Anthony Mangum v. S. Hallembaek , 910 F.3d 770 ( 2018 )


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  •                                       PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 17-7082
    ANTHONY WAYNE MANGUM,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    v.
    WARDEN S. HALLEMBAEK,
    Respondent - Appellee,
    and
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; BUREAU OF PRISONS,
    Respondents.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
    Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:13-hc-02227-FL)
    Argued: September 25, 2018                                 Decided: December 12, 2018
    Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WYNN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
    Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory
    wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wynn and Judge Harris joined.
    ARGUED: Amanda Lineberry, Kendall Burchard, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
    SCHOOL OF LAW, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Michael Bredenburg,
    BUREAU OF PRISONS, Butner, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Stephen L.
    Braga, Appellate Litigation Clinic, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW,
    Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, United States Attorney, Joshua
    Royster, Chief, Civil Division, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
    Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    2
    GREGORY, Chief Judge:
    Appellant Anthony Wayne Mangum appeals the district court’s denial of his
    motion to compel the federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to comply with this Court’s
    mandate in Mangum v. Hallembaek, 
    824 F.3d 98
     (4th Cir. 2016). In that case, Mangum
    had appealed the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     challenging his federal sentence.          Specifically, Mangum’s petition
    challenged the refusal of the BOP to designate nunc pro tunc a state facility for service of
    his federal sentence under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b). See Mangum, 824 F.3d at 99. This
    designation would have effectively run Mangum’s federal and state sentences
    concurrently rather than consecutively, allowing him to credit the time he spent in state
    prison serving his state sentence toward the previously imposed federal sentence that he
    had not yet served.
    This Court agreed with Mangum and held that the BOP abused its discretion in
    denying his request for nunc pro tunc designation under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b). We
    therefore vacated in part the district court’s judgment and instructed the court on remand
    to return the matter to the BOP so that the agency could consider Mangum’s request
    again, this time in a manner consistent with the views expressed in this Court’s opinion.
    See Mangum, 824 F.3d at 103. On remand, the BOP denied Mangum’s request for a
    second time in a decision that contradicts this Court’s mandate in Mangum. Because the
    BOP failed to comply with our mandate, we reverse the district court’s denial of
    Mangum’s motion to compel compliance and remand this matter once again. The district
    3
    court on remand shall enter an order directing the BOP to reconsider Mangum’s request
    for nunc pro tunc designation in light of this opinion.
    I.
    A.
    In February 2006, Mangum was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine base
    in the Middle District of North Carolina. Mangum, 824 F.3d at 99. A few months later,
    in June 2006, Oklahoma state authorities arrested Mangum and charged him with felony
    assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, misdemeanor possession of a fictitious
    driver’s license, misdemeanor resisting an officer, and misdemeanor obstructing an
    officer. Id. In August, a federal magistrate judge requested that Oklahoma transfer
    Mangum to federal custody for his North Carolina proceedings. Id. at 100. Mangum
    ultimately pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and was sentenced to
    262 months’ imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release. Id. During
    sentencing, the district court did not state whether the federal sentence was to be served
    concurrently with or consecutive to any other sentence of imprisonment that might result
    if Mangum were convicted of other offenses in a separate proceeding. Id.
    After the federal proceedings, Mangum was returned to Oklahoma custody in
    October 2007.      He pleaded guilty to the four state charges and was sentenced
    concurrently to terms of ten years on count one, seven years on count two, and one year
    each for counts three and four. Id. The state court specifically ordered that the state
    sentences run concurrently with the previously imposed federal sentence. Id.
    4
    Mangum remained in Oklahoma custody while serving his state sentences. He
    was paroled to a federal detainer on January 13, 2011, and the BOP, in preparing a
    sentence computation for Mangum, determined that his service of the federal sentence
    began on this date. Id.
    On January 3, 2013, Mangum requested that the BOP consider whether to
    designate nunc pro tunc the Oklahoma prison where he served his state sentence as the
    place for service of his federal sentence under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b). 1 Mangum, 824 F.3d
    at 100. The fourth statutory factor the BOP considers in this analysis is “any statement
    by the court that imposed the sentence.”           
