United States v. John Taylor, Jr. ( 2018 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-6771
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN ARTHUR TAYLOR, JR., a/k/a Pumpkin, a/k/a P,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, Senior District Judge. (3:04-cr-00227-HEH-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2018 Decided: November 5, 2018
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Arthur Taylor, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John Arthur Taylor, Jr., appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for a
sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012). Taylor, who pleaded guilty to a
drug offense pursuant to a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, sought relief
under Amendment 782 to the Sentencing Guidelines. For the reasons that follow, we
vacate the court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
We review de novo the district court’s “ruling as to the scope of its legal authority
under § 3582(c)(2).” United States v. Mann, 709 F.3d 301, 304 (4th Cir. 2013).
“[Section] 3582(c)(2) authorizes a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the
defendant ‘has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range
that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.’” Hughes v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2018) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). “A sentence
imposed pursuant to a [Rule 11(c)(1)(C)] agreement is no exception to the general rule
that a defendant’s Guidelines range is both the starting point and a basis for his ultimate
sentence.” Id. at 1776. Thus, ordinarily, a sentence resulting from a Rule 11(c)(1)(C)
agreement is eligible for reduction under § 3582(c)(2). Id. A defendant is not entitled to
such relief, however, “[i]f the Guidelines range was not a relevant part of the analytic
framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the agreement” or if
the record “clear[ly] demonstrat[es] . . . that the court would have imposed the same
sentence regardless of the Guidelines.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
2
The district court determined that § 3582(c)(2) relief was unavailable because the
sentencing court 1 sentenced Taylor pursuant to the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, not
the Guidelines range. In reaching this conclusion, the district court applied the rule
established in United States v. Brown, 653 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2011), abrogated by
Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1775. The district court did not consider Hughes, which issued
shortly before the district court’s order and significantly expanded the circumstances in
which a defendant sentenced pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement may be
entitled to a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2).
Based on our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the sentencing court
eschewed the Guidelines range in favor of other sentencing factors, as in Koons v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 1783, 1789 (2018) (“Petitioners’ sentences were not ‘based on’
Guidelines ranges that the sentencing judge discarded in favor of mandatory minimums
and substantial-assistance factors.”). The court and the parties spent a significant portion
of the sentencing hearing discussing the Guidelines range, and the Government
highlighted that the parties’ recommended 240-month sentence fell within the Guidelines
range calculated by the Government. Although other factors may have been relevant, 2
the record does not clearly demonstrate that the Guidelines were irrelevant to the
1
Judge James R. Spencer presided over Taylor’s sentencing, but Senior Judge
Henry E. Hudson decided Taylor’s § 3582(c)(2) motion.
2
The Government also explained that it forwent a sentencing enhancement under
21 U.S.C. § 851 (2012), in order to avoid the mandatory 10-year term of supervision but
that § 851’s mandatory minimum prison sentence of 240 months informed the 240-month
sentence recommended by the parties.
3
sentencing court’s acceptance of the plea agreement or that the court would have imposed
the same sentence absent the Guidelines. See Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1776.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for further
proceedings. 3 We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
3
By this disposition, we determine only that Taylor is eligible for relief under
§ 3582(c)(2), not that he is entitled to such relief. We express no opinion on the latter
issue, leaving that for the district court to decide in the first instance.
4