United States v. Octavius Fryar , 500 F. App'x 206 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4371
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
OCTAVIUS FRYAR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (7:11-cr-00146-H-1)
Submitted: November 27, 2012 Decided: December 4, 2012
Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Octavius Fryar appeals the district court’s judgment
finding he violated his conditions of supervised release,
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to twenty-
four months in prison. Fryar argues only that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.
This court will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is within the prescribed
statutory range and is not plainly unreasonable. United States
v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-40 (4th Cir. 2006). While a
district court must consider the Chapter Seven policy
statements, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 7, Pt. B, and
the statutory requirements and factors applicable to revocation
sentences under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2012), the district court ultimately has broad discretion
to revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment
up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.
A supervised release revocation sentence is
procedurally reasonable if the district court considered the
Chapter 7 advisory policy statements and the § 3553(a) factors
it is permitted to consider in a supervised release revocation
case. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439-40.
And although the district court need not explain the reasons for
imposing a revocation sentence in as much detail as when it
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imposes an original sentence, it “still must provide a statement
of reasons for the sentence imposed.” United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). A revocation sentence is substantively
reasonable if the district court stated a proper basis for
concluding the defendant should receive the sentence imposed, up
to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if a
sentence is found procedurally or substantively unreasonable
will this court “then decide whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable.” Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted). We have reviewed
the record and have considered the parties’ arguments and
discern no sentencing error. We therefore conclude that Fryar’s
sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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