United States v. Desmond Farmer ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4450
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DESMOND FARMER, a/k/a Slick,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (5:13-cr-00144-D-1)
Submitted: April 14, 2015 Decided: April 27, 2015
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Matthew M. Robinson, ROBINSON & BRANDT, PSC, Covington,
Kentucky, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Desmond Farmer entered into a written plea agreement with
the Government, pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to
conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to
distribute 100 grams or more of phencyclidine (PCP), in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2012). At his Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 hearing, which was conducted by a magistrate judge,
Farmer was placed under oath and advised of his right to have a
district judge conduct the hearing. Farmer informed the court
that he understood this right, had consulted with counsel about
it, and expressly consented to the magistrate judge conducting
the hearing. The magistrate judge found that Farmer’s consent
was knowing and voluntary. Neither party expressed any concern
as to Farmer’s competence or ability to understand the
proceedings.
At sentencing, Farmer did not contest the magistrate
judge’s authority to accept his guilty plea. Farmer was
subsequently sentenced to a 168-month term of imprisonment and a
4-year term of supervised release. This appeal timely followed.
The lone issue Farmer raises on appeal is that the
magistrate judge exceeded the authority vested in him under the
Federal Magistrates Act in accepting Farmer’s guilty plea.
Central to Farmer’s argument is United States v. Harden, 758
F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014), in which the Seventh Circuit held
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“that the magistrate judge’s acceptance of [defendant’s] guilty
plea violated the Federal Magistrates Act[.]” Farmer
acknowledges our contrary precedent, see United States v.
Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “a
magistrate judge’s acceptance of a plea, with the consent of the
parties, does not appear to present any constitutional problems,
either generally or in this case”), but nonetheless suggests
that the reasoning set forth in Harden should be followed
because it is more closely aligned with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 931-33
(1991).
But, as Farmer acknowledges, this court has held that
“magistrate judges possess the authority to bind defendants to
their plea for the purposes of Rule 11, so long as district
judges retain the authority to review the magistrate judge’s
actions de novo.” Benton, 523 F.3d at 429. Regardless of the
Seventh Circuit’s contrary decision in Harden, we are bound by
Benton. United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 311 (4th Cir.
2005) (“A decision of a panel of this court becomes the law of
the circuit and is binding on other panels unless it is
overruled by a subsequent en banc opinion of this court or a
superseding contrary decision of the Supreme Court.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see United States v. Ross, __ F.
App’x __, 2015 WL 1062755 (4th Cir. Mar. 12, 2015) (unpublished)
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(rejecting same argument advanced by Farmer, for same reason).
Accordingly, we reject Farmer’s challenge to the magistrate
judge’s authority to accept his guilty plea and affirm the
criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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