Andrea Cannon v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Association , 509 F. App'x 251 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1778
ANDREA JACKSON CANNON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, and Affiliate, Wells
Fargo Insurance Corporation,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:12-
cv-00377-RWT)
Submitted: January 31, 2013 Decided: February 11, 2013
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Harry T. Spikes, Sr., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Russell
J. Pope, TREANOR POPE & HUGHES, P.A., Towson, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Andrea Jackson Cannon, a property owner in Fort
Washington, Maryland, brought a civil action against Wells Fargo
Bank, the servicer of her mortgage, alleging breach of contract
and related tort claims based on Wells Fargo’s procurement of
Lender Placed Insurance (LPI) on her property. The district
court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss Cannon’s amended
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Cannon appeals the district court’s order dismissing
her civil action. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion
to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Philips v. Pitt Cnty.
Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 179–80 (4th Cir. 2009), and note
that, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint’s
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level” and have “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007).
On appeal, Cannon complains that the district court
considered exhibits outside the pleadings and thereby improperly
converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district
court did not rely upon the challenged exhibits in reaching its
decision to grant the motion to dismiss.
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Cannon next argues that the district court erroneously
dismissed her tort claims. However, Cannon alleged no
extraordinary circumstances that would justify finding Wells
Fargo owed her a duty in tort beyond the written contract
between the parties. See Silver Hill Station Ltd. P’ship v.
HSA/Wexford Bancgroup, LLC, 158 F. Supp. 2d 631, 640 (D. Md.
2001); Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank of Md., 515 A.2d 756, 759
(Md. 1986). Moreover, Cannon failed to plead her claims of
fraud with the required particularity. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
9(b).
Cannon contends that the district court erred in
dismissing her breach of contract claim without considering that
the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing would require Wells
Fargo to seek competitive rates for LPI coverage. Cannon
further argues that Wells Fargo was required to provide her with
notice of its intent to obtain LPI coverage. Because the terms
of the Deed of Trust directly contradict Cannon’s arguments, we
conclude that her claims lack merit.
Finally, Cannon contests the district court’s
conclusion that the property at issue was commercial in nature
and outside the purview of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act.
However, Cannon offers no facts or argument in support of her
conclusory claim, and we therefore deem the issue to be waived.
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Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the
district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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