United States v. Maurice Echols ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4513
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MAURICE NAKIA ECHOLS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00205-TDS-1)
Submitted: January 9, 2013 Decided: February 4, 2013
Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis,
Senior Litigator, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Clifton T. Barrett,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maurice Nakia Echols appeals the criminal judgment
imposed following his guilty plea to interference with commerce
by robbery and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 1951(a) (2006), and carry and use, by brandishing, of a
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). On appeal, Echols
challenges only the district court’s restitution order, arguing
that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
request that the court stay the imposition of interest until his
release from prison. We affirm.
We review a criminal restitution award for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th
Cir. 2010). Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed
de novo. United States v. Weaver, 659 F.3d 353, 356 (4th Cir.
2011).
A criminal restitution order is designed “not to
punish the defendant, but to make the victim whole again by
restoring to him or her the value of the losses suffered as a
result of the defendant’s crime.” United States v. Newman, 659
F.3d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and
emphasis omitted), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1817 (2012); see S.
Rep. No. 104-179, at 12, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924,
925-26 (explaining, in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, that
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restitution is designed to “ensure that the wrongdoer is
required to the degree possible to restore the victim to his or
her prior state of well-being”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A court imposing restitution is required to order
payment “in the full amount of each victim’s losses as
determined by the court and without consideration of the
economic circumstances of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664(f)(1)(A) (2006). In fashioning the restitution schedule,
the court is to consider the defendant’s financial resources and
obligations and his projected earnings. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2)
(2006); see United States v. Leftwich, 628 F.3d 665, 668 (4th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 420 (4th Cir.
1994).
Payment of interest generally is mandatory on any
restitution greater than $2,500. See 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(1)
(2006). However,
[i]f the court determines that the defendant does not
have the ability to pay interest, the court may—
(A) waive the requirement for interest;
(B) limit the total of interest payable to a
specific dollar amount; or
(C) limit the length of the period during which
interest accrues.
18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3) (2006).
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Echols was subject to mandatory restitution pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1) (2006). However, Echols
requested that the court limit the interest imposed pursuant to
§ 3612(f)(3)(C). Echols argues on appeal that the court erred
in denying this request without first making factual findings
regarding his ability to pay interest.
We find Echols’s argument unavailing. Section
3612(f)(3) is written in permissive, not mandatory, language,
authorizing the court to deviate from the interest requirement
if it makes certain factual findings. However, the statute does
not require the court to make explicit factual findings, or to
reduce the interest accrual if those factual findings are made
in the defendant’s favor. Here, the court made general factual
findings regarding Echols’s ability to pay. It also explained
its rationale for refusing Echols’s request, indicating that it
believed the robbery victims would not be fully compensated for
their losses without accrued interest. We conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in making this
determination or in denying Echols’s request on this basis.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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