United States v. Thomas Wilson , 509 F. App'x 259 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4608
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
THOMAS LEROY WILSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:11-cr-02340-TLW-1)
Submitted: January 24, 2013 Decided: February 12, 2013
Before MOTZ, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker
Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas Leroy Wilson appeals his judgment and sentence
after pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute
cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(C) (2006), and possession of a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). Wilson’s attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
asserting, in his opinion, that there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal but raising the issues of whether the district court
complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 when accepting Wilson’s guilty
plea and whether the court committed procedural or substantive
error in sentencing him within his Guidelines range on count
one. Wilson has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising the
issue of whether police had “a right by law to search the car
that they found the gun and drugs in.” We affirm.
Wilson first raises the issue of whether the district
court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 when accepting his
guilty plea. Because Wilson did not challenge the Rule 11
proceedings in the district court, we review this issue for
plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Vonn,
535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002); United States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652,
657 (4th Cir. 2007). We have reviewed the record and conclude
that Wilson has not shown any plain error by the district court.
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Wilson also raises the issue of whether police had “a
right by law to search the car that they found the gun and drugs
in.” We have reviewed the record and conclude that Wilson has
waived the right to raise this issue. See United States v.
Bundy, 392 F.3d 641, 644 (4th Cir. 2004) (“When a defendant
pleads guilty, he waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the
proceedings conducted prior to entry of the plea”); see also
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal
defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact
guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not
thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation
of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the
guilty plea,” as “a guilty plea represents a break in the chain
of events which has preceded it in the criminal process”).
Finally, Wilson raises the issue of whether the
district court committed procedural or substantive error in
sentencing him within his Guidelines range on count one. We
review a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The
first step in this review requires us to ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error, such
as improperly calculating the Guidelines range, failing to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, or failing to
adequately explain the sentence. United States v. Carter, 564
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F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). If the sentence is procedurally
reasonable, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence imposed. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We presume that a
sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range
is substantively reasonable. United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d
278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012).
In sentencing, the district court should first
calculate the Guidelines range and give the parties an
opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem
appropriate. United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212,
216 (4th Cir. 2010). The district court should then consider
the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the
sentence requested by either party. Id. When rendering a
sentence, the district court must make and place on the record
an individualized assessment based on the particular facts of
the case. Carter, 564 F.3d at 328, 330.
In explaining the chosen sentence, the “sentencing
judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court
that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.”
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). While a
district court must consider the statutory factors and explain
its sentence, it need not discuss every factor on the record.
United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
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We have reviewed the record and conclude that Wilson’s
sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable, and the
district court did not err or abuse its discretion.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform his or her client, in
writing, of his or her right to petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for further review. If the client requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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