United States v. Susann Allen ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4637
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SUSANN ALLEN,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4664
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RACHEL WATSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District
Judge. (4:13-cr-00586-RBH-2; 4:13-cr-00586-RBH-1)
Submitted: August 31, 2015 Decided: September 16, 2015
Before DUNCAN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael A. Meetze, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Florence,
South Carolina; FitzLee H. McEachin, MCEACHIN & MCEACHIN,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellants. John C. Potterfield,
Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Susann Allen and Rachel Watson of
conspiracy to defraud the United States, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371 (2012), and multiple counts of aiding and assisting
in the preparation of false and fraudulent tax returns, in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (2012). The court sentenced
Appellants to 24 months’ imprisonment and ordered them to pay
$59,503 in restitution, jointly and severally. On appeal,
counsel have filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal but questioning whether: (1) the district court erred
by finding that Allen voluntarily gave incriminating statements
to Internal Revenue Service agents; (2) the district court erred
by denying Appellants’ motions for judgment of acquittal; and
(3) Appellants’ sentences are reasonable. Appellants were
advised of their right to file pro se supplemental briefs, but
they did not do so. We affirm.
I.
We review the factual findings underlying the district
court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and the
court’s legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Green, 740
F.3d 275, 277 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 207 (2014).
In so doing, “[w]e construe the evidence in the light most
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favorable to the government, as the prevailing party below.”
Id.
When considering the voluntariness of a defendant’s
statement, “we must determine whether the confession was
extracted by any sort of threats or violence, or obtained by any
direct or implied promises, however slight, or by the exertion
of any improper influence.” United States v. Byers, 649 F.3d
197, 215 (4th Cir. 2011) (brackets and internal quotation marks
omitted). “The proper inquiry is whether the defendant's will
has been overborne or h[er] capacity for self-determination
critically impaired.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In conducting this inquiry, we examine “the totality of the
circumstances, including the characteristics of the defendant,
the setting of the interview, and the details of the
interrogation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
After reviewing the transcript of the hearing conducted
pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), we conclude
that the district court properly found that Allen’s statements
during her interviews with the IRS agents were voluntary. The
court conducted an exceptionally thorough analysis of the
circumstances surrounding Allen’s interviews with the agents and
ultimately decided to credit the agents’ testimony over Allen’s.
The court’s factual findings based on this credibility
determination are entitled to the “highest degree of appellate
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deference.” United States v. Thompson, 554 F.3d 450, 452 (4th
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,
Allen’s statements were voluntary and admissible.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion
for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d
405, 419 (4th Cir. 2012). In assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we determine whether there is substantial evidence to
support the conviction when viewed in the light most favorable
to the government. Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. Thus, “[a] defendant bringing a sufficiency
challenge must overcome a heavy burden, and reversal for
insufficiency must be confined to cases where the prosecution’s
failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
To sustain a conviction of conspiracy to defraud the United
States under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the government must prove:
“(1) the existence of an agreement, (2) an overt act by one of
the conspirators in furtherance of the objectives, and
(3) intent to agree to defraud the United States.” United
States v. Winfield, 997 F.2d 1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993). “The
existence of a tacit or mutual understanding between
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conspirators is sufficient evidence of a conspiratorial
agreement” and “[p]roof of the agreement may be established by
circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Kingrea, 573 F.3d
186, 195 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To sustain a conviction under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), the
government must prove: “(1) the defendant aided, assisted, or
otherwise caused the preparation and presentation of a return;
[(2)] the return was fraudulent or false as to a material
matter; and (3) the act of the defendant was willful.” United
States v. Hayes, 322 F.3d 792, 797 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
After carefully reviewing the trial transcript, we conclude
that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellants’
convictions. The evidence established that Appellants had an
agreement to defraud the United States by completing income tax
returns falsely, thereby ensuring that their clients received
high refunds and establishing a loyal clientele. Moreover, the
testimony of Appellants’ clients proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellants are guilty, collectively, of 17 counts of
tax fraud. Allen’s confession only served to bolster her
culpability.
III.
We review a sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range[,] under a
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deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). This review requires
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. at 51. In determining
procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the district
court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Sentencing
Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for
an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012) factors, selected a sentence based on clearly erroneous
facts, or failed to explain sufficiently the selected sentence.
Id. at 49-51.
Only after determining that the sentence is procedurally
reasonable do we consider the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the
circumstances.” Id. at 51. “Any sentence that is within or
below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
[substantively] reasonable. Such a presumption can only be
rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United
States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
Our review of the sentencing transcript reveals no
procedural errors, and we conclude that Appellants have not met
their burden of rebutting the presumption that their within-
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Guidelines sentences are substantively reasonable. The district
court carefully considered the particular circumstances of
Appellants’ cases and determined that the seriousness of their
offenses and the need for just punishment and to promote respect
for the law outweighed any potential mitigating factors.
Furthermore, we discern no plain error in the court’s
restitution order.
IV.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in these cases and have found no meritorious grounds for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgments.
This court requires that counsel inform their clients, in
writing, of their right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If either requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on his client. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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