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b)(4).   The BOP thus
    attempted to contact Mangum’s federal sentencing court to inquire whether the court
    intended to treat the federal sentence as concurrent with or consecutive to the
    1
    Section 3621(b) provides in relevant part:
    The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place of the prisoner’s imprisonment. The
    Bureau may designate any available penal or correctional facility that meets minimum
    standards of health and habitability established by the Bureau . . . that the Bureau
    determines to be appropriate and suitable, considering—
    (1) the resources of the facility contemplated;
    (2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;
    (3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;
    (4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence—
    (A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment
    was determined to be warranted; or
    (B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as
    appropriate; and
    (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission
    pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b).
    5
    subsequently imposed state sentence.      Mangum, 824 F.3d at 100.        The court never
    responded to this inquiry, however, and the BOP went on to deny Mangum’s nunc pro
    tunc request after considering the other statutory factors. Id. at 100–01. In declining to
    grant this request, the BOP invoked the fourth factor and reasoned that “the federal
    Judgment was silent on whether your sentence should run consecutively or concurrently
    to any other sentence.     Pursuant to Title 
    18 U.S.C. § 3584
    (a), ‘Multiple terms of
    imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders that
    the terms are to run concurrently.’” 
    Id. at 101
     (quoting 
    18 U.S.C. § 3584
    (a)).
    The BOP’s refusal to grant nunc pro tunc relief, along with its sentencing
    computation, “effectively determined that the previously imposed federal sentence would
    be served consecutively to the later imposed state sentence,” even though “the clearly
    expressed intent of the state sentencing court [was] that its sentence be served
    concurrently with the federal sentence.” 
    Id.
     Because of the BOP’s decision, Mangum’s
    release date would be on or about January 14, 2030, rather than June 15, 2025.
    On October 24, 2013, Mangum filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
    Eastern District of North Carolina, seeking credit against his federal sentence for the time
    he spent serving his state sentence from June 14, 2006, to January 13, 2011. 
    Id.
     The
    district court granted the warden’s motion for summary judgment, and Mangum
    appealed.
    On May 25, 2016, this Court vacated in part the district court’s judgment because
    it had “overlooked a two-pronged flaw in the BOP’s exercise of its broad discretion” in
    denying Mangum’s requested nunc pro tunc designation of the state facility. 
    Id. at 99
    .
    6
    First, this Court held that the BOP misapplied 
    18 U.S.C. § 3584
    (a) in concluding
    that the federal sentencing court’s silence gave rise to a statutory presumption that
    Mangum’s federal sentence should be deemed to run consecutively to the subsequently
    imposed state sentence.     See Mangum, 824 F.3d at 101–02.            Second, this Court
    determined that the BOP erred in soliciting the federal court’s sentencing views in the
    first place. Id. at 102–03. We explained that, when Mangum was sentenced in North
    Carolina federal court in May 2007, “a federal district judge in this circuit was powerless
    to impose a federal sentence to be served consecutively to a state sentence that had not
    yet been imposed.” Id. at 102; see also United States v. Smith, 
    472 F.3d 222
    , 225 (4th
    Cir. 2006) (“The plain language of [§ 3584(a)] does not grant a district court authority to
    order that its sentence run consecutively to a future sentence.”), abrogated in part by
    Setser v. United States, 
    566 U.S. 231
    , 233 (2012) (holding that a district court “has
    authority to order that the federal sentence be consecutive to an anticipated state sentence
    that has not yet been imposed”), as stated in United States v. Obey, 
    790 F.3d 545
    , 549
    (4th Cir. 2015). Though acknowledging that Setser subsequently changed the law, this
    Court made clear that
    any definition of an arbitrary and capricious determination by an
    administrative agency such as the BOP would include within it the
    agency’s invocation of a presumed intention on the part of a federal
    sentencing judge to do that which he was powerless to do under binding
    circuit precedent at the time he imposed a sentence. In this case, one might
    reasonably expect the BOP to exercise its discretion to weigh heavily what
    the state judge did say rather than what the federal judge did not and could
    not say.
    7
    Mangum, 824 F.3d at 103 (footnote omitted). In vacating and remanding this part of the
    district court’s judgment, we gave the following instructions:
    Upon remand, the district court shall return this matter to the BOP so that
    the agency may give plenary consideration to Mangum’s request for nunc
    pro tunc designation of the Oklahoma state facility as the place for service
    of his federal sentence. In considering the request, the BOP shall invoke no
    presumption under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3584
    (a) and shall fully evaluate all relevant
    factors under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b) in a fashion consistent with the views
    expressed in this opinion.
    
    Id.
