United States v. Mark Haines , 497 F. App'x 266 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4387
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARK DANIEL HAINES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,
Chief District Judge. (3:11-cr-00019-JPB-DJJ-1)
Submitted: October 19, 2012 Decided: November 1, 2012
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Nicholas J. Compton, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kristen
M. Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
States Attorney, Paul T. Camilletti, Assistant United States
Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Mark Daniel Haines appeals his 225-month sentence
following a guilty plea to bank robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006). On appeal, Haines argues that: (1) the
district court erroneously rejected the parties’ first plea
agreement; (2) the district court erroneously denied Haines’
motion to continue sentencing and reassign the case to another
judge; and (3) the district court committed procedural error in
calculating Haines’ criminal history category and utilizing an
extended Guidelines table. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
We review the rejection of a guilty plea for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Midgett, 488 F.3d 288, 297 (4th
Cir. 2007). “[A] district court is not obliged to accept a
particular plea agreement between the government and an accused,
as it always has the authority to either accept or reject any
agreement.” United States v. Lewis, 633 F.3d 262, 270 (4th Cir.
2011). In the case of a binding agreement under Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11(c)(1)(C), a “court may accept the [plea] agreement, reject
it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the
presentence report.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(A).
On appeal, Haines asserts that the district court
abused its discretion in rejecting the first plea agreement
because the time lapse between the preparation and review of the
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presentence investigation report and the court’s decision to
reject the plea agreement was “unreasonably long and unfair.”
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in rejecting Haines’ initial plea agreement. If the court
chooses to reject a plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(5)
requires that the court, in open court, inform the parties that
the plea is being rejected, give the defendant an opportunity to
withdraw the plea, and advise the defendant that the case may be
disposed of less favorably than anticipated by the plea
agreement. Accordingly, although Haines claims that the
district court unreasonably delayed in informing the parties of
its decision to reject the plea agreement, the sentencing
hearing was the court’s first opportunity to address the parties
in open court, as required by Rule 11(c)(5) when rejecting a
plea agreement. The court fulfilled the requirements of Rule
11(c)(5), and allowed Haines to withdraw his plea.
A district court’s denial of a motion for continuance
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Midgett, 488 F.3d at
297. “[B]road discretion must be granted trial courts on
matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary
‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable
request for delay’ violates the right to assistance of counsel.”
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983). We conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
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Haines’ motion to continue sentencing and reassign the case to
another district court judge, as the case had been then pending
for more than one year and the court’s prior involvement with
the case was significant.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 47, 51 (2007). In determining the procedural reasonableness
of a sentence, this court considers whether the district court
properly calculated the Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines
as advisory, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors,
analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 51.
Haines preserved his claim of error “by drawing arguments from
§ 3553 for a sentence different than the one ultimately
imposed.” United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578 (4th Cir.
2010). Therefore, any error must lead to reversal, “unless we
conclude that the error was harmless.” Id. at 581.
We conclude that the district court did not
procedurally err in imposing a within-Guidelines sentence of 225
months’ imprisonment. Haines maintains that the district court
failed to resolve all of his objections to his criminal history
and impermissibly extrapolated the Guidelines in rejecting the
parties’ initial plea agreement. Although the court emphasized
Haines’ significant criminal history in rejecting the first plea
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agreement, indicating that Haines’ criminal history score would
yield a category XVI criminal history by extrapolating the
Guidelines, the court did not upwardly depart from the advisory
Guidelines range in imposing Haines’ ultimate sentence.
Moreover, Haines does not dispute the court’s conclusion that
resolution of his objections would not alter his criminal
history category of VI. Our careful review of the record thus
persuades us that the court properly calculated the advisory
Guidelines range, and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of
225 months’ imprisonment. Accordingly, the sentence was not
procedurally unreasonable.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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