United States v. Devin Ebron ( 2018 )


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  •                                      UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 18-4237
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    DEVIN LAMAR EBRON,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
    Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (4:17-cr-00028-FL-1)
    Submitted: November 30, 2018                                Decided: December 20, 2018
    Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit
    Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Richard E. Rowe, GREENE & WILSON, P.A., New Bern, North Carolina, for Appellant.
    Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Robert J. Dodson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
    UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Devin Lamar Ebron pled guilty, without a plea agreement, to two counts of
    distribution of cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
    Ebron’s Sentencing Guidelines range, which was driven by his career offender
    designation, was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. At sentencing, Ebron argued for a
    79-month sentence, a term 109 months below the bottom of the advisory Guidelines
    range. The district court imposed concurrent terms of 164 months’ imprisonment on each
    count, a downward variance of 24 months below the bottom of the Guidelines range.
    Ebron timely appealed, arguing that the district court failed to meaningfully consider his
    arguments in mitigation. We affirm.
    When rendering a sentence, the district court must make and place on the record
    an individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the case. United States v.
    Carter, 
    564 F.3d 325
    , 328, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). The sentencing court must provide
    specific reasons supporting the sentence, but the explanation “need not be exhaustive.”
    United States v. Avila, 
    770 F.3d 1100
    , 1107 (4th Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, the court’s
    reasoning must be sufficient “to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the
    parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking
    authority.” Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356 (2007).
    “Where the defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a
    different sentence than that set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge should
    address the party’s arguments and explain why he has rejected those arguments.” United
    States v. Bollinger, 
    798 F.3d 201
    , 220 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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    Although it is sometimes possible to discern a sentencing court’s rationale from the
    context surrounding its decision, United States v. Montes-Pineda, 
    445 F.3d 375
    , 381 (4th
    Cir. 2006), “an appellate court may not guess at the district court’s rationale, searching
    the record for statements by the Government or defense counsel or for any other clues
    that might explain a sentence[,]” 
    Carter, 564 F.3d at 329-30
    . An insufficient explanation
    of the sentence imposed constitutes significant procedural error by the district court.
    United States v. Lynn, 
    592 F.3d 572
    , 576 (4th Cir. 2010).
    Where, as here, the defendant properly preserved the issue of whether the
    explanation was adequate by arguing for a sentence different than that which was
    imposed, this court reviews the issue for abuse of discretion. 
    Id. If this
    court finds such
    abuse, the court must reverse unless it concludes that the error was harmless. 
    Id. An error
    is harmless if the Government shows “that the error did not have a substantial and
    injurious effect or influence on the result and we can say with fair assurance that the
    district court’s explicit consideration of the defendant’s arguments would not have
    affected the sentence imposed.” United States v. Boulware, 
    604 F.3d 832
    , 838 (4th Cir.
    2010) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    The court granted Ebron a downward variance, albeit a much more modest
    variance than that requested by Ebron. In explaining the variance at the sentencing
    hearing, the court merely stated that it was appropriate under the circumstances of the
    case. In the Statement of Reasons, however, the court elaborated that the small quantity
    of drugs involved in the case was a mitigating factor for the variance. Neither at the
    sentencing hearing nor in the Statement of Reasons did the court address Ebron’s
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    argument that he should receive a more substantial variance because his career offender
    predicate offenses were nonviolent drug crimes, nor in explaining the sentence imposed
    did the court address Ebron’s argument concerning his rehabilitation efforts.
    Even assuming, arguendo, that the sentencing court committed procedural error in
    failing to adequately consider Ebron’s arguments in mitigation, see United States v. Blue,
    
    877 F.3d 513
    , 521 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that this court will not “assume that a
    sentencing court truly considered a defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments or his individual
    characteristics when the record fails to make it patently obvious” (internal quotation
    marks omitted)), we conclude that any error was harmless, 
    Boulware, 604 F.3d at 839-40
    .
    A sentencing error is harmless if the sentence imposed “is not longer than that to which
    the defendant would otherwise be subject.” United States v. Martinovich, 
    810 F.3d 232
    ,
    243 (4th Cir. 2016) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    The district court commenced the sentencing hearing by summarizing Ebron’s
    extensive criminal history and noting that his 19 criminal history points placed him “very
    firmly in the highest Criminal History Category.” The court stated on the record that it
    had read Ebron’s sentencing memorandum and asked questions during defense counsel’s
    argument about Ebron’s rehabilitation efforts, specifically details regarding when, as a
    state prisoner, Ebron took a vocational course. During Ebron’s allocution, the court also
    engaged in dialogue with Ebron, countering Ebron’s argument that he faced a long
    sentence by opining that he had received lenient treatment at times in the state system.
    The court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) sentencing factors, observing that
    Ebron’s record demonstrated that he did not respect the law, was someone against whom
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    the public needed protection, and that he needed to be deterred from further criminal
    activity. Additionally, in pronouncing Ebron’s sentence, the court stated that his current
    offenses poisoned communities with crack and were very dangerous, which indicated that
    the court was not swayed by Ebron’s argument that a below-Guidelines sentence was
    warranted because his prior drug convictions that qualified as career offender predicates
    were nonviolent. On this record, we conclude that the district court would impose the
    same sentence even if the case were remanded for the court to address on the record
    Ebron’s arguments in mitigation.
    Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument
    because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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