    B.
    On July 28, 2016, the district court returned the matter to the BOP “so that it
    [could] give plenary consideration to [Mangum’s] request for nunc pro tunc designation
    of the Oklahoma state facility as the place for service of his federal sentence as set forth
    above and in the Fourth Circuit’s May 25, 2016 opinion.” J.A. 99.
    On October 17, 2016, the BOP’s Designation and Sentence Computation Center
    reconsidered Mangum’s request for nunc pro tunc designation under the statutory factors
    set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b). J.A. 106. In considering the fourth factor, the BOP
    again erroneously invoked the statutory presumption in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3584
    (a) in favor of
    consecutive sentences. See Mangum, 824 F.3d at 103. The BOP also contacted the
    federal sentencing court once more “for a statement concerning its position on a
    retroactive designation.” J.A. 106; S.J.A. 157–58. In a letter dated October 14, 2016, the
    federal court began by acknowledging that Mangum had no state sentence at the time the
    court imposed the federal sentence. Mangum had yet to plead guilty to the state charges,
    and as the federal court explained, it “had no information whether the State of Oklahoma
    8
    would continue with those charges or not in view of the sentence being imposed in this
    Court.” S.J.A. 159. The federal court nevertheless indicated that, had Mangum already
    pleaded guilty to the state charges and received the ten-year state sentence at the time of
    federal sentencing, it “would not have ordered that the sentences run concurrently since
    the conduct in Oklahoma was not actually increasing his sentence in this Court.” J.A.
    106; S.J.A. 159. Relying on this statement, the BOP denied Mangum’s request for nunc
    pro tunc relief for a second time. J.A. 106.
    On December 15, 2016, Mangum filed a motion to compel performance in the
    district court, arguing that the BOP had refused to obey the orders from the district court
    and this Court. J.A. 100–05. The BOP responded on December 29, 2016. J.A. 111–15.
    After acknowledging that its original review “was not consistent with the views
    expressed in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in this case,” the BOP explained that it had
    “conducted another review of [Mangum’s] request” on December 23, 2016, “this time
    consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s directive.” J.A. 111–12.
    On August 4, 2017, the district court denied Mangum’s motion to compel. J.A.
    144–49.    Citing a “Factors Under 18 USC 3621(b) Worksheet” that the BOP had
    completed as part of its second review, the district court held that the BOP properly
    evaluated each of the relevant statutory factors in denying Mangum’s nunc pro tunc
    request. Addressing the fourth factor, the district court noted that the BOP contacted “the
    sentencing court, which did not express an opinion at sentencing, . . . to obtain an opinion
    regarding retroactive designation.” J.A. 148. The district court then reproduced the
    sentencing court’s statement that it would not have ordered that the sentences run
    9
    concurrently. The district court in its review did not mention that the BOP included the
    following in the “Comments” section at the end of the Factors Worksheet:
    It appears that dicta in the opinion of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
    Mangum v. Hallembaek, 
    824 F.3d 98
     (4th Cir. 2016), may suggest that
    under the unique circumstances of the case, the Bureau of Prisons could
    consider the intent of the state court judge in exercising its discretion. The
    Bureau of Prisons has done so in this case, and accordingly used its
    discretion consistent with its statutory authority under 18 U.S.C.
    [§] 3621(b) and the Fourth Circuit’s opinion with respect to Mangum’s
    request for nunc pro tunc designation.
    In closing, the district court stated that, “[a]s directed by the Fourth Circuit, the
    BOP invoked no presumption under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3584
    (a)” and “evaluated all of the
    relevant factors under § 3621(b) in a manner that is consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s
    opinion.” J.A. 149. According to the district court, the BOP’s “exercise of its broad
    discretion here was not arbitrary.” J.A. 149.
    This appeal followed. The issue this Court identified for briefing is “whether the
    district court erred in denying the motion to compel compliance with Mangum v.
    Hallembaek, 
    824 F.3d 98
     (4th Cir. 2016).” Briefing Order, Docket No. 18.
    II.
    “We review de novo whether a post-mandate judgment of the district court
    ‘contravenes the mandate rule, or whether the mandate has been scrupulously and fully
    carried out.’” Doe v. Chao, 
    511 F.3d 461
    , 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting S. Atl. Ltd. P’ship
    10
    of Tenn., LP v. Riese, 
    356 F.3d 576
    , 583 (4th Cir. 2004)). 2 We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    .
