United States v. Jonathan Keesee , 498 F. App'x 297 ( 2012 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-5037
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JONATHAN WAYNE KEESEE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Virginia, at Abingdon.   James P. Jones, District
    Judge. (1:10-cr-00047-JPJ-PMS-1)
    Submitted:   June 11, 2012                 Decided:   December 5, 2012
    Before GREGORY, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Brian J. Beck,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Abingdon, Virginia, for
    Appellant.   Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Jean B.
    Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville,
    Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Jonathan Keesee appeals his convictions and 90-month-
    plus-one-day       sentence     imposed      following        his   guilty     plea     to
    offenses involving the manufacturing of methamphetamine.                           Keesee
    contends that the district court clearly erred in finding that
    his manufacturing of methamphetamine created a substantial risk
    of harm to the life of a minor and that his sentences for both
    manufacturing methamphetamine, 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) (2006), and
    manufacturing or attempting to manufacture methamphetamine in a
    manner that creates a substantial risk of harm to human life, 
    21 U.S.C. § 858
     (2006), violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.                           Keesee
    also contends that the district court abused its discretion in
    imposing its       sentence.          The   parties     were   directed       to   submit
    supplemental briefing regarding whether application of the risk
    of harm enhancement of USSG § 2D1.10(b)(1)(B), * in addition to
    the consecutive sentence imposed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 860a
    (2006), results in improper double counting.                   We affirm.
    Keesee      pled    guilty      to   four    of    five    counts      in   an
    indictment       that   charged       him   with     conspiracy       to    manufacture
    methamphetamine,        manufacture         of   methamphetamine,           creating     a
    substantial      risk   of     harm    to    human    life     while       manufacturing
    *
    U.S.    Sentencing      Guidelines         Manual,    §     2D1.10(b)(1)(B)
    (2010).
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    methamphetamine,              and        the        manufacture,             distribution,                 and
    possession         with           intent        to         manufacture             and         distribute
    methamphetamine on premises in which an individual under the age
    of 18 years was present and resided.
    At    sentencing,            Keesee          objected        to      the     recommended
    enhancement        to    his      sentence          under       USSG     § 2D1.10(b)(1)(B)                 for
    manufacturing           methamphetamine              in        a    manner         that        created      a
    substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor.                                           He asserted
    that    the   methamphetamine                 lab    was       small,     produced         only        eight
    grams of methamphetamine, and that the minor children who lived
    in   the   house        were      removed        during         the      gassing      phase       of       the
    manufacturing.               He   presented          the    testimony         of     a    chemist          who
    testified concerning the method of manufacturing used by Keesee,
    and opined that there was insufficient evidence to support a
    finding of a substantial risk of harm to the minors.
    After hearing evidence on the risk of harm issue, the
    court      determined             that     the       Government              had     proven           by     a
    preponderance           of    the    evidence,           that       the      “children,          that       is
    minors,     were    residents            of    the       home      and    present         in    the     home
    during the so-called cooking or cook process of the manufacture
    of     methamphetamine             at    the        time.”             The      court          found       the
    Government’s evidence more persuasive as to whether there was a
    substantial        risk       of     harm       to       the       minors,      and       applied          the
    enhancement.
    3
    The    court    rejected     Keesee’s     request      for   a   below-
    Guidelines sentence, finding that a within-Guidelines sentence
    reflected the seriousness of the offense and its consideration
    of the sentencing factors.              The court sentenced Keesee to 78
    months of imprisonment on the conspiracy and the manufacturing
    charges, and a consecutive sentence of 12 months and one day on
    the manufacturing while creating a substantial risk of harm to a
    minor charge, for a total sentence of 90 months and one day.
