United States v. Reginald Morton ( 2012 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4230
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    REGINALD DARWIN MORTON,     a/k/a   Jay,    a/k/a     Boogie,   a/k/a
    Jason, a/k/a Novacaine,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of Virginia, at Abingdon.   James P. Jones, District
    Judge. (1:08-cr-00024-JPJ-PMS-14)
    Submitted:   November 29, 2012             Decided:    December 17, 2012
    Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Helen Eckert Phillips, ALLEN, KOPET & ASSOCIATES, PLLC, Bristol,
    Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States
    Attorney,   Jennifer  R.   Bockhorst,  Assistant  United  States
    Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    A   federal     jury    convicted        Reginald    Darwin     Morton    of
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribute
    more than fifty grams of cocaine base (“crack”) and less than
    500 grams of cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     (2006).
    The district court initially sentenced Morton to 240 months of
    imprisonment.      On    appeal    from       the   judgment,     we    affirmed    the
    conviction,      but     vacated     the       sentence     and        remanded     for
    resentencing in light of United States v. Simmons, 
    649 F.3d 237
    (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).          On resentencing, the court sentenced
    Morton to 210 months of imprisonment, and he again appeals.                         For
    the reasons that follow, we affirm. *
    Morton first argues that the district court erred in
    failing to apply the Fair Sentencing Act (“FSA”) to determine
    the statutory penalties applicable to Morton.                     However, in his
    opening brief, Morton fails to properly raise this issue and has
    therefore forfeited appellate review.                 See Eriline Co. S.A. v.
    Johnson,   
    440 F.3d 648
    ,     653     n.7      (4th   Cir.    2006)    (finding
    conclusory single sentence in brief “insufficient to raise on
    *
    In addition to the arguments raised by appellate counsel,
    Morton filed a pro se supplemental brief raising additional
    issues. We have considered the issues raised in Morton’s pro se
    brief and conclude that they lack merit.
    2
    appeal     any     merits-based        challenge     to    the     district    court’s
    ruling”).
    Even were we to consider this issue, however, Morton
    is not entitled to relief.                 When considering whether preserved
    procedural sentencing errors require resentencing, we apply a
    harmless error standard.                 See United States v. Boulware, 
    604 F.3d 832
    , 838 (4th Cir. 2010).                    Accordingly, we may affirm a
    sentence despite such an error if the government demonstrates
    that the error “did not have a substantial and injurious effect
    or influence on the result and we can say with fair assurance
    that”    the     district      court’s    judgment   was    not    affected     by   the
    error.    
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
    Prior to the enactment of the FSA, a defendant who was
    held responsible for more than fifty grams of crack was subject
    to a term of imprisonment between ten years and life.                           See 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A) (2006).               Under the FSA, however, in order
    to be subject to a statutory mandatory minimum of ten years of
    imprisonment, a defendant must be found to have been responsible
    for 280 grams or more of crack.                 See 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 841
    (b)(1)(A)
    (West Supp. 2012).              If the defendant was responsible for less
    than     280     but    more    than     twenty-eight      grams    of    crack,      the
    applicable statutory penalties range from five to forty years of
    imprisonment.          See 
    21 U.S.C.A. § 841
    (b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2012).
    In   Dorsey      v.    United    States,    567    U.S.   ___,     
    132 S. Ct. 2321
    3
    (2012), the Supreme Court determined that the FSA applies to
    defendants who committed their offenses prior to the effective
    date of the Act, August 3, 2010, but who were sentenced after
    that date.
    Here, the jury determined that Morton was responsible
    for more than fifty grams of crack under the statute, and he was
    resentenced after August 3, 2010.                     Therefore, the applicable
    statutory       penalties        were    between   five      and    forty    years     of
    imprisonment.             At     the    resentencing       hearing,     however,      the
    district court erroneously stated that the statutory mandatory
    minimum was ten years of imprisonment.                     While this was error, we
    conclude that the Government has established that the error was
    harmless.
    Morton next argues on appeal that the district court
    erred in failing to distinguish between crack/cocaine base and
    powder cocaine in calculating the drug weight.                      As Morton failed
    to raise this argument before the district court, we decline to
    consider it on appeal.                 See Muth v. United States, 
    1 F.3d 246
    ,
    250 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[I]ssues raised for the first time on
    appeal generally will not be considered . . . [unless] refusal
    to consider the newly-raised issue would be plain error or would
    result    in    a   fundamental         miscarriage    of     justice.”).        In   any
    event, it is clear that the district court correctly applied the
    mandate     rule     in        concluding   that      it    could     not   on   remand
    4
    reconsider the drug weight for which Morton was responsible as
    Morton    failed      to    challenge       the        drug   weight       in    his     initial
    appeal.    See United States v. Susi, 
    674 F.3d 278
    , 283 (4th Cir.
    2012) (mandate rule forecloses litigation of issues decided by
    the district court but foregone on appeal or otherwise waived).
    Finally, Morton argues that the district court abused
    its     discretion          by     failing        to     adequately         consider         his
    post-sentencing rehabilitation on resentencing.                                 Again, Morton
    has    failed    to   preserve       this    argument         by    failing       to    properly
    raise it in his opening brief.                      See Johnson, 
    440 F.3d at
    653
    n.7.     Regardless, we conclude that the district court properly
    considered       Morton’s        arguments    related         to    his    post-sentencing
    conduct.              The        court       explicitly             discussed           Morton’s
    rehabilitation,         along       with     other        factors      that        the    court
    considered important, when sentencing Morton to the low end of
    the advisory Guidelines range to which the district court had
    already downwardly departed.
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
    court.     We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
    legal    contentions        are    adequately          presented      in    the        materials
    before    this    court      and    argument      would       not    aid    the    decisional
    process.
    AFFIRMED
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-4230

Judges: Wilkinson, Niemeyer, Duncan

Filed Date: 12/17/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/2/2024