    III.
    A.
    “The force of our prior mandate is governed by well-established principles.”
    Invention Submission Corp. v. Dudas, 
    413 F.3d 411
    , 414 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that the
    mandate rule “is a more powerful version of the law of the case doctrine”). “In general,
    once a case has been decided on appeal and a mandate issued, the lower court may not
    deviate from that mandate but is required to give full effect to its execution.” Id.; see
    also 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice
    and Procedure § 4478.3, at 733 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that the mandate rule is based
    on “the principle that an inferior tribunal is bound to honor the mandate of a superior
    court within a single judicial system”). A district court may not deviate from the mandate
    rule “except in rare circumstances.” United States v. Bell, 
    5 F.3d 64
    , 66 (4th Cir. 1993).
    The respondents do not contend that such rare circumstances are present here. “Our
    review, therefore, is limited to consideration of the scope of our mandate and a
    2
    Relying primarily on United States v. Hall, 
    664 F.3d 456
     (4th Cir. 2012), the
    respondents argue that the question whether the district court erred in concluding that the
    BOP did not abuse its discretion is a question of fact that we review only for clear error.
    Our precedent makes clear, however, that this Court reviews de novo whether our
    mandate “has been scrupulously and fully carried out.” Doe, 
    511 F.3d at 464
     (citation
    and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Hall, 
    664 F.3d at
    465–66 (reviewing for clear
    error the district court’s factual findings based on witness testimony and related
    credibility determinations).
    11
    determination of whether the district court faithfully executed it[.]” Invention Submission
    Corp., 
    413 F.3d at 415
    .
    In this case, we must determine whether the district court faithfully executed our
    mandate when it denied Mangum’s motion to compel compliance with our previous
    opinion. The respondents note that this Court has never held that the mandate rule
    applies to administrative agencies like the BOP, but the “general principle is easily
    recognized,” and circuit case law accords with this conclusion. Wright, Miller & Cooper,
    Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478.3, at 760; see also Scott v. Mason Coal Co., 
    289 F.3d 263
    , 267 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating in dicta that the “rule applies with equal authority
    and weight to the [Benefits Review] Board and to the ALJ as administrative agencies”);
    Tanner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 602 F. App’x 95, 98 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting Mason
    Coal’s dicta and “presum[ing] without deciding that the Social Security Administration is
    an agency to which the mandate rule applies”). 3
    B.
    Mangum argues that on remand the district court erred in failing to compel the
    BOP to evaluate the relevant factors under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b) in a manner consistent
    3
    Several of our sister circuits have likewise concluded that the mandate rule
    applies to administrative agencies. See, e.g., Grigsby v. Barnhart, 
    294 F.3d 1215
    , 1218
    (10th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “the doctrine and the mandate rule apply to judicial
    review of administrative decisions”); Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Milliken, 
    200 F.3d 942
    , 950 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Administrative agencies and ALJs, of course, are not free
    to ignore this court’s mandates.”); Wilder v. Apfel, 
    153 F.3d 799
    , 803 (7th Cir. 1998)
    (same).
    12
    with our mandate. See Mangum, 824 F.3d at 102–03. We agree with Mangum, and
    reverse the district court’s denial of his motion to compel compliance.
    In Mangum, this Court reversed the district court’s judgment because it had
    “overlooked a two-pronged flaw in the BOP’s exercise of its broad discretion” under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b). 824 F.3d at 99. The second prong of that flaw was the BOP’s decision
    to invoke the federal sentencing court’s views on Mangum’s nunc pro tunc request when
    “a federal district judge in this circuit was powerless to impose a federal sentence to be
    served consecutively to a state sentence that had not yet been imposed” at the time
    Mangum was sentenced in federal court in May 2007. 4 Id. at 102. This Court deemed
    arbitrary and capricious the BOP’s invocation of the federal sentencing judge’s
    “presumed intention . . . to do that which he was powerless to do under binding circuit
    precedent at the time he imposed a sentence.” Id. at 103. Because the federal sentencing
    court’s views were legally irrelevant, and because it was undisputed that the state court
    clearly intended for the state sentence to run concurrently with the federal sentence, we
    stated that “one might reasonably expect the BOP to exercise its discretion to weigh
    heavily what the state judge did say rather than what the federal judge did not and could
    not say.” Id. We then ordered that the BOP on remand “shall fully evaluate all relevant
    4
    The first prong of the flaw was the BOP’s reliance on the statutory presumption
    in favor of consecutive sentences as a basis for denying Mangum’s nunc pro tunc request.