    Keesee first challenges the district court’s factual
    finding that his method of manufacturing methamphetamine created
    a substantial risk of harm to the life of a minor, warranting
    the increased offense level under USSG § 2D1.10(b)(1)(B).                        In
    determining       whether    this      enhancement    applies,       courts    may
    consider:       (1) the quantity of chemicals found at the lab and
    the manner of storage; (2) the manner in which the hazardous
    substances were disposed of and the likelihood of release into
    the environment; (3) the duration of the offense and the extent
    of the manufacturing; and (4) the location of the lab and how
    many   people     were   placed   at    substantial    risk   of    harm.     USSG
    § 2D1.10 cmt. n.1; United States v. Simpson, 
    334 F.3d 453
     (5th
    Cir. 2003).
    Keesee contends that the court failed to consider all
    the factors and that the Government’s evidence was inconsistent
    and insufficient to support the enhancement.              The district court
    4
    found    that    the     facts   presented      at    trial    indicated          that    the
    minors were residents of the home and were present during the
    cooking    process,       but    not    during       the    gassing       stage    of     the
    manufacture.       The court further credited the Government’s expert
    and found that there was a substantial risk of fire based on the
    manner     of     manufacturing         methamphetamine            used     by     Keesee.
    Addressing the factors to consider in determining the amount of
    risk,     the    court    focused      on   the      risk     of    fire     during       the
    manufacturing, and the location of the methamphetamine lab in
    the basement of the home, directly under the rooms in which the
    minor children slept.
    Keesee presented evidence that his one-pot method of
    cooking     methamphetamine          used   Coleman        fuel,     which       was     less
    flammable       than   the   other     three    starter      fluids       that    could    be
    used.     He also presented evidence that the use of less water
    decreased the hazardousness of the cooking process because, as
    the Government’s chemist testified, “the more water, typically
    the more reactive the lithium will be.”                      However, there was no
    evidence that Keesee actually used less water than was used in
    the Government’s experiments in which one of the twelve failed
    experiments resulted in fire when using Coleman fuel.                               As the
    district court noted, Keesee’s expert did not testify that there
    was not a substantial risk of harm; rather, he testified that he
    5
    could not state that there existed a substantial risk to human
    life based on Keesee’s manufacturing process.
    The Government presented evidence that in controlled
    experiments      conducted    by    the   Drug    Enforcement     Administration,
    Coleman fuel resulted in bottle failure upon the reaction of
    water    and    lithium,   which     then     caused     the   “contents   [of   the
    bottle], including the flammable Coleman fuel, to be ejected and
    igniting the surroundings.”           This testimony established that the
    methamphetamine manufacturing method used by Keesee created a
    risk of fire.       Further, although there was no actual fire during
    the two times that Keesee cooked methamphetamine, this does not
    mean that there was not a risk.                  See United States v. Bivens,
    129 Fed. App’x 159, 165 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The guidelines do not
    require the sentencing court to find that the . . . children
    were actually harmed by the . . . production of methamphetamine,
    . . . only that their lives were placed at substantial risk.”).
    As the district court stated, “the likelihood of substantial
    harm to minors who lived there through a fire occurring at the
    home would still exist even if it had not occurred in the past.”
    See United States v. Layne, 
    324 F.3d 464
    , 470-71 (6th Cir. 2003)
    (explaining that enhancement for substantial risk of harm to
    minors    was     “designed    to     address      the    inherent    dangers     of
    methamphetamine       manufacturing”).              We     conclude    that      the
    enhancement was supported by the evidence, and therefore not
    6
    clearly erroneous. See United States v. Carter, 
    601 F.3d 252
    ,
    254 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard).
    Keesee        next    argues     that       his     conviction           for     both
    manufacturing methamphetamine and manufacturing methamphetamine
    in   a   manner       that     creates    a    substantial             risk    to     human    life
    violates the Double Jeopardy Clause because the latter offense
    includes all of the elements of the former.                             He argues that the
    crime    of    manufacturing          methamphetamine             is    a     lesser     included
    offense       of    the     crime    of   manufacturing           methamphetamine              in   a
    manner that creates a substantial risk of harm to human life.
