United States v. Mark Manuel ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4560
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARK SHANNON MANUEL,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 14-4561
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMES CHAPPELL DEW,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00479-CMC-2; 3:13-cr-00479-CMC-3)
Submitted: August 31, 2015 Decided: September 16, 2015
Before DUNCAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark Shannon Manuel, James Chappell Dew, Appellants Pro Se.
Tommie DeWayne Pearson, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Mark S. Manuel and James C. Dew were convicted by a jury of
eight counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1341
(2012), and were each sentenced to 120 months in prison.
Defendants raise several arguments on appeal, including
challenges to the district court’s decision to admit certain
evidence against Defendants; the district court’s interruption
during the Government’s direct examination of one of its
witnesses; and the district court’s failure to dismiss the mail
fraud charges against them after it granted Defendants’ motion
to dismiss a charge of uttering counterfeit government
obligations, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 514 (2012). We have
reviewed the record and have considered Defendants’ arguments
and find no reversible error by the district court.
For instance, we discern no reversible error in the
district court’s interruption of the Government’s examination of
one of its witnesses. Under Fed. R. Evid. 611, trial courts
have the authority to organize the mode and order of witnesses
in order to make effective procedures for determining the truth.
Moreover, trial judges have the right, and often the obligation,
to “interrupt the presentations of counsel in order to clarify
misunderstandings.” United States v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323, 332
(4th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus,
we find that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district
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court to ask clarifying questions and allow the witness to
return to the stand to clarify his testimony. See United States
v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 877 (4th Cir. 1970) (finding no
reversible error where the “obvious purpose of the [trial
court’s] questioning was to clear up a confusing factual
situation and the triers of fact (the jury in Cassiagnol’s case
. . .) were entitled to information necessary to a correct
determination of the facts[,]” and holding that “where the
evidence is in conflict it is proper for a judge to ask
questions designed to bring before the jury the facts and
circumstances pertinent to the alleged offense”).
We also discern no reversible error in the district court’s
jury instructions. In particular, although Defendants did not
request that the jury be instructed regarding the dismissal of
one of the counts with which they were charged, such an
instruction was not legally supported. In particular, the
counts of which Defendants were convicted required that the
Government prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendants:
“(1) devised or intended to devise a scheme to defraud and (2)
used the mail or wire communications in furtherance of the
scheme.” United States v. Wynn, 684 F.3d 473, 477 (4th Cir.
2012).
In contrast, the dismissed charge, which charged Defendants
with uttering counterfeit government obligations, required that
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the Government prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Defendants: (1) with intent to defraud; (2) passed uttered,
presented, offered, brokered, issued, sold, or attempted or
caused the same, or with like intent possessed within the United
States; (3) a false or fictitious instrument, document, or other
item appearing, representing, purporting, or contriving through
scheme or artifice to be an actual security or other financial
instrument issued under the authority of the United States. See
18 U.S.C. § 514 (2012). As separate and distinct elements were
required to prove the counts, there was no need for the trial
court to instruct the jury about the dismissed count.
We have reviewed Defendants’ arguments in their entirety
and find them to be meritless. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s judgments. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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