Valinda Streater v. Matthew Wilson , 565 F. App'x 208 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2018
VALINDA STREATER, individually and as guardian ad litem for
minor other J.G.,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MATTHEW WILSON, in his Individual and Official Capacity as
an Officer of the Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Department,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
CITY OF CHARLOTTE,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:11-cv-00548-MOC-DSC)
Argued: March 20, 2014 Decided: April 7, 2014
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Agee and Judge Wynn joined.
ARGUED: Mark H. Newbold, Daniel Edward Peterson, OFFICE OF THE
CITY ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Fred
William DeVore, IV, DEVORE, ACTON & STAFFORD, P.A., Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: R. Harcourt Fulton,
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Fred W. DeVore, III, Derek P. Adler, DEVORE, ACTON &
STAFFORD, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:
Valinda Streater filed suit against Officer Matthew Wilson,
a Mecklenburg County Police Officer, on behalf of her minor son,
J.G., alleging that Officer Wilson violated J.G.’s Fourth
Amendment rights by employing lethal force to effectuate a
seizure. Officer Wilson filed this interlocutory appeal arguing
that the district court erred by denying his motion for judgment
as a matter of law on the ground of qualified immunity. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
The facts, set out in the light most favorable to Streater
as the non-moving party, follow. See Anderson v. G.D.C., Inc.,
281 F.3d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 2002).
On the evening of October 16, 2010, Officers Matthew Wilson
and Andrew Helms responded to a reported stabbing at Brandie
Glen Road in Charlotte, North Carolina. The officers identified
the victim, Valinda Streater, standing outside a friend’s home.
Streater, who had been stabbed in the arm and abdomen by her
boyfriend, testified that she told the officers her assailant
had already fled by car. Officer Helms transmitted this
information and Streater’s description of the assailant as a
male weighing approximately 240 pounds by hand-held radio to all
officers in the North Division, which includes Officer Wilson.
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Meanwhile, Officer Wilson spotted two people at a distance
of about fifty feet, one of whom was Streater’s son, J.G.,
weighing between 115 and 120 pounds, walking quickly toward the
scene. J.G. was carrying a kitchen knife that he picked up at
home after learning that his mother had been stabbed. Standing
between J.G. and the other officer and civilians, Officer Wilson
saw what appeared to be a knife and unholstered his gun. He
ordered J.G. to drop his knife three times. J.G. failed to
immediately comply and continued to approach.
J.G. stopped 31.9 feet away from Officer Wilson and dropped
the knife to his left. Thus when Officer Wilson again told him
to disarm, J.G. responded, “Didn’t you just see me drop the
knife?” Joint Appendix, J.A. 143. Streater, who was standing
several feet away, started shouting, “That’s my son, please
don’t shoot.” J.A. 119. Although Officer Helms heard her,
Officer Wilson testified that he continued to believe J.G. to be
a suspect in the stabbing who was armed, dangerous, and non-
compliant.
Based on his assessment, Officer Wilson fired a total of
four shots hitting J.G. twice. After the first two rounds,
Officer Wilson testified that he paused for two or three seconds
to reassess the situation before firing the third and fourth
shots, which he intended to be fatal.
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II.
Streater filed suit in Mecklenburg County Superior Court
against Officer Wilson in his individual capacity under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he violated J.G.’s Fourth Amendment
rights by employing deadly force to effectuate a seizure. 1 The
case proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of Streater’s
evidence, Officer Wilson filed a motion for judgment as a matter
of law on the ground of qualified immunity. 2 The district court
denied his motion but the jury failed to reach a verdict. After
the district court declared a mistrial, Officer Wilson filed a
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. He again argued
that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he employed
reasonable force under the totality of the circumstances.
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Streater,
the district court held that Officer Wilson was not entitled to
qualified immunity. It concluded that J.G.’s Fourth Amendment
right to be free from the use of deadly force when standing
1
Streater also filed various tort claims under state law
against Officer Wilson and state and federal claims against the
City of Charlotte that are not before us on appeal.
2
Streater argues on appeal that Officer Wilson’s delay in
asserting qualified immunity resulted in an abandonment of this
defense. Because we hold that Officer Wilson is not entitled to
qualified immunity here, we need not resolve any issues of
waiver. McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 87 (4th Cir. 2013).
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still and over thirty feet away from Officer Wilson was clearly
established, and that no jury could find that the use of force
was reasonable in these circumstances. This appeal followed.
III.
A.
We review a denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of
law de novo. Anderson v. G.D.C., Inc., 281 F.3d at 457. “We
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the
nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.”
Id. “Judgment as a matter of law is proper only if ‘there can
be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.’” Id.(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
(1986)).
In an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified
immunity, we have jurisdiction “‘to the extent that [an appeal]
turns on an issue of law,’” but we cannot “re-weigh the evidence
in the record to determine whether material factual disputes
preclude summary disposition.” Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 234
(4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530
(1985)(emphasis omitted)).
We confine our review therefore to the question of whether,
taking the facts in the light most favorable to Streater,
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Officer Wilson is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of
law.
B.
