current rates, of $838,722.00. (J.A. 196, 202.)
6
Finally, the district court awarded the full amount of
expenses sought by RHI, finding them to be “very reasonable” and
“well documented.” (J.A. 193.) The award ultimately included
expenses in the total amount of $40,784.40. 4 (J.A. 202.)
The County timely appealed and we have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
We review “[t]he reasonableness of the amount of a district
court’s fee award . . . for abuse of discretion,” and questions
of law arising in the course of the determination de
novo. Johannssen v. Dist. No. 1-Pac. Coast Dist., MEBA Pension
Plan, 292 F.3d 159, 178 (4th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other
grounds by Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105(2008); Robinson v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243
(4th Cir. 2009) (court reviews award of attorneys’ fees and
expenses for an abuse of discretion). While that discretion is
“not unlimited” and “[i]t is essential that the judge provide a
reasonably specific explanation for all aspects of a fee
4
The Clerk of the District Court had previously awarded
costs in the amount of $7,348.23 based on a bill of costs RHI
submitted shortly after trial. To avoid duplication when
entering its award of expenses upon RHI’s renewed motion, the
district court deducted that amount from the total amount of
expenses awarded ($40,784.40), resulting in an order awarding
$33,400.17. (J.A. 196, 202, 554.)
7
determination,” Perdue, 130 S. Ct. at 1676, our review is
nonetheless “sharply circumscribed.” Jadhav, 555 F.3d at 356(citation omitted). “[B]ecause a district court has close and
intimate knowledge of the efforts expended and the value of
services rendered, the fee award must not be overturned unless
it is clearly wrong.” Id. (citation omitted).
On appeal, the County challenges various aspects of the
district court’s determination of the fee award. The County’s
arguments fall into three categories: (1) challenges to the
hourly rates used in calculating the fee; (2) challenges to the
number of hours deemed by the district court to be reasonable;
and (3) challenges to specific items of expenses as improperly
documented. We address each argument in turn.
A.
The County’s challenge to the hourly rate used by the
district court is two-fold. First, it contends that the hourly
rates sought by RHI, i.e., the historical billing rates, were
far above the prevailing market rate for civil rights litigation
in the District of Maryland, and that there was insufficient
support in the record for the rates utilized by the district
court. Second, it challenges the district court’s use of current
market rates to account for a delay in payment.
8
As to the first part of its challenge to rates, the County
argues that the rates charged by the attorneys and paralegals to
private clients are not the prevailing market rate for the type
of work involved here and that a better indicator of a
“reasonable rate” would be either the amount RHI agreed to pay
its attorneys (the blended hourly rate of $250 for attorneys and
$130 for paralegals) or the rates set forth in Appendix B to the
Local Rules for the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, entitled “Rules and Guidelines for
Determining Attorneys’ Fees in Certain Cases.” 5
As noted, our review is limited to a determination of
whether the district court abused its discretion, and we find no
abuse of discretion in its determination that the rates sought
were reasonable. The court expressly considered, and relied
upon, affidavits from Messrs. Rosenberg and Maloney, experienced
trial attorneys who were known to the district judge and who
5
The rates in Appendix B vary depending on the number of
years since an attorney has been admitted to the bar. For
example, the suggested range of hourly rates for a lawyer
admitted to the bar for less than five years is $150-190. For a
lawyer admitted for fifteen years or more, the rate would be
$275-$400. The section of Appendix B setting forth the rates
also makes clear that “[t]he factors established by case law
obviously govern over [these rates]” and that “[o]ne factor that
might support an adjustment to the applicable range is an
increase in the cost of legal services since the adoption of the
guidelines.” Id. at n.6. According to counsel’s representations
to this Court, the rates were last updated in January 2008.
9
both appeared regularly in federal court in Maryland in complex
civil litigation matters and other cases. Those affidavits
stated that the rates sought were reasonable. 6 The district judge
also relied on his own knowledge of prevailing market rates in
the relevant market. In particular, he explained that he had
been responsible for billing at the law firm where he practiced
prior to his appointment to the bench in 2003 and that he knew
the rates charged by attorneys at that local firm for all types
6
The County emphasized, both in its brief and at argument,
that the affidavits were insufficient to establish that the
rates sought were reasonable because they did not contain
“satisfactory ‘specific evidence of the prevailing market rates
in the relevant community’ for the type of work performed.” (Br.
at 11-12 (quoting Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir.