    The    Double        Jeopardy    Clause       of     the       Fifth     Amendment
    protects criminal defendants from repeated prosecutions for the
    same offense, Oregon v. Kennedy, 
    456 U.S. 667
    , 671 (1982), and
    from     multiple         punishments        for     the     same       offense.              United
    States v.          Martin,    
    523 F.3d 281
    ,    290       (4th       Cir.    2008).          A
    defendant may be convicted of two separate offenses arising from
    a    single    act     if     each    charge       requires       proof       of    a   fact    not
    essential to the other.                United States v. Dixon, 
    509 U.S. 688
    ,
    696 (1993).
    In Blockburger v. United States, 
    284 U.S. 299
    , 304
    (1932), the Supreme Court held that, “where the same act or
    transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
    provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there
    are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires
    7
    proof of a fact which the other does not.”                                   Albernaz v. United
    States,   
    450 U.S. 333
    ,         333    (1981).              Here,    the    manufacturing
    count,    
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1),               proscribes         the    manufacturing,
    distribution,         dispensing,              or        possession          with        intent     to
    manufacture, distribute or dispense a controlled substance.                                        
    Id.
    Section    858      penalizes        a    person             who,   “while     manufacturing         a
    controlled substance [ ] or attempting to do so, or transporting
    or causing to be transported materials, including chemicals, to
    do so, creates a substantial risk of harm to human life.”                                           
    21 U.S.C. § 858
    .
    Each of these statutes requires proof of an element
    that the other does not.                  Section 858 requires that the conduct
    “create[] a substantial risk of harm to human life.”                                        Section
    841 requires that the person actually manufacture, distribute,
    dispense,      or    possess        a    controlled             substance.          We    conclude,
    therefore, that the offenses are two separate crimes, and not a
    crime and a lesser included offense.                               See Albernaz, 
    450 U.S. at 333
    ; Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
    Moreover,       we       note   that           
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1),         the
    purported “lesser” offense, carries a greater penalty than the
    purportedly      “greater”          offense,            
    21 U.S.C. § 858
    .           Compare    
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A)-(C) (providing for maximum sentences of
    twenty    years      to    life         imprisonment,               depending       on    the     drug
    8
    quantity), with 
    21 U.S.C. § 858
     (providing a maximum sentence of
    ten years).
    Additionally,              §   858   applies     only       to    a    person     who,
    “while manufacturing a controlled substance in violation of this
    subchapter, or attempting to do so . . . creates a substantial
    risk of harm to human life” and provides for a sentence of up to
    ten years.           Because it is necessary to have violated another
    statute    in       “this    subchapter”         in    order      to     be       convicted    of
    violating       §     858,   we        conclude       that    Congress            intended    for
    additional and cumulative punishment for these two offenses, see
    Missouri v. Hunter, 
    459 U.S. 359
    , 367 (1983); Albernaz, 
    450 U.S. at 341
     (explaining that it is presumed that Congress legislates
    with an awareness of other statutes and an awareness of the
    Blockburger         rule),       and       therefore       find    no    Double        Jeopardy
    violation.
    Finally, Keesee also contends that the district court
    abused its discretion in sentencing him to a total term of 90
    months    and       one   day,    the      middle     of   the    applicable         Guidelines
    range, after stating that a sentence “at the lower end of th[e
    78 to 97 month] range” was appropriate.                                As to this issue,
    Keesee argues that the court failed to consider Application Note
    22 to USSG § 2D1.1, which requires the court, when imposing a
    consecutive sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 860a, to determine
    the “‘total punishment’ and divide the sentence on the judgment
    9
    form between the sentence attributable to the underlying drug
    conduct    and   the     sentence       attributable         to       21   U.S.C.    §    860a.”
    USSG § 2D1.1 cmt. n.22; see United States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
    , 459-60 (4th Cir. 2006).                      He contends that his sentence
    should be vacated and his case remanded for resentencing.
