United States v. Irvin Catlett, Jr. , 498 F. App'x 352 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4331
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
IRVIN HANNIS CATLETT, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge.
(8:10-cr-00101-RWT-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2012 Decided: December 11, 2012
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Irvin Hannis Catlett, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Gregory Robert
Bockin, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland;
Frank Phillip Cihlar, Gregory Victor Davis, Mark Sterling
Determan, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A federal jury convicted Irvin Hannis Catlett, Jr., of
conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); ten counts of aiding in the
preparation of false tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(2) (2006); and corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the
administration of the internal revenue laws and aiding and
abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006), 26 U.S.C.
§ 7212(a) (2006). The district court sentenced Catlett to a
total of 210 months of imprisonment and he now appeals. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
Catlett argues that the district court erred in
denying his requests for continuances at various stages of the
trial. We review a district court’s denial of a continuance for
abuse of discretion. See United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d
724, 738-39 (4th Cir. 2006). However, “even if such an abuse is
found, the defendant must show that the error specifically
prejudiced [his] case in order to prevail.” Id. at 739(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Catlett’s requests.
Catlett also argues that the Government committed
prosecutorial misconduct by unfairly intimidating witnesses and
committing various other improper acts. To succeed on a claim
2
of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that the
government’s “conduct prejudicially affected his substantial
rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial.” United States v.
Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2002). “In reviewing a
claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we review the claim to
determine whether the conduct so infected the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the Government did
not commit misconduct.
Catlett next argues that the district court prejudiced
him by asking the potential jurors whether they had any strong
views of the tax laws during voir dire, and that the district
court was biased against him. As Catlett did not raise the voir
dire issue below, we review this argument for plain error. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
731-32 (1993). To meet this standard, Catlett must demonstrate
that there was error, that was plain, and that affected his
substantial rights. Id. Moreover, even if Catlett demonstrates
plain error occurred, this court will not exercise discretion to
correct the error “unless the error seriously affect[s] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). We have reviewed the record and the relevant legal
3
authorities and conclude that the district court did not commit
plain error in conducting voir dire. In addition, we conclude
that Catlett has failed to demonstrate that the district court
was biased against him. See United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d
658, 665 (4th Cir. 2003).
Catlett also argues that the district court erred in
refusing his proposed jury instruction on the definition of
reasonable doubt. However, the district court did not err as
“[i]t is well settled in this circuit that a district court
should not attempt to define the term ‘reasonable doubt’ in a
jury instruction absent a specific request for such a definition
from the jury.” United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1300
(4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Next, Catlett argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support the conspiracy conviction. We review a
district court’s decision to deny a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion
for a judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Smith,
451 F.3d 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2006). A defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden. United
States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). The
verdict of a jury must be sustained “if, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, the verdict is
supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Smith, 451 F.3d at 216(citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “evidence that a
4
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Furthermore, “[t]he jury, not the reviewing court,
weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any
conflicts in the evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reversal for
insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
In order to demonstrate conspiracy to defraud the
United States, the Government had to demonstrate “(1) the
existence of an agreement, (2) an overt act by one of the
conspirators in furtherance of the objectives, and (3) an intent
on the part of the conspirators to agree as well as to defraud
the United States.” United States v. Gosselin World Wide
Moving, 411 F.3d 502, 516 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). However, the Government is not
required to make this showing through direct evidence as “a
conspiracy may be proved wholly by circumstantial evidence,” and
therefore may be inferred from the circumstances presented at
trial. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 858 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc). Our review of the record leads us to conclude
5
that the Government presented overwhelming evidence of Catlett’s
guilt of the offenses of conviction.
Catlett also challenges the district court’s
calculations under the Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically,
Catlett contends that the district court erred in enhancing the
base offense level for obstruction of justice and in calculating
his criminal history category. In reviewing the district
court’s calculations under the Guidelines, we “review the
district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual
findings for clear error.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d
621, 626 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks, alteration,
and citation omitted). We will “find clear error only if, on
the entire evidence, we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 631(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)
§ 3C1.1 (2011), a district court applies a two-level enhancement
in offense level if the defendant attempted to obstruct or
impede the administration of justice with respect to the
prosecution of the offense of conviction and that conduct
related to the conviction or any relevant conduct. The
Guidelines specify that committing perjury constitutes such
conduct. See USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(B). In addition, in
calculating a defendant’s criminal history under the Guidelines,
6
a district court shall add three points for each prior sentence
of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month. USSG
§ 4A1.1(a). “A sentence imposed more than fifteen years prior
to the commencement of the instant offense is not counted unless
the defendant’s incarceration extended into this fifteen-year
period.” USSG § 4A1.1 cmt. n.1. Here, the district court
correctly enhanced Catlett’s offense level for obstruction of
justice and correctly calculated Catlett’s applicable criminal
history category under the Guidelines.
Catlett next argues that his conviction for corruptly
endeavoring to obstruct the administration of the internal
revenue laws is barred by the statute of limitations. As
Catlett failed to raise this issue before the district court, we
review this argument for plain error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at
731-32. “In order to prove a violation of 26 U.S.C.[]
§ 7212(a), the government must prove that the defendant:
1) corruptly; 2) endeavored; 3) to obstruct or impede the
administration of the Internal Revenue Code.” United States v.
Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The applicable statute of
limitations is six years, and commences on the date of the last
corrupt act. See id. at 236 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6531(6)
(2006)). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that the statute of limitations did not bar Catlett’s conviction
7
on this count. In addition, we have reviewed Catlett’s other
arguments and conclude that they lack merit.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. We further deny Catlett’s motions to vacate the
convictions and to reconsider our prior order denying his motion
to compel production of the record. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
8