1990)) (citation omitted).) In particular, it contends the
affidavits of Messrs. Rosenberg and Maloney were insufficient
because they did not state that the claimed rates were
consistent with the market rate for the specific type of
litigation involved, here, “civil rights litigation.” (Br. at
12-14.) We disagree.
While the affidavits may not have used the precise language
suggested in Plyler and while they could have been more
specific, there are significant distinctions between “civil
rights cases” in general (such as Section 1983 cases brought by
prisoners or against the police by arrestees) and a RLUIPA case
like this one, which was much more involved and complicated than
a typical “civil rights” case and more akin to complex civil
litigation. As noted, there was significant novelty to this
litigation because so few cases under RLUIPA for money damages
in this context had occurred at that time. Thus, we conclude the
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
the affidavits were sufficient to show that the rates were
reasonable for the type of work performed.
10
of litigation up through that time in the relevant market. 7
Additionally—and significantly—there was a lack of comparable
rates for RLUIPA work in Maryland and even nationwide, in view
of its novelty at the time, and the fact that no jury award of
damages had ever been made prior to this case. (J.A. 172, 184-85
(district court noting “this was a very novel case with
extremely difficult questions raised” and that there is not a
RLUIPA bar that the court could look to in order to determine
rates).) In short, we find no error or abuse of discretion in
the district court’s determination that the historical rates
requested were reasonable.
The County’s second challenge to the rates used by the
district court is that the use of March 2011 hourly rates,
rather than historical rates, constituted an improper
enhancement and was not warranted by any delay in payment. The
County relies heavily on the fact that RHI paid its attorneys
the agreed-upon reduced rate throughout the litigation, and thus
there was no delay in payment to the attorneys as to most of the
7
In fact, the district court noted that the historical fees
now requested were less than what he would have termed
comparable rates when he left private practice seven years
earlier. (J.A. 187 (“Mr. Coe’s rates now are less than my rate
was [when I arrived on the bench]”); id. at 199 (“all these
rates are very reasonable. Very reasonable. I mean, my rate was
north of these rates seven years ago. And rates at my old law
firm have been going up since then, not down.”).)
11
fees earned. This second challenge to the rates is a slightly
more involved issue.
As an initial matter, we first note that the use of the
current rates was not an “enhancement” of the fee award of the
type discussed in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Perdue. While
the district judge clearly indicated he would have liked to
apply a Perdue-type enhancement, he expressly stated that he
was not doing so, but was simply awarding the time value of
money, or using current rates to account for a delay in payment.
(J.A. 197 (district judge expressing that “in [his] heart of
hearts” he believed an enhancement was probably appropriate in
this case, but “applying current hourly rates to the recovery of
fees in this case is fully justified by the time value of
money”).) 8 Accordingly, we address whether using current rates to
account for either a delay in payment or the lost time value of
money was an abuse of discretion.
8
The County complains that the district court’s ruling was
simply a way to enhance the award without calling it an
enhancement. In part, it relies on the district court’s
alternative statement that “to the extent that [applying current
rates is] too generous, which I doubt it is, that this does
represent in my judgment a case of superior – I mean really
superior attorney performance.” (J.A. 197.) The record is clear
that the district court did not apply an enhancement, as that
term is utilized by Perdue, since the district court expressly
disavowed that it was doing so. See id. Since we affirm the use
of current rates as justified by the delay in payment, we do not
have occasion to consider whether a Perdue-type enhancement
would be appropriate in this case.
12
Our precedent is clear that, in the typical case, an
appropriate way to compensate for a delay in payment for
attorneys’ fees is either to use the current hourly rates
instead of historical ones, or to include an award of interest
to account for the lost time value of money. As the Supreme
Court explained in Missouri v. Jenkins:
Our cases have repeatedly stressed that
attorney’s fees awarded under [42 U.S.C. §
1988] are to be based on market rates for
the services rendered. . . . Clearly,
compensation received several years after
the services were rendered – as it
frequently is in complex civil rights
litigation - is not equivalent to the same
dollar amount received reasonably promptly
as the legal services are performed, as
would normally be the case with private
billings. We agree, therefore, that an
appropriate adjustment for delay in payment
- whether by the application of current
rather than historic hourly rates or
otherwise – is within the contemplation of
the statute. . . . An adjustment for delay
in payment is, we hold, an appropriate
factor in the determination of what
constitutes a reasonable attorney’s fee
under § 1988.
491 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1989) (internal footnote and citations
omitted).
