Patrice Tavernier v. Health Management Associates , 498 F. App'x 349 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1541
PATRICE L. TAVERNIER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
HEALTH MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES, INC.; CHESTER HMA, LLC,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Margaret B. Seymour, Chief
District Judge. (0:10-cv-01753-MBS)
Submitted: November 7, 2012 Decided: December 10, 2012
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lovic A. Brooks, III, BROOKS LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Jeffrey A. Lehrer, FORD & HARRISON
LLP, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Patrice Tavernier appeals the district court’s order
adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and entering
summary judgment in favor of Health Management Associates, Inc.,
(“HMA”) on Tavernier’s employment discrimination claims.
Although the district court disposed of several species of
discrimination claims raised by Tavernier, Tavernier challenges
only the entry of summary judgment on her claim that HMA’s
conduct violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-34 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012). We
affirm.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. United States v. Bergbauer, 602 F.3d 569, 574
(4th Cir. 2010). To withstand a summary judgment motion, the
nonmoving party must produce competent evidence sufficient to
reveal the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for
trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Thompson v. Potomac Elec.
Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). Neither
conclusory allegations, speculative scaffolding of one inference
upon another, nor the production of a “mere scintilla of
evidence” in support of a nonmovant’s case suffices to forestall
summary judgment. Id.; Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th
Cir. 1985). Instead, we will uphold the district court’s grant
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of summary judgment unless we find that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence
presented. See EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167,
174-75 (4th Cir. 2009).
The ADEA forbids an employer to take an adverse
employment action against an employee “because of” the
employee’s age. 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1); Hill v. Lockheed
Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 2004)
(en banc). A plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment suit
pursuant to the ADEA must prove that age was not merely a
motivating factor of the challenged adverse employment action
but was in fact its “but-for” cause. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). To do so, the plaintiff may
either present direct or circumstantial evidence of the
employer’s impermissible motivation or proceed under the
familiar burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). Gross, 557
U.S. at 175 n.2; Hill, 354 F.3d at 284.
Tavernier, who claims that HMA forced her to retire as
the CEO of a hospital because of her age, trains the bulk of her
appellate arguments upon the district court’s application of the
McDonnell Douglas scheme to her claims. See Hill, 354 F.3d at
285 (detailing the applicable framework). Despite Tavernier’s
assertions otherwise, we conclude that HMA articulated a
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legitimate, age-neutral reason for Tavernier’s separation from
HMA’s employ: namely, the desire of Tavernier’s supervisor to
fashion a symbiosis between Tavernier’s apparent retirement
plans and the hospital’s need for a change in leadership, due to
Tavernier’s poor performance as CEO.
The record likewise convinces us that the evidence,
even viewed in the light most favorable to Tavernier, fails to
demonstrate that HMA’s stated age-neutral rationale is
pretextual.1 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 177-78 (burden of proof on
plaintiff to show discrimination); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (burden on plaintiff to
show pretext). Contrary to Tavernier’s repeated assertions, the
fundamental issue in this appeal is not whether Tavernier
voluntarily accepted the retirement offer or actually wanted to
retire as early as she did. An employer is liable only for
discriminating on grounds that are improper, not for
differentiating for reasons that are mistaken. Holland v.
Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir. 2007). As a
result, “ultimately, it is the perception of the decisionmaker
1
Given our conclusion that Tavernier’s evidence clearly
failed to demonstrate that HMA’s conduct was pretextual for age
discrimination, we need not address the parties’ contentions
with respect to whether Tavernier established a prima facie case
of age discrimination.
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which is relevant.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted).
In our view, the record evidence permits only the
conclusion that Tavernier’s supervisor actually believed — even
if erroneously — that Tavernier was a poor performer and was a
good candidate for early retirement, and that Tavernier’s
supervisor acted on that belief. See Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d
369, 386 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 398 (2011);
DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998)
(“[I]t is not our province to decide whether the reason was
wise, fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was
the reason.”). Because there is nothing in the record to
suggest that HMA’s stated rationale for offering Tavernier a
strong financial incentive to accept an early retirement buyout
was false, Tavernier has failed to put into genuine issue
whether HMA’s motives for instigating her separation were
tinctured by age bias. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 177-78.2
Tavernier also contends that the district court erred
in failing to hold HMA to the burden of proof allocated to it
under 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (2006). We see no such error. In
2
Notwithstanding Tavernier’s heavy reliance upon Clark v.
Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217 (11th Cir. 1993), we note
that Tavernier’s circumstances are clearly distinguishable from
those at issue in Clark.
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particular, § 623(f) does not, as Tavernier supposes, impose a
burden of proof upon an employer to explain its action absent a
showing that the employer’s conduct was “otherwise prohibited”
by the ADEA. Id. Instead, § 623(f) is a limited affirmative
defense available to employers whose conduct is shown to be age-
differential. See EEOC v. Minn. Dep’t of Corrs., 648 F.3d 910,
913 (8th Cir. 2011). Contrary to Tavernier’s assertions, even
an involuntary early retirement is not necessarily a violation
of the ADEA; the statute prohibits employers’ actions — coercive
or otherwise — only when they are undertaken because of the
employee’s age. Gross, 557 U.S. at 180. In arguing that HMA
must meet the burden imposed by § 623(f) where her evidence has
failed to generate a genuine dispute over HMA’s motivations,
Tavernier is placing the cart well before the horse. See id.;
Abrahamson v. Bd. of Educ. of Wappingers Falls Cent. Sch. Dist.,
374 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2004); Stokes v. Westinghouse Savannah
River Co., 206 F.3d 420, 426 (4th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the material
before this court and argument will not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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