United States v. Johnell Alston , 499 F. App'x 319 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4135
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHNELL MCRAE ALSTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. W. Earl Britt,
Senior District Judge. (4:11-cr-00029-BR-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2012 Decided: December 17, 2012
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Johnell McRae Alston appeals his 104-month sentence
imposed after he pled guilty without a plea agreement to one
count of distribution of fifty or more grams of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006). Alston asserts that
his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because he argues that
the district court: (1) did not address his arguments for a
downward variance; (2) did not explain its reasons for rejecting
his arguments for a variance; and (3) gave an invalid reason to
deny his request for a variant sentence. Alston also asserts
that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because he
argues that: (1) the district court erred when it described its
decision to sustain his objection to his Guidelines range
calculation as an “advantage” to Alston; (2) a long sentence
deprives his children of a father “who is resolved to
rehabilitate himself[;]” (3) he should get some credit for a
state sentence he served; and (4) the Fair Sentencing Act
(“FSA”) has not made crack cocaine offenses “truly fair.”
Finding no error, we affirm.
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
this court reviews a sentence for reasonableness. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step in this
review requires the court to ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error. United States v.
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Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008). Procedural errors
include “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing
to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence — including an explanation for any deviation
from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
“[I]f a party repeats on appeal a claim of procedural
sentencing error . . . which it has made before the district
court, we review for abuse of discretion” and will reverse
unless we conclude “that the error was harmless.” United States
v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). For instance, if
“an aggrieved party sufficiently alerts the district court of
its responsibility to render an individualized explanation” by
drawing arguments from § 3553 “for a sentence different than the
one ultimately imposed,” the party sufficiently “preserves its
claim.” Id. at 578. However, we review unpreserved non-
structural sentencing errors for plain error. Id. at 576-77.
If, and only if, this court finds the sentence
procedurally reasonable can it consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed. United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). We presume that a
sentence within the Guidelines range is reasonable. See United
States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010)
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(“[W]e may and do treat on appeal a district court’s decision to
impose a sentence within the Guidelines range as presumptively
reasonable.”).
We discern no procedural error in Alston’s 104-month
sentence. Admittedly, in giving its explanation for a sentence,
a district court “must place on the record an individualized
assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it.”
Carter, 564 F.3d at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).
However, the reasons given by the district court need not be
“couched in the precise language of § 3553(a)” so long as the
“reasons can be matched to a factor appropriate for
consideration . . . and [are] clearly tied [to the defendant’s]
particular situation.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
658 (4th Cir. 2007). Additionally, a district court need not
provide a “comprehensive, detailed opinion,” as long as it has
satisfied the appellate court that it “has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its]
own legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Engle,
592 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). We conclude that the
district court adequately addressed the arguments raised by
counsel in support of a variant sentence, and that its rationale
for the 104-month sentence was sufficient to allow for
meaningful appellate review.
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Having discerned no procedural error in Alston’s 104-
month sentence, the sentence is entitled to the presumption of
reasonableness. See Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d at 217. Although
Alston attempts to rebut this presumption by arguing that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable because application of
the FSA was not an “advantage[;]” his long sentence deprives his
children of a father “who is resolved to rehabilitate
himself[;]” he should get some credit for the state sentence he
served; and the FSA has not made crack cocaine offenses “truly
fair[,]” we conclude that Alston’s assertions are insufficient
to rebut the presumption of reasonableness afforded his within-
Guidelines sentence.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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