This Court, too, has repeatedly noted that a court may base
a reasonable rate for lodestar purposes on current rates to
compensate for a delay in payment. See Ohio River, 511 F.3d at
419-20; Johannssen 292 F.3d at 181; Daly, 790 F.2d at 1081.
In Johannssen, for example, we concluded that the district court
13
had abused its discretion in adopting historic rates without
considering the effect of delay of payment on the value of the
fee. As we explained in Johannssen, “consideration of the effect
of time on the value of the fee is mandatory as part of a
consideration of what is reasonably compensatory.” Id. at 180.
Thus, it is clear that in an appropriate case, the use of
current rates is permissible, and that using either current
rates or some appropriate rate of interest is required to
account for such a delay. The use of current rates, to be sure,
can be an imprecise substitute for some other form of
mathematical precision, and interest rates may often be a more
accurate way to calculate the lost time value of money. But as
explained above, our precedent allows that imprecise
methodology.
The case at bar, however, has a wrinkle that potentially
complicates the application of this general practice to account
for a delay in payment. That wrinkle is that RHI made
substantial, but not always timely, ongoing payments to its
attorneys during the litigation. Indeed, approximately $560,000
of the initial $765,000 in fees and expenses sought by RHI had
already been paid to its attorneys. Thus, the question could be
14
raised as to whether the fact that a significant partial payment
had been made to the attorneys here affects the analysis. 9
It is certainly a feasible argument that, in a case where
such a partial payment has been made, the two portions of the
fee award (representing the paid and unpaid amounts) could be
subject to different analyses when adjusting to account for a
delay in payment. One portion would be the loss to RHI itself of
what could be characterized as the traditional concept of the
time value of money, representing the amounts it paid to its
attorneys throughout the litigation. Had RHI not had to make
these payments, it could have earned interest on those funds.
The second portion is the loss suffered by the attorneys from a
delay in payment, but is applicable only to those amounts equal
to the historical rates (as determined by the district court to
be reasonable) less the amounts paid by RHI using the reduced
blended rates.
9
The fact of partial payment certainly affects who, as
between the plaintiff (RHI) and its attorneys, should receive
what portion of the adjustment to current rates. As RHI’s
counsel acknowledged at oral argument, RHI should receive all
amounts it had previously paid to its attorneys, as well as an
additional amount representing the portion of the adjustment
equal to the percentage of the unadjusted total award that the
previously-paid amount comprises. Indeed, since the bulk of the
fees were paid by RHI, it was RHI, not the attorneys, who lost
most of the time value of its money.
15
At argument before this Court, counsel for RHI was asked
whether any of the three principal cases RHI relied upon to
support the district court’s use of current rates involved a
partial payment to attorneys. RHI’s attorney responded that they
did not involve partial payments. 10 In fact, however, at least
one of those—Johannssen—appeared to have involved a partial
payment, although this Court did not address the significance of
that fact. 11
In Johannssen, we reversed a district court’s fee award
because it failed to either use current hourly rates or award
interest in order to account for a delay in payment. It appears
that Johannssen actually involved some amount of partial payment
to the plaintiffs’ attorneys during the litigation. In a
footnote, this Court explained:
The district court also noted that
Plaintiffs’ attorneys had agreed to a
retainer agreement with them that was to
provide them with a portion of the fees
necessary to prosecute the case. The court
did not explain how this was relevant to the
issue of delay other than the somewhat
mysterious statement that “it was not
10
Oral Argument Digital Recording at 31:02 (March 21,
2012).
11
The other two cases are Daly and Ohio River. In Daly,
there was a contingency fee agreement in the underlying suit and
no partial payments made. 790 F.2d at 1074-75 (describing 25%
contingency fee agreement). In Ohio River, the opinion is silent
as to any type of payment arrangement between the client and its
attorneys. See generally 511 F.3d 407.
16
insignificant that the clients agreed to
support the litigation to the extent that
they did.”
Id. at 180 n.20.
We did not explain in Johannssen the significance of this
fact, if any, or how it could impact the district court’s
calculation of any adjustment for delay in payment. Nonetheless,
despite the knowledge that there was at least an agreement by
the clients to make some payments during the litigation—and
possibly payments were made—we held that an adjustment was
warranted for a delay in payment, and did not differentiate the
calculation of that adjustment into segregated amounts
representing funds already paid by the client and amounts
unpaid. This could suggest, although it is by no means clear,
that no different calculation is required, even in cases where
there is a partial payment to the lawyers during the litigation.