    See Mangum, 824 F.3d at 101–02. Although the BOP on remand initially invoked this
    presumption again, the agency conducted another review of Mangum’s request to remedy
    that error.
    13
    factors under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b) in a fashion consistent with the views expressed in this
    opinion.” 
    Id.
    The BOP disregarded these instructions on remand. In a letter sent less than three
    months after this Court’s decision issued, the BOP again asked the federal sentencing
    court whether it would have ordered that Mangum serve his federal sentence concurrently
    with or consecutive to his state sentence. The BOP’s letter clearly indicates that its nunc
    pro tunc determination would ultimately turn on the federal sentencing court’s response. 5
    After the federal court indicated that it would not have ordered that the sentences run
    concurrently “since the conduct in Oklahoma was not actually increasing his [federal]
    sentence,” the BOP recorded this response in its Factors Worksheet as a basis for denying
    Mangum’s nunc pro tunc request, even though Mangum had not been convicted of the
    Oklahoma offenses at the time of federal sentencing and thus his conduct in Oklahoma
    could not have increased his federal sentence. By contrast, the BOP gave the state
    court’s sentencing views only token consideration.        It characterized as “dicta” this
    Court’s instruction that the BOP consider the state court’s views and indicated that it “has
    done so in this case” without elaborating on this assertion or otherwise engaging with the
    state court’s clear preference for concurrent sentences. The district court, overlooking the
    5
    See S.J.A. 158 (“It is the Bureau’s preference that the federal sentencing Court
    state its position with respect to a retroactive designation. . . . Should the Court indicate
    the sentence is to run concurrent with the state term, the Bureau will commence the
    sentence in the above judgment on May 16, 2007, the date of imposition, which will
    result in Mr. Mangum’s release from custody on or about June 15, 2025. Should the
    Court indicate the term is to run consecutive to the state term, [Mangum] will continue to
    a current projected release date of January 14, 2030.”).
    14
    flaws in the BOP’s analysis, concluded that the agency had “evaluated all of the relevant
    factors . . . in a manner that is consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s opinion.” J.A. 149.
    The BOP’s actions on remand were directly contrary to this Court’s holding that
    the federal sentencing court’s views on Mangum’s nunc pro tunc request were legally
    irrelevant, and that the BOP thus could give no weight to these views and must instead
    “weigh heavily” the state court’s statement that the sentences should run concurrently.
    See Mangum, 824 F.3d at 103.          Rather than comply with this directive, the BOP
    considered each court’s position on sentencing and determined that the federal court’s
    views were entitled to more weight than the state court’s statement. See, e.g., Resp. Br.
    10 (asserting that “the BOP . . . took care to note that, in reaching its designation
    decision, it had reflected on the state court’s wishes” but “[t]hat wish was outweighed by
    other considerations, including that . . . the federal sentencing judge would not have
    ordered its sentence to be concurrent with the unrelated state sentence”); id. at 15
    (explaining that “the clear intent of Mangum’s state court sentencing judge was that
    Mangum’s state sentence should run concurrently with his federal sentence, but the
    federal sentencing court judge indicated that he would not have ordered the sentences to
    run concurrently”).
    Under our mandate, however, the state court’s statement was entitled as a matter
    of law to receive more weight than the federal court’s views, which could be given no
    15
    weight under binding circuit precedent at the time. 6 The BOP thus could not have
    properly concluded that the state court’s clear preference for concurrent sentences was
    outweighed by any statement from the federal sentencing court. And yet that is precisely
    what it did.   The BOP’s weighing of the federal court’s sentencing views and its
    perfunctory consideration of the state court’s statement—an assertion that it “has done so
    in this case” with no accompanying reasoning to explain why it was declining to honor
    the state court’s wishes—mark an improper deviation from our mandate and require that
    we reverse the district court’s denial of Mangum’s motion. See Invention Submission
    Corp., 
    413 F.3d at 414
     (stating that “the lower court may not deviate from th[e] mandate
    but is required to give full effect to its execution”); Bell, 
    5 F.3d at 66
     (explaining that a
    district court must “implement both the letter and spirit of the . . . mandate, taking into
    account [our] opinion and the circumstances it embraces” (alterations in original)
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    It is true, as the respondents contend, that the BOP is not bound by the state
    court’s sentencing preference in the nunc pro tunc analysis. See Barden v. Keohane, 
    921 F.2d 476
    , 478 n.4 (3d Cir. 1990). But as we have explained, the state court’s statement
    6
    We recognize, as noted above, that our precedent subsequently was abrogated by
    Setser v. United States, 
    566 U.S. 231
     (2012), which makes a federal court’s views on this
    matter highly relevant. In Setser, the Supreme Court held that a federal sentencing court
    has discretion to determine whether its sentence will run concurrently with an anticipated
    (but not yet imposed) state sentence, 
    id.
