Gregory Reid, Jr. v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Schools , 675 F. App'x 315 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1892
GREGORY ARTHUR REID, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
CHARLOTTE MECKLENBURG SCHOOLS; MECKLENBURG COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
RACHEL CORN; MAUREEN FURR; JANET H. HAMILTON; RHONDA
HOUSTON; BRANDY NELSON; ALICIA MCCREE,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:14-cv-00066-FDW-DSC)
Submitted: January 27, 2017 Decided: February 1, 2017
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gregory Arthur Reid, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Courtney Collins
Rogers, CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG GOVERNMENT CENTER, Charlotte,
North Carolina; Karl Dean Shatley, II, CAMPBELL SHATLEY, PLLC,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Gregory Arthur Reid, Jr., appeals from the district court’s
judgment entered after a jury trial on his retaliation claim
raised pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
Reid first challenges the district court’s order granting
partial summary judgment to Charlotte Mecklenburg Schools. We
have reviewed the record and conclude that no genuine dispute of
material fact exists. See Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the
Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 565, 568 (4th Cir. 2015) (setting forth
standard of review). Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons
stated by the district court. Reid v. Charlotte Mecklenburg
Schs., No. 3:14-cv-00066-FDW-DSC (W.D.N.C. Feb. 12, 2016.)
Reid next contends that the district court erred in denying
his motion for a continuance. We review for abuse of discretion
a district court’s decision to deny a motion for continuance.
United States v. Speed, 53 F.3d 643, 644 (4th Cir. 1995). We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion,
as Reid was able to participate in the trial proceedings and
does not allege that participation in the trial presented a
substantial danger to his health. See Latham v. Crofters, Inc.,
492 F.2d 913, 916 (4th Cir. 1974).
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Finally, Reid contends that the district court erred in
admitting a photograph of him and his boyfriend. “We review a
trial court’s rulings on the admissibility of evidence for abuse
of discretion . . . .” Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762
F.3d 339, 349 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted). An evidentiary error is harmless unless it affects a
party’s substantial rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; United States
ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2015).
Even if the district court could be deemed to have erred, any
error was harmless, as the district court admitted only the
single photograph that did not identify the other individual as
Reid’s boyfriend, and the court gave a limiting instruction.
See Smith v. Balt. City Police Dep’t, 840 F.3d 193, 203-04 (4th
Cir. 2016).
Accordingly, although we grant Reid leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
further deny Reid’s motion for transcripts at government expense
and to appoint counsel. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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