The parties have not pointed to any Fourth Circuit cases or out-
of-circuit cases addressing whether a different calculation is
required or warranted for the two possible portions of the fee
award where there has been a partial payment by the client.
Resolution of this question is not required in the case at
bar, however, because the issue was not squarely raised before
the district court. At the fee petition hearing, in the context
of arguing that no enhancement should be applied, attorneys for
the County argued that there was no delay in payment because the
17
client had paid the largest portion of the fees sought to the
attorneys. (J.A. 178 (counsel for the County arguing “there
wasn’t a big delay in payment . . . [as to] what was paid to Mr.
Coe by Reaching Hearts. In other words, they were paid fees by
their client all along.”).) Thus, the district court clearly
knew that some payments had been made. See id. 12 However, the
issue of whether the portion of the fees representing payments
made by the client should be treated differently than payment
for the portion representing amounts not paid to RHI’s attorneys
was never squarely presented to the district court and it was
not asked to rule on the fee award on that basis.
Unsurprisingly, then, the district court did not address this
point. 13
12
In his affidavit, Ward Coe, the lead counsel for RHI,
explained: "Both RHI – for the money it already has forwarded
for attorneys' fees and costs – and RHI's attorneys – for the
difference between what they have received for services rendered
versus the actual cost of those services—have unfairly lost the
time value of money. The representation of RHI in this matter
also carried with it the risk that full payment for services may
not come at all or, at best, would only come many years later or
at a reduced amount.” (J.A. 215 at ¶ 23.) See J.A. 167 (Mr.
Coe’s statement at the fee hearing that the use of current rates
or an “interest calculation” would “compensate[] for both
Reaching Hearts' outlay of fees and not getting them back for a
long time, and also the delay in payment to attorneys where
we're both delayed in compensation because we're working for a
client who has to pay us to play.").
13
The district court recognized that there were separate
delays, at least to some extent, explaining that he would use
current rates to "take into account the time value of money in
(Continued)
18
Similarly, the County did not argue this specific point on
appeal. Instead, it was raised by the panel at oral argument and
the parties merely responded to the questioning by the panel.
Regardless of whether the County’s failure constitutes a waiver
of the issue, we cannot say that the district court abused its
discretion in this case in failing to treat the two amounts
differently, where that possibility was never presented to it.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s use
of current hourly rates to account for a delay in payment.
B.
We have carefully considered the County’s remaining
challenges to the fee award. These include allegations that the
district court failed to carefully scrutinize the fees and
expenses sought and consequently awarded fees that were the
result of overstaffing, excessive hours for certain tasks, or
hours associated with RHI’s lead counsel changing law firms
during the litigation. As to each of these challenges, we
conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in
the sense that the fee was not received by either the law firm –
by the law firm in part for a considerable period of time and,
of course, the fact that the plaintiff had to lay this money out
from day one all the way to the present time, to the extent that
it paid money." (J.A. 194.) But the court did not consider
whether those separate items should be analyzed differently nor
did the County make that request.
19
reaching its determination that the number of hours and the time
entries were adequately documented and were reasonable.
To be sure, the approved number of hours expended here (and
indeed, the fee award itself) was quite large. But this was a
hard-fought case, one that was vigorously litigated by the
County. The County raised a large number of defenses, filed
motions to dismiss on various grounds, fought discovery, came to
two settlement conferences without authority to settle, and
raised numerous assignments of error in its first appeal to this
Court. It is irrelevant whether, had we been reviewing the fee
petition in the first instance, we might have reduced some of
the hours on the grounds urged by the County, or found that some
hours were potentially the result of duplicative efforts. Daly,
790 F.2d at 1079 (“[W]e are not entitled to disturb a district
court’s exercise of discretion even though we might have
exercised that discretion quite differently.”) We review the
district court’s decision as to the hours expended only for an
abuse of discretion, and we find nothing “clearly wrong” about
its decision as to the hours reasonably expended
here. See Jadhav, 555 F.3d at 356.
Similarly, as to the County’s claim that certain expenses
(in-house photocopying and legal research) were inadequately
documented or otherwise unreasonable, we find no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s ruling.
20
III.
As both parties acknowledge, RHI will also be entitled to
its reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses for its successful
efforts in this appeal. Plyler, 902 F.2d at 281-82. Accordingly,
we remand this case to the district court for a determination of
reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses related to this
appeal. See id.IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district is
affirmed, and we remand to the district court for a further fee
determination.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
21