On appeal, Officer Wilson contends that he is entitled to
qualified immunity because his shooting of J.G. did not violate
the minor’s Fourth Amendment rights, and, in the alternative,
that J.G.’s right to be free from such force was not clearly
established. We disagree.
Qualified immunity shields government officials in their
individual capacities from civil liability “unless the § 1983
claim satisfies a two-prong test: (1) the allegations, if true,
substantiate a violation of a federal statutory or
constitutional right and (2) the right was ‘clearly established’
such that a reasonable person would have known his acts or
omissions violated that right.” Brockington v. Boykins, 637
F.3d 503, 506 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
“The burden of proof and persuasion with respect to a defense of
qualified immunity rests on the official asserting that
defense.” Meyers v. Baltimore Cnty., Md., 713 F.3d 723, 731
(4th Cir. 2013). We consider each prong in turn.
1.
“Whether an officer has used excessive force is judged by a
standard of objective reasonableness.” Clem v. Corbeau, 284
F.3d 543, 550 (4th Cir. 2002). The relevant question is
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“whether a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would
have concluded that a threat existed justifying the particular
use of force.” Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir.
1996).
It is undisputed here that Officer Wilson used a lethal
weapon with intent to kill. The “intrusiveness of a seizure by
means of deadly force is unmatched,” and a police officer may
only employ such force where he “has probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either
to the officer or to others.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,
9, 11 (1985). If an individual “poses no immediate threat to
the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from
failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly
force to do so.” Id. at 11. And, while the qualified immunity
doctrine accounts for mistakes police officers might make in the
line of duty, “the mistakes must be those of reasonable men,
acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of
probability.” Mazuz v. Maryland, 442 F.3d 217, 225 (4th Cir.
2006) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949)). We cannot agree with Officer Wilson that his decision
to employ lethal force to seize J.G. was a reasonable mistake.
Taking the facts and reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to Streater, we conclude that no reasonable
officer would have believed J.G. presented a threat of
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immediate, serious injury justifying the application of deadly
force. Significantly, we may separately consider non-continuous
uses of force during a single incident to determine if all were
constitutionally reasonable. See Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d
471, 481 (4th Cir. 2005). Even if we were to conclude,
therefore, that Officer Wilson could have reasonably perceived
J.G. to be a threat prior to firing his first two shots, we
cannot find that his third and fourth shots were justifiable as
a matter of law.
Officer Wilson himself admits that he had time to pause
after the first two shots for a brief period to reassess the
situation and decide whether further force was necessary under
the totality of the circumstances. Contrary to his contention
on appeal, therefore, we are not confronted here with the
“split-second judgments of a police officer to use deadly force
in a context of rapidly evolving circumstances, when inaction
could threaten the safety of the officers or others.” Milstead
v. Kibler, 243 F.3d 157, 165 (4th Cir. 2001). Nor do we risk
judging an officer’s conduct “with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)). At the point when
Officer Wilson chose to fire a third and then a fourth shot, he
knew or should have known that J.G. was over 30 feet away,
standing still, unarmed, complying with his orders, and making
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no attempt to escape. His mistaken belief that J.G. posed an
immediate threat of serious physical injury to himself or to
Officer Helms and civilians, who were even further away, was
objectively unreasonable. We hold therefore that Officer
Wilson’s resort to deadly force violated J.G.’s Fourth Amendment
rights. We must now determine whether J.G.’s right to be free
from excessive force under these facts was clearly established
at the time of the shooting.
2.
Whether a right was clearly established such that a
reasonable officer would have known that his actions were
unlawful must be analyzed “in light of the specific context of
the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Clem, 284 F.3d
at 549 (internal quotations and citations omitted). When making
this determination, we typically ask “whether a closely
analogous situation ha[s] been litigated and decided before the
events at issue, making the application of law to fact clear.”
Id. at 553. Further, in the rare case where the official’s
“conduct is so patently violative of the constitutional right
that reasonable officials would know without guidance from the
courts that the action was unconstitutional, closely analogous
pre-existing case law is not required to show that the law is
clearly established.” Id. at 553 (quoting Mendoza v. Block, 27
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F.3d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1994)). We have no troubling holding
that both standards are met here.
In Garner, the Supreme Court held under analogous
circumstances that it was clearly established that “[a] police
officer may not seize an unarmed nondangerous suspect by
shooting him dead.” 471 U.S. at 11. Similarly, by the time
Officer Wilson reassessed the objective facts on the evening of
October 16, 2010, and decided to take what he called a “kill
shot,” J.G. had disarmed, was neither approaching nor
threatening the officers or civilians, and based on the police
broadcast and Streater’s protests, was not a suspect in the
domestic assault. Moreover, even accepting Officer Wilson’s
argument that these facts are not directly analogous to Garner,
J.G.’s right to be free from the use of lethal force to
effectuate a seizure under the totality of the circumstances was
“manifestly included within more general applications of the
core [Fourth Amendment] principle[s].” Pritchett v. Alford, 973
F.2d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 1992). We hold therefore that Officer
Wilson violated J.G.’s clearly established Fourth Amendment
rights.
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IV.
Because we hold that Officer Wilson is not entitled to
qualified immunity as a matter of law, the district court’s
denial of his renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is
AFFIRMED.
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