United States v. Shawn Davis ( 2012 )


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  •                                             Filed:   December 6, 2012
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-4953
    (4:11-cr-00416-TLW-5)
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    SHAWN JERMAINE DAVIS, a/k/a Big Boy,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    O R D E R
    The Court amends its opinion filed October 2, 2012, as
    follows:
    On page 5, section IV, first paragraph, lines 3 and 4,
    -- the sentence “Counsel’s motion to withdraw is denied at this
    time” is deleted; and the name “Pratt” in the final line is
    corrected to read “Davis.”
    For the Court – By Direction
    /s/ Patricia S. Connor
    Clerk
    UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-4953
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    SHAWN JERMAINE DAVIS, a/k/a Big Boy,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Florence.   Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
    (4:11-cr-00416-TLW-5)
    Submitted:   September 17, 2012           Decided:   October 2, 2012
    Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    John M. Ervin, III, Darlington, South Carolina, for Appellant.
    Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States
    Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Shawn Jermaine Davis pled guilty in accordance with a
    written     plea        agreement           to    conspiracy        to      distribute        five
    kilograms or more of cocaine, 280 grams or more of cocaine base,
    fifty     kilograms       or      more       of    marijuana,         and    a     quantity      of
    methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     (2006).                                  He was
    sentenced to 264 months in prison.                             Davis now appeals.              His
    attorney     has    filed         a     brief      in       accordance      with     Anders      v.
    California,        
    386 U.S. 738
           (1967),      raising       two    issues      but
    concluding       that    there        are    no    meritorious         issues      for    appeal.
    Davis     has    filed        a    pro       se    supplemental          brief     raising       an
    additional issue.          We affirm.
    I
    In     the    Anders         brief,        counsel   questions         whether     the
    district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.                                 Our review of
    the     transcript       of       the     Rule         11   proceeding       discloses        full
    compliance with the Rule.                        Further, the record reflects that
    Davis’    plea     was    knowing        and      voluntary      and     that     there    was    a
    factual basis for the plea.                  We therefore affirm the conviction.
    II
    Counsel        next          questions          whether      the      sentence       is
    reasonable.          Davis’           advisory         Guidelines      range       was    262-327
    2
    months.             There     were    no    objections          to     the     presentence
    investigation           report,   which    the    court    adopted.          In    imposing
    sentence, the district court considered the Guidelines range,
    the 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a) (West Supp. 2011) factors, and the
    arguments of counsel. * Further, the court mentioned that: Davis’
    offense was both significant and serious; he had an extensive
    criminal          history,    including     several      drug        convictions     and    a
    conviction for a violent offense; he had served little time for
    his past offenses; and he had shown no respect for the law.
    Weighing in Davis’ favor was the fact that he had cooperated
    with the United States.
    We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
    abuse-of-discretion standard.                Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007).            This review requires consideration of both the
    procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence.                               
    Id.
    We     first       determine      whether     the     district         court      correctly
    calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range, considered
    the     applicable          § 3553(a)      factors,      analyzed        the      arguments
    presented          by   the    parties,     and     sufficiently         explained       the
    selected sentence.            United States v. Lynn, 
    592 F.3d 572
    , 575-76
    (4th       Cir.    2010).      With     respect     to    the    explanation        of     the
    sentence, the court “must place on the record an individualized
    *
    Davis declined allocution.
    3
    assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it.”
    United States v. Carter, 
    564 F.3d 325
    , 330 (4th Cir. 2009).                        If
    the sentence is free of procedural error, we then review the
    substantive reasonableness of the sentence.                     Lynn, 
    592 F.3d at 576
    .     This review requires us to consider the totality of the
    circumstances     and      to     decide         “whether     the      sentence   was
    reasonable—i.e.,        whether      the    [d]istrict        [j]udge    abused   his
    discretion in determining that the § 3553(a) factors supported”
    the selected sentence.          Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 56
    .
    We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in imposing the 264-month sentence.                      The court fully
    complied with the required procedures, properly calculating the
    Guidelines range, considering the arguments presented, providing
    an     individualized     assessment,          and   taking     into    account   the
    § 3553(a)    factors.          The    sentence,       which     falls    within   the
    Guidelines     range,     is     presumptively        reasonable,        see   United
    States v. Go, 
    517 F.3d 216
    , 218 (4th Cir. 2008), and Davis did
    not rebut this presumption.
    III
    In his pro se brief, Davis claims that his attorney
    was ineffective.         Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
    generally are not cognizable on direct appeal unless the record
    conclusively     establishes         counsel’s       “objectively       unreasonable
    4
    performance” and resulting prejudice.                           United States v. Benton,
    
    523 F.3d 424
    ,   435    (4th     Cir.       2008).           Rather,    to     allow   for
    adequate development of the record, a defendant ordinarily must
    bring an ineffectiveness claim in a 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 2255
     (West
    Supp. 2011) motion.           United States v. Baptiste, 
    596 F.3d 214
    ,
    216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010).             After reviewing the record, especially
    the transcript of sentencing, we conclude that ineffectiveness
    does    not    conclusively        appear       on        the    record.       We    therefore
    decline to address the merits of the claim.
    IV
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
    in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
    We therefore affirm Davis’ conviction and sentence.                                 This court
    requires that counsel inform Davis, in writing, of the right to
    petition      the   Supreme       Court    of       the    United     States    for    further
    review.       If Davis requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
    believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
    may     move     in    this        court        for        leave      to    withdraw        from
    representation.       Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
    was served on Davis.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions        are    adequately             presented    in   the      materials
    5
    before   the   court   and   argument   would   not   aid   the   decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
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