Cai Zheng v. Eric Holder, Jr. ( 2013 )


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  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-1801
    CAI YAN ZHENG; HANG LIN,
    Petitioners,
    v.
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals.
    Submitted:   January 15, 2013                Decided:   February 13, 2013
    Before MOTZ, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Gregory Marotta, LAW OFFICE OF RICHARD TARZIA, Belle Mead, New
    Jersey, for Petitioners.    Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General, Blair O’Connor, Assistant Director, Rachel
    Browning, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
    DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Cai Yan Zheng and Hang Lin, natives and citizens of
    the People’s Republic of China, petition for review of the Board
    of Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) order dismissing their appeal
    from the immigration judge’s order denying their applications
    for asylum and withholding of removal.                     We deny the petition for
    review.
    The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes
    the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee.                                 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)    (2006).          The    INA      defines    a     refugee    as    a     person
    unwilling or unable to return to her native country “because of
    persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
    race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
    group, or political opinion.”                  
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A) (2006).
    “Persecution      involves         the        infliction        or    threat     of     death,
    torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one
    of the enumerated grounds . . . .”                    Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 
    405 F.3d 171
    ,    177       (4th   Cir.   2005)        (internal        quotation   marks     and
    citations omitted).             An individual who has been forced to submit
    to an abortion or sterilization procedure is “deemed to have
    been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person
    who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to
    undergo   such       a    procedure      or    subject     to    persecution      for     such
    failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well
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    founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.”                               
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42) (2006).
    An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
    for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 
    455 F.3d 484
    , 486 (4th Cir.
    2006);      see    
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (a)         (2012),   and    can      establish
    refugee status based on past persecution in her native country
    on account of a protected ground.                          
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1)
    (2012). *      Without regard to past persecution, an alien can also
    establish         refugee     status    by    showing       a   well-founded         fear   of
    future persecution based on a protected ground.                                Ngarurih v.
    Ashcroft, 
    371 F.3d 182
    , 187 (4th Cir. 2004).                           The well-founded
    fear       standard      contains      both    a    subjective      and       an    objective
    component.              The   objective       element       requires      a    showing      of
    specific, concrete facts that would lead a reasonable person in
    like circumstances to fear persecution.                          Gandziami-Mickhou v.
    Gonzales, 
    445 F.3d 351
    , 353 (4th Cir. 2006).                              “The subjective
    component         can    be   met    through        the     presentation       of    candid,
    credible, and sincere testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of
    persecution . . . . [It] must have some basis in the reality of
    the circumstances and be validated with specific, concrete facts
    . . . and it cannot be mere irrational apprehension.”                               Qiao Hua
    *
    The Petitioners                 do    not     claim     they      suffered       past
    persecution.
    3
    Li,   
    405 F.3d at 176
         (internal        quotation       marks    and    citations
    omitted).
    A     determination        regarding         eligibility         for    asylum    or
    withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
    evidence on the record considered as a whole.                                 INS v. Elias-
    Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992).                          Administrative findings of
    fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
    compelled to decide to the contrary.                          
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B)
    (2006).         This        court    will    reverse          the    Board    only    if    “the
    evidence . . . presented was so compelling that no reasonable
    factfinder        could       fail     to        find        the     requisite       fear     of
    persecution.”          Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. at 483-84
    ; see Rusu v.
    INS, 
    296 F.3d 316
    , 325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).                                  When both the
    Board     and     the       immigration          judge       issue     decisions       in     an
    immigration       case,       this     Court         will     review     both       decisions.
    Kourouma v. Holder, 
    588 F.3d 234
    , 239-40 (4th Cir. 2009).
    An applicant’s credible testimony “may be sufficient
    to    sustain      [her]      burden        of       proof     without       corroboration.”
    Marynenka v. Holder, 
    592 F.3d 594
    , 601 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
    quotation       marks       omitted).                “However,       even     for     credible
    testimony, corroboration may be required when it is reasonable
    to expect such proof and there is no reasonable explanation for
    its absence.”          Chen Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 
    489 F.3d 182
    , 191-92
    (4th Cir. 2007).
    4
    “Regardless of [China’s] policy generally prohibiting
    the birth of additional children following the birth of a son,
    to be eligible for [asylum] relief the respondent must also meet
    her   burden     of   demonstrating        a   reasonable     possibility    that
    Chinese Government officials would enforce the family planning
    policy   against      her   through       means   constituting      persecution.”
    Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 
    25 I. & N. Dec. 209
    , 211 (B.I.A.
    2010), abrogated on other grounds, Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 
    677 F.3d 130
     (2d Cir. 2012).            The applicant must show that there is
    a government policy implicated by the births at issue, that the
    births in question are a violation of that policy and there is a
    reasonable possibility that government officials would enforce
    the   policy   against      the    petitioner     through   means    constituting
    persecution.     See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 138
    , 142-43
    (2d Cir. 2008).
    The     Board     and    the    immigration      judge   relied   upon
    reports issued by the State Department in support of the finding
    that the Petitioners did not show an objective well-founded fear
    of persecution.        There was no support in the reports for the
    conclusion that the Petitioners risk being forcibly sterilized
    because they had two children in the United States.                   While they
    may face a fine, there was no evidence to compel the conclusion
    that the fine would be so severe that it would be tantamount to
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    persecution.         We conclude that there was no error in relying
    upon the State Department’s reports.
    A State Department report on country conditions is
    highly probative evidence in a well-founded fear case.
    Reliance upon these reports makes sense because this
    inquiry is directly within the expertise of the
    Department of State. . . .
    Absent powerful contradictory evidence, the existence
    of a State Department report supporting the BIA’s
    judgment will generally suffice to uphold the Board’s
    decision.    Any other rule would invite courts to
    overturn the foreign affairs assessments of the
    executive branch.
    Gonahasa v. INS, 
    181 F.3d 538
    , 542-43 (4th Cir. 1999).                        The
    Board relies upon the State Department’s reports because “they
    are   based    on    the   collective   expertise   and   experience    of   the
    Department      of     State    which    has   diplomatic     and      consular
    representatives throughout the world.”              Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-
    Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 213.
    The Petitioners contend that neither the Board nor the
    immigration      judge     considered    the   documentary    evidence       they
    submitted.      In this instance, the immigration judge detailed the
    contents of the administrative record and then stated that all
    of the evidence was considered.             The Petitioners fail to point
    to any evidence that seriously undermines the State Department’s
    reports regarding the treatment of persons who return to China
    after giving birth to two children overseas.
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    We also conclude there was no error in the immigration
    judge’s and Board’s decision to give little weight to the more
    localized   evidence,     such   as     the    affidavits    from    friends     and
    family and the village committees’ responses to inquiries.                       The
    evidence was unnotarized and in some instances unsigned.                      Also,
    some of the evidence did not indicate that the Petitioners would
    be forcibly sterilized or heavily fined.                    While some of the
    evidence     described      instances          of   forced        abortions       or
    sterilizations, there was nothing that could be related to the
    Petitioners’ immediate situation.
    We also reject the Petitioners’ argument that their
    burden of proof was too high.                The State Department’s reports
    were highly probative evidence that went against their claims
    for asylum and withholding of removal.               The Petitioners failed
    to submit sufficient evidence that compels a different result.
    Because   substantial       evidence    supports      the   denial    of
    asylum and withholding of removal and the record does not compel
    a   different   result,    we    deny    the    petition    for     review.       We
    dispense    with   oral    argument      because     the     facts      and   legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    PETITION DENIED
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