    We    review      a    sentence       under      a       deferential     abuse    of
    discretion standard.              Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51
    (2007).     This    court         may   presume       that       a    sentence     within    the
    properly calculated Guidelines range is reasonable.                                      Rita v.
    United    States,      
    551 U.S. 338
    ,    351     (2007).            Section       3553(a)
    provides    that,        in       addition      to     considering           the     standard
    sentencing factors, the court must consider the sentencing range
    for the offenses of conviction and also “any pertinent policy
    statement    issued      by       the   Sentencing        Commission.”              
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(4), (5).
    The district court found that a sentence within the
    calculated 78 to 97 month Guidelines range was appropriate in
    light of the seriousness of the offense, the dangerousness of
    manufacturing methamphetamine, and the need for deterrence.                                  The
    district court also acknowledged that it was required to impose
    a consecutive sentence for the § 860a charge.
    In imposing sentence, the court, in accordance with
    the   directive     in   Application           Note    22,       stated     that    the    total
    sentence was to be 90 months and one day.                             The court then broke
    10
    that sentence down into the 78-month term for the drug charge
    and     the     consecutive          12-month-plus-one-day             term     for    the
    endangerment offense.               Although the court had previously noted
    that a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range was
    appropriate,       the       government     argues      that   this    statement      might
    well have been in reference to the sentence for the underlying
    drug charges, for which the court sentenced Keesee at the bottom
    of the advisory Guideline range.                        In any event, the district
    court’s statement is, at best for Keesee’s position, ambiguous.
    Given     the     presumption         of     reasonableness          accorded    within-
    Guidelines       sentences       like      the    one    at    issue    here,   we    find
    Keesee’s reliance on an ambiguous phrase plucked from a full
    sentencing proceeding insufficient to warrant relief.
    After reviewing the supplemental briefs, we conclude
    that there was no reversible error in the application of both
    the risk of harm enhancement and the consecutive sentence under
    § 860a.         “The    Sentencing      Commission         plainly     understands     the
    concept of double counting, and expressly forbids it where it is
    not intended.”           United States v. Williams, 
    954 F.2d 204
    , 208
    (4th Cir. 1992).             Thus, it is presumed that “double counting is
    proper    where        not     expressly     prohibited        by     the   Guidelines.”
    United States v. Hampton, 
    628 F.3d 654
    , 664 (4th Cir. 2010).
    Applying        the    greatest        applicable        enhancement     for
    Keesee’s specific offense characteristics related to the drug
    11
    offenses results in an increase in Keesee’s offense level to
    level     30,     based     on     the        fact       that     his     manufacturing         of
    methamphetamine created a substantial risk of harm to the life
    of a minor.        USSG § 2D1.1(b)(10)(D).                     Nowhere do the Guidelines
    prohibit the application of the § 2D1.1(b)(10)(D) enhancement
    for risk of loss in combination with the consecutive sentence
    imposed pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 860a.
    Moreover,         the        consecutive            sentence      imposed        under
    § 860a    did     not     result       in     a   greater        sentence.          Rather,     as
    directed in Application Note 22, the court first determined the
    total     sentence      for      all     of       Keesee’s       convictions,         and     then
    divided that sentence between the drug charge (78 months) and
    the consecutive term under § 860a (12 months plus one day).                                    See
    USSG § 2D1.1 cmt. n.22; Green, 
    436 F.3d at 459-60
    .                                  We conclude
    that there was no plain error by the district court in applying
    both the risk of harm enhancement and the consecutive sentence.
    See     United    States      v.       Olano,          
    507 U.S. 725
    ,    732-37        (1993)
    (providing standard).
    Accordingly,            we      affirm           Keesee’s      convictions         and
    sentence.        We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions        are     adequately           presented       in   the     materials
    before    the     court    and     argument            would    not     aid   the    decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
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