United States v. Michael Davila ( 2018 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4255
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL ANDREW DAVILA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
George Jarrod Hazel, District Judge. (1:17-cr-00025-GJH-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2018 Decided: December 13, 2018
Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gerald C. Ruter, LAW OFFICES OF GERALD C. RUTER, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland,
for Appellant. Robert K. Hur, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, Nicolas A.
Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorney, Sarah E. Edwards, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Andrew Davila was convicted following a bench trial of: (1) conspiracy
to provide contraband to an inmate in prison, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012); (2) attempt to
obtain contraband in prison, 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2) (2012); (3) attempted possession
with intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012); and, (4) witness and evidence
tampering, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B) (2012). He was sentenced to a total term of 30
months’ imprisonment. Davila timely noted an appeal.
At the time of the underlying offenses, Davila was an inmate at the Chesapeake
Detention Facility (“CDF”) in Baltimore, Maryland. Construing the facts in the light
most favorable to the Government, United States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 689 (4th Cir.
2013), the evidence before the district court established the following. In early 2016,
prison officials at CDF began to discover contraband left in the visiting booths at the
prison. An investigation revealed that Davila was the likely source and, therefore, prison
officials placed a “mail cover” in order to monitor Davila’s incoming and outgoing mail.
Based on evidence obtained in several of his letters to his then-wife, officials monitored
her visits and soon discovered that, pursuant to instructions from Davila, she had
smuggled suboxone strips, marijuana, tobacco, and matches into the facility during her
visits. Davila was subsequently indicted. Davila filed a motion to suppress, arguing that
the mail cover instituted by prison officials to search his mail violated his rights under the
First and Fourth Amendments. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion.
Davila was found guilty of all charges after a bench trial. Based on a total offense
level of 14 and a criminal history category of VI, Davila’s advisory Guidelines range was
2
37 to 46 months’ imprisonment. At sentencing, the district court denied Davila’s request
for a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual (“USSG”) § 3E1.1 (2016), and imposed a 30-month sentence on each count, to
run concurrently. Davila appeals, challenging both the denial of his motion to suppress
and the denial of the two-level reduction under § 3E1.1.
We review the district court’s factual findings regarding the motion to suppress for
clear error, and the court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Lull, 824 F.3d
109, 114 (4th Cir. 2016). “When, as here, a motion to suppress has been denied, we view
the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the government.” Watson, 703 F.3d
at 689.
This court has held that a prison official’s decision to open and inspect an inmate’s
outgoing mail is constitutional so long as it is “reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.” Altizer v. Deeds, 191 F.3d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court has noted, the investigation and
prevention of ongoing, illegal inmate activity furthers the legitimate penological
objectives of prison security and inmate rehabilitation. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401, 411-12 (1989) (noting that “dangerous outgoing correspondence” includes
“plans relating to ongoing criminal activity,” which pose a “serious threat to prison order
and security”); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-13 (1974) (foiling inmates’
ongoing criminal activity is legitimate governmental interest); see also Stroud v. United
States, 251 U.S. 15, 21 (1919) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
examination of prisoners’ mail).
3
Here, based on a review of the visitor’s logs and observation of the visiting booths
before and after visits to Davila, prison officials had reason to believe that Davila was
using his wife to smuggle contraband into the prison. We find that the imposition of the
mail cover was reasonably related to the legitimate penological goal of preventing the
smuggling of contraband into the prison and, hence, did not violate Davila’s
constitutional rights.
Turning to Davila’s sentencing claim, under USSG § 3E1.1, a district court may
award a two-level reduction for a defendant who “clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 678 (4th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). This court has noted that “[a]lthough the reduction is
not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at
trial, . . . going to trial does not automatically preclude the adjustment.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2. “In rare situations,
such as when the defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to
factual guilt, . . . an adjustment may still be appropriate.” Jeffery, 631 F.3d at 678(internal quotation marks omitted). “The sentencing judge is in a unique position to
evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, and thus . . . the determination of the
sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review.” Elliott v. United States, 332
F.3d 753, 761 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and brackets omitted).
Here, the district court recognized its authority to grant the reduction, but declined
to do so, finding that it would not be appropriate under the circumstances of this case.
We find no error in the court’s decision.
4
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5