     at 236–37, and that once it exercises that
    discretion, the BOP is “not free to use its ‘place of imprisonment’ authority [under
    § 3621(b)] to achieve a different result.” Id. at 238. Our mandate in Mangum, which we
    enforce today, was limited to the law as it stood at the time of Mangum’s federal
    sentencing.
    16
    that the sentences should run concurrently is entitled to more weight than the BOP gave
    it, especially because the BOP’s Factors Worksheet on its face provides little indication
    of what factors would justify overriding the state court’s preference and denying
    Mangum’s nunc pro tunc request once the federal court’s views are properly excluded
    from the analysis.
    The respondents’ remaining arguments likewise prove unavailing.                 The
    respondents contend that Mangum “has mischaracterized the scope of the mandate to
    include dicta,” but this Court’s determination that the federal court’s sentencing views
    were legally irrelevant, and that the state court’s preference for concurrent sentences was
    thus entitled to weight in the nunc pro tunc analysis, was central to the holding in our
    prior opinion. See Mangum, 824 F.3d at 102 (“The clarity of the BOP’s error is made
    even more plain by [this] second compelling consideration.”); id. at 103 (explaining that
    “one might reasonably expect the BOP to exercise its discretion to weigh heavily” the
    state court’s statement because the federal court’s views are legally irrelevant and
    directing the BOP on remand to “fully evaluate all relevant factors . . . in a fashion
    consistent with the views expressed in this opinion”).
    Relying heavily on our unpublished decision in Trowell v. Beeler, the respondents
    also argue that the BOP conducted a proper nunc pro tunc analysis because it completed
    the Factors Worksheet and took into account each of the relevant statutory factors before
    exercising its broad discretion to deny Mangum’s request. 135 F. App’x 590, 596 (4th
    Cir. 2005) (explaining that the “BOP must exercise its own independent judgment, taking
    into account all applicable factors in § 3621(b), including the views of the sentencing
    17
    court,” when evaluating a request for nunc pro tunc designation).             Contrary to the
    respondents’ suggestion, however, this case does not involve a routine review of the
    BOP’s exercise of discretion in ruling on a nunc pro tunc request. This case instead
    requires us to define the scope of our mandate and determine whether the BOP, in our de
    novo judgment, “faithfully executed it.” Invention Submission Corp., 
    413 F.3d at 415
    .
    We hold that it did not. That the BOP typically enjoys broad discretion in analyzing nunc
    pro tunc requests in the first instance bears little relevance to our analysis.
    Finally, the respondents defend the BOP’s actions by contending that “one might
    [] reasonably expect BOP to follow up with the federal sentencing judge” given that
    § 3621(b) includes as a factor for consideration “any statement by the court that imposed
    the sentence.”     
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b)(4).         But this argument runs contrary to our
    conclusion in Mangum that any statement by the federal sentencing court here would be
    legally irrelevant because the court could not have ordered that its sentence run
    consecutively to a future state sentence under binding circuit precedent at the time. Any
    suggestion that the BOP may “follow up” with the court thus conflicts with our opinion
    and mandate.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the BOP failed to comply with this Court’s
    mandate in evaluating Mangum’s request for nunc pro tunc designation of the Oklahoma
    state facility as the place for service of his federal sentence. We therefore reverse the
    district court’s denial of Mangum’s motion to compel compliance. On remand, the
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    district court shall enter an order directing the BOP to reconsider Mangum’s request for
    nunc pro tunc designation in light of this opinion. In reevaluating the request, the BOP
    shall not invoke the views of the federal sentencing court and shall weigh heavily the
    state court’s desire for concurrent sentences in the course of conducting a full and proper
    evaluation of all relevant factors under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3621
    (b).
    REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
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