Millis Stokes v. Commonwealth of Virginia DOC , 512 F. App'x 281 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2330
MILLIS STOKES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:10-cv-00370-REP-MHL)
Submitted: February 22, 2013 Decided: February 28, 2013
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Millis Stokes, Appellant Pro Se. Gregory Clayton Fleming,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Millis Stokes appeals the district court’s order
adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and granting
summary judgment to his former employer, the Commonwealth of
Virginia Department of Corrections (“VDOC”), on his civil action
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended
(“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2003 &
Supp. 2012). On appeal, Stokes challenges the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to VDOC on his claims under Title VII
for retaliation based on VDOC’s failure to rehire him. We
affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead
Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). To withstand a motion for summary judgment,
the non-moving party must produce competent evidence to reveal
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
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See Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th
Cir. 2002) (“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not
suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the non-moving party’s] case.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating
against any “applicants for employment . . . because [the
employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee] has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII. 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(a). Absent direct evidence of intentional
discrimination, claims under Title VII are analyzed under the
burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-07 (1973). To establish a
prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show
“(1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) adverse employment
action; and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and
the employment action.” Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d
187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010).
If a plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03. Once the employer comes forward with
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such a reason, “the burden reverts to the plaintiff to establish
that the employer’s non-discriminatory rationale is a pretext
for intentional discrimination.” Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank,
F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 258 (4th Cir. 2006). This “final pretext
inquiry merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court
that the plaintiff has been the victim of intentional
discrimination, which at all times remains with the plaintiff.”
Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 294
(4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted).
After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to VDOC. Assuming, as the district court did, that
Stokes made a prima facie showing of retaliation, he fails to
demonstrate that VDOC’s non-discriminatory reasons for refusing
to rehire him were a pretext for retaliation. Stokes challenges
VDOC’s procedure in processing his employment applications and
inquiring into his personnel record. Stokes fails to establish,
however, that VDOC based its refusal to rehire him on anything
other than the ineligibility notation present in his record.
Stokes also asserts on appeal that he has been eligible for
rehire since February 2003. The district court concluded that
Stokes failed to substantiate this claim with admissible
evidence. We find no basis to disturb this determination. We
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therefore conclude that Stokes has failed to demonstrate that
VDOC’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for declining to
rehire him were a pretext for retaliation.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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